**Dems Bad DA**

Minimum Wage DA 5

Reps Win Updates 6

1NC 7

1NC Core 8

1NC Econ Impact 10

----Econ Turns Crime 12

1NC Poverty Impact 13

1NC Crime Impact 14

---Crime Turns Soft Power 15

2N – Links 16

2N – Econ 17

Econ XT 18

Econ Wall 19

2N – Poverty 21

Poverty XT + Wall 22

Poverty Weighing 25

A2 Squo Can’t Solve Poverty 27

2N – Crime 28

Crime XT + Wall 29

Crime Internal Link O/W 32

Taxes DA 34

1NC 35

2N Frontlines 38

UQ 39

CV Link 40

2N Redistribution Bad 41

2N Weighing 42

Small Biz Key 43

Econ Stuff 44

Frontlines 45

A2 Budget 46

Impacts 47

Turns Democracy 48

Turns Poverty/Inequality 49

Turns Heg 50

Turns Fossil Fuels/Warming 51

Nuclear Deterrence DA 52

1NC 53

1NC Shell 54

Extra Impacts 56

Nukes Turn Heg 58

Stable Heg Module 59

2N Add-Ons 61

2N Impact Calc – Deterrence 62

2N Impact Calc - Space Wep 64

2N Prolif Impact 65

2N I/L Wall 66

2N NoKo Module (A2 Turns) 67

A2 Arsenal Bad 69

Overview + Disads 70

----Small Arsenals DA [Miscalc] 71

----Fast Prolif DA [Miscalc] 73

----Secret Arsenals DA [Miscalc/Accidents] 75

----Early Warning DA [Miscalc] 77

----Civilian Controls [Miscalc] 78

----Terror 80

A2 TURNS 83

A2 Deterrence Failures 84

A2 Accidents 85

A2 Terror 86

A2 DEFENSE 88

A2 START = No Aggression 89

A2 Cuts Are Small 92

Misc Frontlines 94

A2 Obama Non-Uniques 95

Link XT – Dems Cut the Arsenal 96

A2 Kritik 97

Spending DA 98

1NC 99

CV Link 102

Link Wall 103

Linear Econ DAs 104

Welfare Bad DA 105

CV Link 106

1NC Dependency 107

1NC Productivity + Incentives 108

1NC Liberty 110

2NC Productivity 111

2N CV Links 113

Single Mothers Aid Bad 114

1NC 115

1NC Crime 🡪 Racism 117

General XT + Weighing 118

XT Marriage Incentives 119

XT Crime 🡪 Poverty 120

A2 They Voted for It 121

Poverty Impact 122

A2 Aff Advantages 123

A2 Dems Solve Warming 124

Compromise Turns 125

Climate Action Plan Turn 127

Keystone Ad WIP 128

A2 GOP Sucks 129

Random Shit 130

Notes on the file:

-Don’t read republicans will win if you plan on reading the warming turn

-Don’t read Minimum Wage with a linear Welfare Bad DA

-Minimum Wage DA – the employment XT is part of the

To do

Kersey XT and poverty XT cards are repeated – fix this and read the file through again

More cards for dems like min wage

2NC Incentives

2NC Dependency

brookie answers this DA – write blocks

New dems bad scenario – sanctions?

# General Stuff

Notes:

We wrote this file as our go-to disadvantage on the compulsory voting topic. The disad argued that if compulsory voting was passed, Democrats would win more elections which would be bad for several different reasons. One of the impacts was that democrats would raise the minimum wage, which conveniently ended up being the topic the following year.

My favorite impact was the Nuclear Deterrence scenario because the impact cards are amazing.

## Nuke War – Extinction

#### Nuclear war causes extinction

Starr 9 (Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict, October 2009, by Steven Starr Steven Starr is a Senior Scientist with Physicians for Social Responsibility, and the Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri. He has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the STAR (Strategic Arms Reduction) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology.

Despite a two-thirds reduction in global nuclear arsenals since 1986, new scientific research makes it clear that the environmental consequences of nuclear war can still end human history. A series of peer-reviewed studies, performed at several U.S. universities, predict the detonation of even a tiny fraction of the global nuclear arsenal within large urban centers will cause catastrophic disruptions of the global climate and massive destruction of the protective stratospheric ozone layer.

## Link Update

#### Democrats would make huge electoral gains under CV, comfortably winning the House and Senate.

Leon 13 [Fernanda L L de Leon. Assistant Professor. School of Economics. University of East Anglia. “Adding Ideology to the Equation: New Predictions for Election Results under Compulsory Voting.” No 44, University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series. April 15, 2013] AJ

Turning to the results, if the current voting population had the ideological prefer-ences of a compulsory electorate, Democrats would gain an average of 8.7 p[ercent] .p. to their vote shares and would win (i.e. obtain more than 50% of votes) in 68% (=44/64) of the compulsory elections, as opposed to 43.75% (=28/64) as predicted for voluntary elections. They actually won 48.4% (=31/64) of total races. The actual value and predictions for Democratsívote share in the 2000 and 2004 senatorial race are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. In Figure 1, I present the data sorted by predicted vote share for voluntary voting to ease the comparison with compulsory voting predictions. It shows (and more formal analysis conÖrms) that candidates with expected lower vote shares are the ones that benefit more from compulsory elections.15 These are mostly Democrats that run for elections in red states like Wyoming, Indiana, and Mississippi. It is possible that Democrats that self-select to run for election in "safe Republican" states are weaker than other Democrats (those in toss-up state, for example.) This Önding is also in line with the "Two-e§ect hypothesis" proposed by DeNardo (1980). According to this concept, higher turnout helps the minority party within an electorate, since this is the a¢ liation of "peripheral" voters (those who vote occasionally). The mechanism driving these results are that, under compulsory voting, peripheral voters or moderates become a larger fraction of the electorate. According to this paperís predictions, in the 2000 Wyoming election, the Democrat challenger, mine worker and Örst-time runner Mel Logan, would obtain 54.8% of total votes and beat the Republican incumbent Craig Thomas, a hard-core conservative according to On The Issuesís ratings.16 Figure 1 also shows that those with higher vote share are the ones who lose more votes under compulsory elections (but still would win the election). According to the model, the Democrat incumbent Ron Wyden would see his vote share decrease from 72.5% in CV to 64.4% in VV, but would still beat the Republican candidate Al King. There are still some cases in which the voting system would not make a di§erence in deciding the election outcome or candidatesívote share. One example is the 2000 New York election, a high-proÖle open race in which Hillary Clinton run against Rick Lazio and won the election.

# Minimum Wage DA

## 1NC

### 1NC Core

#### Republicans have a strong advantage in the 2014 elections

Bartash 10/8 [Jeffry Bartash. “Why House Republicans aren’t sweating the 2014 election.” Market Watch. October 8, 2013, 1:20 PM. <http://blogs.marketwatch.com/capitolreport/2013/10/08/why-house-republicans-arent-sweating-the-2014-election/>] AJ

The public fingers Republicans for most of the blame over the government shutdown, but that doesn’t mean the GOP faces grave danger of losing power in the House come the 2014 midterm elections. Two articles, one from the left-leaning New Republic and another from the right-leaning Weekly Standard, see slim to no chance that Democrats will capture the House in 2014. And by some accounts, Republicans face not-insurmountable odds of taking control of the Senate. Can it really be possible? The latest Washington Post poll, for example, shows that 70% of Americans disapprove of Republican tactics in the budget impasse. Yet as both the New Republic and Standard articles point out, Democrats face a number of tall hurdles to winning the House. First and foremost, they haven’t recruited enough good candidates to challenge the most susceptible Republicans, most of whom are entrenched incumbents with moderate voting records. [Second,] Americans also have notoriously short political memories. So the fiscal fights of 2013 are likely to have faded in the minds of most persuadable voters by November 2014 — unless the more dangerous stalemate over the debt ceiling triggers an economic calamity. Consider what happened in 1996. Voters only threw out three Republican House members just a mere nine months after an extended government shutdown for which conservatives were widely blamed. The GOP even won two Senate seats to extend its majority in that chamber. Another hurdle for Democrats is the once-a-decade redistricting process that took place in 2010. Republicans controlled more state governments than Democrats and they used their influence to solidify the GOP’s grip on the party’s more vulnerable districts. That helps explain why Republicans only lost eight seats in 2012 even though Democrats won 1.7 million more votes nationwide in congressional races. By far the biggest obstacle is history: mid-term elections heavily favor the party not in the White House. The opposition party has picked up seats in 24 of the 28 midterm elections since 1900, in many cases making big gains. Read Stuart Rothenberg on why the House is not in play right now. More crucially, the president’s party has never won control of the House after being in the minority ahead of the midterms. Put another way, Democrats are trying to do what’s never been done before. They need to win 17 seats to oust Republicans, but even in the four midterms when the president’s own party did well, the gains ranged from just five to 11 seats.

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#### *Compulsory voting means democrats control the House*

*Lexington 12 [“If America had compulsory voting, would Democrats win every election?” The Economist, Sep 28th 2012] AT*

*But here is the thing, I suggested to Mr Metcalfe. The poorest and least educated are overwhelmingly Democrats when asked, but—far from comprising Barack Obama’s base—they mostly do not vote (less than 40% of adult high-school drop-outs voted in 2008, for instance, and about 50% of the unemployed). America—a land that takes its liberties seriously—is unlikely to copy Belgium or Australia and adopt compulsory voting. But if it did, Mr Obama would romp home in November. Are you not in fact lucky that so many welfare recipients do not vote, I asked him? He did not agree.*

#### Democrat control of the house raises the minimum wage

Wrigley 13 [(Will, Political Editorial Intern at The Huffington Post) “House Republicans Unanimously Vote Down Minimum Wage Increase” The Huffington Post 3/15] AT

House Republicans voted unanimously against raising the federal minimum wage Friday. A proposal by Rep. George Miller (D-Calif.) to raise the federal minimum wage to $10.10 an hour over the next two years and increase the wage for tipped employees to 70 percent of the minimum wage was defeated, with every House Republican voting against the motion. On the Democratic side, six lawmakers voted against the measure, and 184 Democrats voted for it. Miller's proposal was more than a dollar higher than what President Barack Obama proposed during his State of the Union address in February. Obama said in his speech that Congress and the White House should work to "raise the federal minimum wage to $9 an hour." The proposal by Miller was offered as an amendment to the SKILLS Act, which Republicans in the House passed Friday afternoon, over strong Democratic opposition. According to the Washington Post, the act will eliminate or consolidate 35 federal programs and create a Workforce Investment Fund to help those searching for a job acquire the skills needed in the workforce. In his State of the Union, Obama said that he hoped to "cut through the maze of confusing training programs," but the White House said it opposes the House bill, the Post reports. House Democrats argued that the bill eliminates programs for veterans, the disabled, and other groups, and voted overwhelmingly against it. The bill now goes to the Senate. This is not the first time Miller has proposed legislation to raise the minimum wage. In July 2012, Miller and more than 100 House Democrats proposed a bill to raise the federal minimum wage to $9.80 an hour and peg it to inflation.

### 1NC Econ Impact

#### Minimum wage laws cause rampant unemployment and collapses the economy – this disproportionately affects the worst off – every credible study goes neg

Wilson 12 [(Mark, Principal at Applied Economic Strategies, 25 years of economic policy experience, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Employment Standards Administration at the U.S. Department of Labor, Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation specializing in workplace policy and tax issues) “The Negative Effects of Minimum Wage Laws” Policy Analysis, No. 701 June 21, 2012] AT

Despite the use of different models to understand the effects of minimum wages, all economists agree that businesses will make changes to adapt to the higher labor costs after a minimum wage increase. Empirical research seeks to determine what changes to variables such as employment and prices firms will make, and how large those changes will be. The higher costs will be passed on to someone in the long run; the only question is who. The important thing for policymakers to remember is that a decision to increase the minimum wage is not cost-free; someone has to pay for it. The main finding of economic theory and empirical research over the past 70 years is that minimum wage increases tend to reduce employment. The higher the minimum wage relative to competitive-market wage levels, the greater the employment loss that occurs. While minimum wages ostensibly aim to improve the economic well-being of the working poor, the disemployment effects of a minimum wages have been found to fall disproportionately on the least skilled and on the most disadvantaged individuals, including the disabled, youth, lower-skilled workers, immigrants, and ethnic minorities.16 Based on his studies, Nobel laureate economist Milton Friedman observed: “The real tragedy of minimum wage laws is that they are supported by well-meaning groups who want to reduce poverty. But the people who are hurt most by higher minimums are the most poverty stricken.”17 In a generally competitive labor market, employers bid for the most productive workers and the resulting wage distribution reflects the productivity of those workers. If the government imposes a minimum wage on the labor market, those workers whose productivity falls below the minimum wage will find few, if any, employment opportunities. The basic theory of competitive labor markets predicts that a minimum wage imposed above the market wage rate will reduce employment.18 Evidence of employment loss has been found since the earliest implementation of the minimum wage. The U.S. Department of Labor’s own assessment of the first 25-cent minimum wage in 1938 found that it resulted in job losses for 30,000 to 50,000 workers, or 7 The greatest adverse impact will generally occur in the poorer and lower-wage regions. In those regions, businesses have to take more dramatic steps to adjust to the higher costs. 10 to 13 percent of the 300,000 covered workers who previously earned below the new wage floor.19 It is important to note that the limited industries and occupations covered by the 1938 FLSA accounted for only about 20 percent of the 30 million private sector, nonfarm, nonsupervisory, production workers employed in 1938. And of the roughly 6 million workers potentially covered by the law, only about 5 percent earned an hourly rate below the new minimum.20 Following passage of the federal minimum wage in 1938, economists began to accumulate statistical evidence on the effects. Much of the research has indicated that increases in the minimum wage have adverse effects on the employment opportunities of low-skilled workers.21 And across the country, the greatest adverse impact will generally occur in the poorer and lower-wage regions. In those regions, more workers and businesses are affected by the mandated wage, and businesses have to take more dramatic steps to adjust to the higher costs. As an example, with the original 1938 imposition of the minimum wage, the lower-income U.S. territory of Puerto Rico was severely affected. An estimated 120,000 workers in Puerto Rico lost their jobs within the first year of implementation of the new 25-cent minimum wage, and the island’s unemployment rate soared to nearly 50 percent.22 Similar damaging effects were observed on American Samoa from minimum wage increases imposed between 2007 and 2009. Indeed, the effects were so pronounced on the island’s economy that President Obama signed into law a bill postponing the minimum wage increases scheduled for 2010 and 2011.23 Concern over the scheduled 2012 increase of $.50 compelled Governor Togiola Tulafono to testify before Congress: “We are watching our economy burn down. We know what to do to stop it. We need to bring the aggressive wage costs decreed by the Federal Government under control. . . . Our job market is being torched. Our businesses are being depressed. Our hope for growth has been driven away.”24 In 1977 ongoing debate about the minimum wage prompted Congress to create a Minimum Wage Study Commission to “help it resolve the many controversial issues that have surrounded the federal minimum wage and overtime requirement since their origin in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.”25 The commission published its report in May 1981, calling it “the most exhaustive inquiry ever undertaken into the issues surrounding the Act since its inception.”26 The landmark report included a wide variety of studies by a virtual ‘‘who’s who’’ of labor economists working in the United States at the time.27 A review of the economic literature amassed by the Commission by Charles Brown, Curtis Gilroy, and Andrew Kohen found that the “time-series studies typically find that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage reduces teenage employment by one to three percent.”28 This range subsequently came to be thought of as the consensus view of economists on the employment effects of the minimum wage. It is important to note that different academic studies on the minimum wage may examine different regions, industries, or types of workers. In each case, different effects may predominate. A federal minimum wage increase will impose a different impact on the fast-food restaurant industry than the defense contractor industry, and a different effect on lower-cost Alabama than higher-cost Manhattan. This is why scholarly reviews of many academic studies are important. In 2006 David Neumark and William Wascher published a comprehensive review of more than 100 minimum wage studies published since the 1990s.29 They found a wider range of estimates of the effects of the minimum wage on employment than the 1982 review by Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen. The 2006 review found that “although the wide range of estimates is striking, the oft-stated assertion that the new minimum wage research fails to support the traditional view that the minimum wage reduces the employment of low-wage workers is clearly incorrect. Indeed . . . the preponderance of the evidence points to disemployment effects.”38 Some employers will replace their lowest-skilled workers with somewhat higherskilled workers in response to increases in the minimum wage. Nearly two-thirds of the studies reviewed by Neumark and Wascher found a relatively consistent indication of negative employment effects of minimum wages, while only eight gave a relatively consistent indication of positive employment effects. Moreover, 85 percent of the most credible studies point to negative employment effects, and the studies that focused on the least-skilled groups most likely to be adversely affected by minimum wages, the evidence for disemployment effects were especially strong. In contrast, there are very few, if any, studies that provide convincing evidence of positive employment effects of minimum wages. These few studies often use a monopsony model to explain these positive effects. But as noted, most economists think such positive effects are special cases and not generally applicable because few low-wage employers are big enough to face an upward-sloping labor supply curve as the monopsony model assumes

#### The US economy is on the brink – minimum wage will push it over

Economic Times 8/2 [“US economy recovering from worst downturn: White House.” Aug 2, 2013, 09.40PM IST. Economic Times. <http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-08-02/news/41008276_1_unemployment-rate-lowest-level-alan-b-krueger>] AJ

WASHINGTON: The US economy is recovering from the worst downturn, the White House said today as the latest figures indicated that the unemployment rate has dropped to 7.4 per cent, the lowest level since December 2008. "While more work remains to be done, today's employment report provides further confirmation that the US economy is continuing to recover from the worst downturn since the Great Depression," Alan B Krueger , Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers to US President Barack Obama said. "It is critical that we remain focused on pursuing policies to speed job creation and expand the middle class, as we continue to dig our way out of the deep hole that was caused by the severe recession that began in December 2007," he said. The latest report from the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) indicates that the unemployment rate declined from 7.6 per cent to 7.4 per cent in July, reaching its lowest level since December 2008. The unemployment rate for African Americans fell from 13.7 per cent to 12.6 per cent, also its lowest level since December 2008. The unemployment rate for women fell from 7.3 per cent to 7.0 per cent, its lowest level since January 2009, and from 7.8 per cent to 7.7 per cent for men. The economy has now added private sector jobs for 41 consecutive months, and a total of 7.3 million jobs have been added over that period. So far this year, 1.4 million private sector jobs have been added. "With the recovery entering its fifth year, we need to build on the progress we have made so far and now is not the time for Washington to impose self-inflicted wounds. The across-the-board budget cuts known as the sequester continue[s] to be a drag on the economy now and in the future," Krueger said. "The Administration continues to urge Congress to replace the sequester with balanced deficit reduction, and promote the investments our economy needs to put more Americans back to work, such as by rebuilding our roads and bridges," he said.

#### Economic collapse causes extinction.

Bearden 2000 [(Thomas, Lt. Col in US Army) “The Unnecessary Energy Crisis”, Free Republic, June 24, p. online wyo-tjc]

History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China-whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States-attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.

### ----Econ Turns Crime

#### The best study proves unemployment causes crime but income inequality does not – the disads link to crime but the aff doesn’t

Doyle 99 [(et al, Joanne M. Doyle, James Madison University Associate Professor of Economics Program; Ehsan Ahmed professor and the head of the Economics Department in the College of Business at James Madison University; and Robert N. Horn, Professor of Economics at James Madison University) “The Effects of Labor Markets and Income Inequality on Crime: Evidence from Panel Data” Southern Economic Journal Vol. 65, No. 4 (Apr., 1999), pp. 717-738] AT

We estimate a model of property crime using a panel data set of the U.S. over the years 1984-1993. We focus on property crime under the assumption that property crime is more likely motivated by ﬁnancial gain and thus the beneﬁts and costs of property crime are more likely to be captured with economic variables than are the beneﬁts and costs of violent crime. For the purpose of comparison, we also present results from estimating the model for violent crime. The use of aggregate data, whether at the country, state, city, or police jurisdiction level, has been criticized since the model at hand is one of individual behavior. In spite of this criticism, such data have nevertheless been used in circumstances where individual data are not available. Given our focus on labor markets, income distribution, and demographics, we believe that aggregate data are well suited for our study since we can use a rich set of variables such as average market wages, sector-speciﬁc wages, unemployment rates, and income inequality measures. Furthermore, variables such as income inequality are not readily available at aggregation levels lower than the state level. Using panel data instead of a simple time series or cross-section allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity across states, which greatly reduces the likelihood of an omitted variable bias. We ﬁnd econometric evidence that partly supports Freeman’s arguments. In particular, we ﬁnd, not surprisingly, that the proportion of young males in the population has a signiﬁcant positive effect on property crime yet a signiﬁcant negative effect on violent crime. More importantly, we ﬁnd strong evidence that favorable labor market conditions have signiﬁcant negative effects on both property crime and violent crime. We measure labor market conditions using an expected wage that takes into account wages, unemployment compensation, and the unemployment rate. We further analyze labor market conditions by replacing the expected wage with a vector of sector-speciﬁc average wages. We ﬁnd that property crime is most responsive to wages in low-skilled sectors. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that, contrary to popular belief, income inequality has no independent effect on crime rates.

### 1NC Poverty Impact

#### Low minimum wage is key to solving poverty – it ensures low-skilled jobs that are crucial stepping stones out of poverty

Kersey 4 [(Paul, Bradley Visiting Fellow in Labor Policy at the Heritage Foundation) “The Economic Effects of the Minimum Wage” Testimony of Paul Kersey Bradley Visiting Fellow Before the House of Representatives; Small Business Committee; Subcommittee on Workforce, Empowerment, and Government Programs Regarding The Economic Effects of the Minimum Wage, May 3, 2004 – Accessed at Heritage] AT

In other words, the typical beneficiary of a minimum wage increase will not be a poor father or mother scrambling to keep a family fed, clothed, and housed. The recipients of the pay raises demanded under this proposal are at least as likely, if not more likely, to already be solid members of the middle class. For those low-wage earners who are members of poor families, we should not overstate the effects that an increase in the minimum wage will have. Our review of the Census data indicates that fewer than one-quarter of those affected by the proposed new minimum wage work full-time. There is no reason to believe that this percentage is higher for poor families. In fact, last year Heritage scholars Robert Rector and Rea Hederman looked at the average hours of work performed by adults in poor families, and found that a little more than one quarter, 27.8 percent, reported 2,000 hours or more. Two thousand hours would be equivalent to one parent working full-time year-round. Nearly as many families, 27.4 percent, reported no work at all. Median hours worked by adults in families with children were lower than 1,000 per year, or less than 20 hours a week.[2] Consequently, the value of a minimum wage increase for poor families is limited by the low amount of hours that parents in poor families actually tend to work. Increasing working hours would have a far greater benefit for these families, both immediately and in the long term than increasing the minimum wage. Although the minimum wage increase currently proposed may raise family income by as much as 30 percent in the short term, Rector and Hederman showed that increasing work hours to the equivalent of having one adult working full time nearly doubles the average income of these families, even after accounting for lost government benefits and increased taxes. Over the longer term, minimum-wage or near-minimum wage work can serve as a springboard to better jobs. Unskilled workers may gain new skills, or gain a record of reliability, that allows them to move on to better-paying positions. Low-wage earners frequently see their wages rise quickly: Researchers at two universities, Florida State and Miami of Ohio, found that full-time workers hired at the minimum wage received a median pay increase of 13 percent within their first year, which shows that low-wage employees are able to work through minimum wage jobs into better ones.[3] The schedule of increases currently under consideration, first to $5.90 then $6.65 an hour a year later, is not all that much greater than the pay raises that occur naturally. Simply finding full-time work, including jobs at or near the minimum wage, provides the poor with the means to escape poverty. Research by the Employment Policy Institute shows 47 percent of families living below the poverty line in 1997 managed to make it over the poverty line in 1998. The authors of that study concluded that "earnings from minimum wage work and the Earned Income Tax Credit both significantly reduced the number of working poor in the 1990s."[4] Artificially raising wages will cut off this difficult but direct path to greater prosperity for many poor families, and will delay the entry of other workers, including youth, into paid work by needlessly increasing the cost of unskilled labor. Employers will not be able to afford to hire as many unskilled workers, and will respond by cutting back services or replacing workers with machinery. Labor economists refer to the "elasticity" of demand for labor to describe the ratio of jobs gained or lost when wages change. Estimates of this "elasticity" vary, but the average estimate by labor economists is that for a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage, employment among those affected drops by 5 percent.[5] If the minimum wage is increased from $5.15 to $6.65 per hour, demand for unskilled labor could drop by as much as 15 percent in jobs that earn the minimum wage, resulting in the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs and making it more difficult for poor families to take this escape route out of poverty.

### 1NC Crime Impact

#### The minimum wage causes crime and unemployment – empirics prove

Beauchamp and Chan 13 [(Andrew, Assistant Professor in Department of Economics at Boston College; and Stacey, PhD in Economics, Research Assistant in Economics) “The Minimum Wage and Crime” Under review as of August 23, 2013] AT

Does crime respond to changes in the minimum wage? A growing body of empirical evidence indicates that increases in the minimum wage have a displacement effect on low-skilled workers. Economic reasoning provides the possibility that dis-employment may cause youth to substitute from legal work to crime. However, there is also the countervailing effect of a higher wage raising the opportunity cost of crime for those who remain employed. We use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 cohort to measure the effect of increases in the minimum wage on self-reported criminal activity and examine employment-crime substitution. Exploiting changes in state and federal minimum wage laws from 1997 to 2010, we find that workers who are affected by a change in the minimum wage are more likely to commit crime, become idle, and lose employment. Further, there is an increase of property theft among both unemployed and employed individuals, suggesting that reduced employment effects dominate any wage effects. These findings have implications for policy regarding both the low-wage labor market and efforts to deter criminal activity.

### ---Crime Turns Soft Power

#### Crime destroys US soft power

Freedman 13 [(Jonathan, contributor to the Guardian, New York Times, New York Review of Books, and BBC Radio 4's contemporary history series, columnist of the year in the What the Papers Say awards and won the David Watt prize for journalism) “Washington DC shootings: America's gun disease diminishes its soft power” The Guardian, 17 Sept] AT

If this isn't a matter of national security, what is? When 13 people end up dead at a US military base, that surely crosses the threshold – putting America's problem with guns into the category reserved for threats to the mortal safety of the nation. At its narrowest, Monday's massacre at the Washington navy yard is a national security issue because it involved hostile entry into what was meant to be a secure military facility. Plenty will now focus on how a man twice arrested in gun-related incidents was able to gain such easy access to the nerve centre of the US navy. There will be inquiries into the entry-pass system, use of contractors and the like. But that would be to miss the wider point. America's gun sickness – which has turned massacres of this kind into a fairly regular, rather than exceptionally rare occurrence – endangers the US not solely because it can lead military personnel to lose their lives, nor even because it can lead to the murder of schoolchildren, as it did at Sandy Hook elementary school last year, or the death of young movie-goers, as it did in Aurora, Colorado, also last year – dreadful though those losses are. The foreign policy experts who gather in the thinktanks and congressional offices not far from the navy yard often define national security to encompass anything that touches on America's standing in the world. That ranges from its ability to project military force across the globe to its attractiveness, its "soft power". For decades, this latter quality has been seen as one of the US's primary assets, central to its ability to lead and persuade other nations. But America's gun disease diminishes its soft power. It makes the country seem less like a model and more like a basket case, afflicted by a pathology other nations strive to avoid. When similar gun massacres have struck elsewhere – including in Britain – lawmakers have acted swiftly to tighten controls, watching as the gun crime statistics then fell. In the decade after the rules were toughened in Australia in 1996, for example, firearm-related homicides fell by 59%, while suicides involving guns fell by 65%. But the US stays stubbornly where it is, refusing to act. When President Obama last tried, following the deaths of 20 children and six staff at Sandy Hook at the end of 2012, his bill fell at the first senate hurdle. He had not proposed banning a single weapon or bullet – merely expanding the background checks required of someone wanting to buy a gun. But even that was too much. The national security pundits who worry how a US president is perceived when he is incapable of protecting the lives of innocent Syrians abroad should think how it looks when he is incapable of protecting the lives of innocent Americans at home. On guns, the US – so often the world leader in innovation and endeavour – is the laggard, stuck at the bottom of the global class. Bill Clinton perfectly distilled the essence of soft power when he said in 2008, "People the world over have always been more impressed by the power of our example than by the example of our power." He was right. But every time a disturbed or angry individual is able to vent his rage with an assault weapon, killing innocents with ease, the power of America's example fades a little more.

#### This outweighs the aff’s internal link –

#### Crime is a tangible statistic other countries can notice but the quality of a democracy is not – democracy can’t affect soft power if other countries aren’t even aware of how to judge it

#### Other countries often don’t have compulsory voting and face similar turnout problems, so they don’t see our low turnout as a problem, but high rates of gun violence are unique to the US.

## 2N – Links

### Dems Favor Min Wage

#### A majority of Democrats support an increase in minimum wage – even conservative dems overwhelmingly favor it

Gewurz 13 [Danielle Gewurz-Research Analyst at the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. “Sharp divisions in GOP base on raising the minimum wage”. Pew Research Center August 20, 2013.]NM

Democrats are far less divided internally. Fully 87% of higher income Democrats and Democratic leaners favor raising the minimum wage, as do 82% of those with lower incomes. And support for raising the minimum wage is nearly as extensive among conservative and moderate Democrats (83%) as among the party’s liberals (90%).

#### And, Republicans oppose the bill – they won’t back down

Gewurz 13 [Danielle Gewurz-Research Analyst at the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. “Sharp divisions in GOP base on raising the minimum wage”. Pew Research Center August 20, 2013.]NM

The proposal faces stiff opposition in Congress from Republicans, particularly in the House. After Obama called for raising the minimum wage in his State of the Union speech, House Speaker John Boehner said [the action would cost jobs](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IWhsBrMQToc) among lower-income workers (video from AP).

### Leon Reasons to Prefer

#### Leon’s methodology isolates causality by accounting for voter incentives and having the perfect control group, since it compares probabilities within the same election-year and country.

Leon 13 [Fernanda L L de Leon. Assistant Professor. School of Economics. University of East Anglia. “Adding Ideology to the Equation: New Predictions for Election Results under Compulsory Voting.” No 44, University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series. April 15, 2013] AJ

Studies based on a cross-country analysis and laboratory experiments examine how compulsory voting correlates with population and electorate characteristics. Gordon and Segura (1997) and Berggren (2001) Önd that citizens living in CV countries are more informed than individuals living in VV countries. The same pattern is observed in the laboratory (Seebauer and Grosser 2006),3 while studies based on an hypothetical compulsory voting scenario Önd no di§erence across voters in either system (Czesnik 2011).4 This paper looks at differences among voters exposed to VV and CV in the same country and election- year. Hence, I can better isolate confounders associated to country-election year di§erences to draw a causal inference. Also, this data presents an advantage with respect to the laboratory experimental one , since it is based on real-life incentives. I use the same data as in Leon and Rizzi (2012), in which we document in a regression discontinuity framework that exposure to a compulsory election (as opposed to a voluntary system) does not lead to an increase in political information among this population. In this paper, I focus only on the group of voters to document di§erences among electorates.

### A2 Hansford, Gomez, Krause

#### Your authors literally just draw a causal inference for the entire population based on RAINFALL LEVELS. If any evidence is bottom of the barrel, it’s that.

Leon 13 [Fernanda L L de Leon. Assistant Professor. School of Economics. University of East Anglia. “Adding Ideology to the Equation: New Predictions for Election Results under Compulsory Voting.” No 44, University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series. April 15, 2013] AJ

Gomez, Hansford and Krause (2007) and Hansford and Gomez (2010) explore weather conditions on Election Day to establish a causal relationship between voting participation and candidate choice. They find that bad weather leads to less voting participation and helps republicans gain votes. Hansford and Gomez (2010) use an IV approach, explaining US presidential candidatesívote share with county turnout, that is instrumented by Election Day rainfall. They predict that a 4% change in turnout leads to a change in Democratsívote share at the national level of just less than one percentage point. Although very persuasive, these estimates represent local average treatment average effects on individuals who react to the instrument (weather condition) in turning out to vote (Imbens and Angrist, 1994.) It is di¢ cult to extrapolate this causal effect for the whole population of non-voters and use these estimates to guess election results under compulsory voting (Angrist and Pischke 2009).

## 2N – Econ

### Econ XT

#### Extend Wilson 12 – minimum wage laws increase the cost of unskilled labor which puts pressure on businesses – that causes businesses to collapse or to offset the costs by hiring less, causing massive unemployment disproportionately among the poor. This is verified by basic economic theory and every credible study in the past 70 years. There are two effects – the worst-off are denied employment opportunities, and the economy collapses, verified by the effect of a minimum wage raise in the American Samoa.

Stop here if there are no turns

#### Weighing for the Wilson card----

#### This evidence indicates there is a huge consensus that goes neg – every credible study has found minimum wage laws increased unemployment – Consensus is the strongest indicator of good evidence – high schoolers can’t do as good evidence comparison in 45 minutes than professional scholars do in years – you should default to the evidence comparison done by the scholars, which is characterized by consensus since scholars can choose sides – this is meta-level comparison about what kinds of evidence comparison to prefer

#### there’s empirical evidence that goes both ways but the basic economic principles go neg since higher labor costs means less labor – if empirics defy the laws of economics it’s an indicator your empirics are wrong since those laws have governed economic behavior since the start of history and they are assumed by all economic models

### Econ Wall

#### Next, the fact that crime has a net increase as a result of minimum wage laws prove the unemployment from minimum wage laws outweigh the effect of higher wages – this is comparative evidence

Beauchamp and Chan 13 [(Andrew, Assistant Professor in Department of Economics at Boston College; and Stacey, PhD in Economics, Research Assistant in Economics) “The Minimum Wage and Crime” Under review as of August 23, 2013] AT

Does crime respond to changes in the minimum wage? A growing body of empirical evidence indicates that increases in the minimum wage have a displacement effect on low-skilled workers. Economic reasoning provides the possibility that dis-employment may cause youth to substitute from legal work to crime. However, there is also the countervailing effect of a higher wage raising the opportunity cost of crime for those who remain employed. We use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 cohort to measure the effect of increases in the minimum wage on self-reported criminal activity and examine employment-crime substitution. Exploiting changes in state and federal minimum wage laws from 1997 to 2010, we find that workers who are affected by a change in the minimum wage are more likely to commit crime, become idle, and lose employment. Further, there is an increase of property theft among both unemployed and employed individuals, suggesting that reduced employment effects dominate any wage effects. These findings have implications for policy regarding both the low-wage labor market and efforts to deter criminal activity.

#### Unemployment has the strongest internal link to the economy – this will outweigh their turns

Lazzaro 12 [(Joseph, U.S. Editor of IB Times, Managing Editor of financial news web sites Wall Street Europe and Wall Street Italia, Economics Editor for AOL’s Daily Finance) “Five Social Conditions That Could Collapse The U.S. Economic System” International Business Times March 30 2012] AT

Globalization -- basically, free markets, international trade, and the transfer of jobs to lower-labor-cost production centers -- is a system that has made almost all U.S-based multinational corporations (MNCs) massively profitable and successful. U.S. corporations are sitting on $2 trillion in cash -- in cash alone(!) -- but globalization and the enormous structural changes accompanying it has also led to four of the five problems that, if not addressed, could undermine the U.S. economic system itself. Below is a summary of each condition, from least to most capable, of triggering a collapse of the U.S. economic system: 5) Poverty / Increase In No-Stake Citizens. Poverty, a large and generations-long underclass, massive income disparity between the Caucasian and nonwhite population groups, inadequate job training, and a band-aid social-welfare state, have created a social condition in which roughly 40 percent of the electorate currently has no stake in the U.S. economic system, corporate capitalism. For these citizens, the work environment is a place that exploits them and abuses them -- treats them as mere production beings, even as it undervalues their labor, and society is a place that marginalizes them. They have been alienated by corporate capitalism. For them, corporate capitalism is not a blessing, it's the curse. As such, they would have no qualms with seeing the downfall of corporate capitalism -- and its supporting institutions -- and its replacement by an economic system that treats them with dignity, that pays them a living wage, and whose means of production serve the societal interest, not the interests of the uber-rich and upper-income groups. For many in this group, that economic system is democratic socialism. Further, if the enormous social problems listed above increase and an educated, organized interest group/coalition marshals these citizens into an effective, potent political force, they could put unprecedented pressure on U.S. institutions, including massive social unrest. A period of social chaos (or worse) could ensue, bringing the U.S. economy to a virtual standstill, including disruption of the energy supply and food delivery. New York University Economics Professor Nouriel Dr. Doom Roubini, who accurately predicted the bursting of the housing bubble and financial crisis four years ago, said last August that unless public officials invest in a new, smarter social safety net to restore a balance between the free market and public goods, the kind of social unrest seen in the Arab world, Greece, and the United Kingdom would hit other advanced economies and emerging markets. Is the Occupy Wall Street protest movement seeking economic and fiscal reform the start of this social unrest? 4) Aging Population. The baby boom generation, born between 1946 and 1964, the largest demographic group in the United States, is starting to retire, and, historically, as adults age, they buy fewer consumer goods and more health-care services. This will have a double-dose contraction impact on the U.S. economy, regardless of whether the U.S. health-care reform law mandating universal coverage is struck down or upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. Consumer spending, which accounts for about two-thirds of U.S. gross domestic product, will struggle to grow as the boomers continue to retire, weighing on GDP growth. At the same time, entitlement spending -- especially for Medicare -- will take up a larger portion of federal spending -- diverting resources that could be used for other public goods and needs: child education, infrastructure rebuilding/development, and research and technology. The net result would be a U.S. economy that both grows too slowly to provide enough jobs and one that doesn't have enough federal revenue to meet social safety net needs. Further the U.S. Health Care Reform Act will slow Medicare spending growth, but it probably will not eliminate it. Further, faced with a smaller pie, pressures could build to divvy-up the pie better, including efforts aimed at: 1) achieving federal ownership of natural resources (oil, natural gas, electric); 2) creating a revenue-sharing arrangement between multinational corporations and society; and 3) achieving democratic, public stewardship of the economy -- an economy whose major decisions are determined by the people, democratically, not by corporate boards of directors. 3) Outsourcing. Globalization has substantially increased outsourcing. If emerging markets, and in particular, China and India, continue to trigger the transfer of jobs out of higher labor-cost production centers such as the United States, the U.S. could see unacceptably high levels of unemployment linger for even longer than current projections of 7 percent unemployment through at least 2014. Also, if outsourcing continues at its current pace, job growth could remain inadequate. 2) Frugal Consumers. With wages and median incomes stagnant in many job segments, Americans have adopted a new stance (for them): dramatically cutting discretionary and needless spending and increasing saving. The trend is so cross-cutting that it's led to a downsizing in the retail and restaurant sectors. To gauge the extent of the frugal consumer trend, visit a local shopping plaza and/or indoor shopping mall. Note the store vacancies. To be sure, a savings rate at or near 5-7 percent per year is a good thing for a nation in terms of capital formation. The problem is, if it rises above that level and too many people save too much for decades, it will act as a brake on GDP growth. Moreover, so far during the financial crisis era, it looks like the frugal consumer trend is a long-term decision by Americans to consume less, not a short-term fad. Another frugal consumer trend downside is that the U.S. economy is predicated on consumers spending a lot: Such a pronounced, long-term frugality trend would, again, weigh on job growth, increasing social support costs, and accompanying social/economic problems. 1) Wage Stagnation / Unemployment. Of all the factors, or threats to corporate capitalism -- the U.S.'s economic system -- this is the greatest. Simply, the whole point of the U.S. economic system is: 1) profits and 2) jobs. It's the reason Americans tolerate its harshness -- the reason Americans work so hard, don't have a national law guaranteeing six-weeks of paid vacation like their brothers and sisters in France, the reason you don't have an adequate public pension system like Germany, or other social supports for health care and education found in social-welfare-system-adequate Western Europe. However, if you take either profits or jobs away, the U.S. economic system, corporate capitalism, experiences stress. Take them both away, and a systemic crisis occurs. No one knows how the American system of corporate capitalism will respond this time to a crisis -- an era of unprecedented wealth, material abundance, opulence, conspicuous consumption and technological advance, amid enormous income inequality, poverty and dislocation -- if the unemployment rate doesn't return to normal, low-joblessness levels. At The Sign-Post Up Ahead ... Poverty. An increase in no-stake citizens. An aging population. Outsourcing. Frugal consumers. Wage stagnation. Unemployment. Each, to varying degrees, poses a threat to the U.S. economic system. The good news is ... one solution can address all of these problems/threats: massive job growth -- which is why public officials and corporate CEOs need to find ways -- both public and private -- to keep job growth -- which has averaged about 200,000 new jobs per month over the past three months -- trending higher, to 300,000 new jobs per month. In short, to avert a crisis the U.S. needs to create a job for every person seeking work.

## 2N – Poverty

### Poverty XT + Wall

#### Extend Kersey 4 – the minimum wage forces businesses to compensate for higher labor costs by cutting out low-skilled jobs – these aren’t dead-end jobs, they’re crucial stepping stones out of poverty and removing these jobs locks them in a permanent status of poverty.

#### Now on the turns – here’s an overview----

#### 1. This evidence comes first – it denies the assumption by their evidence that poor families rely on minimum-wage jobs to feed their families. Kersey cites empirical evidence that proves the jobs are only a stepping stone to other employment opportunities. And here’s more evidence – minimum-wage jobs are held by young people who need the jobs as a transition to other jobs, not to feed their families

Wilson 12 [(Mark, Principal at Applied Economic Strategies, 25 years of economic policy experience, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Employment Standards Administration at the U.S. Department of Labor, Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation specializing in workplace policy and tax issues) “The Negative Effects of Minimum Wage Laws” Policy Analysis, No. 701 June 21, 2012] AT

Only 20.8 percent of all minimum wage workers are family heads or spouses working full time, 30.8 percent were children, and 32.2 percent are young Americans enrolled in school.13 The popular belief that minimum wage workers are poor adults (25 years old or older), working full time and trying to raise a family is largely untrue. Just 4.7 percent match that description.14 Indeed, many minimum wage workers live in families with incomes well above the poverty level.

#### This means the existence of the job opportunity, not the actual wage, is important for young people to gain jobs and stay out of poverty.

#### 2. The fact that crime has a net increase as a result of minimum wage laws prove the unemployment from minimum wage laws outweigh the effect of higher wages – this is comparative evidence

Beauchamp and Chan 13 [(Andrew, Assistant Professor in Department of Economics at Boston College; and Stacey, PhD in Economics, Research Assistant in Economics) “The Minimum Wage and Crime” Under review as of August 23, 2013] AT

Does crime respond to changes in the minimum wage? A growing body of empirical evidence indicates that increases in the minimum wage have a displacement effect on low-skilled workers. Economic reasoning provides the possibility that dis-employment may cause youth to substitute from legal work to crime. However, there is also the countervailing effect of a higher wage raising the opportunity cost of crime for those who remain employed. We use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 cohort to measure the effect of increases in the minimum wage on self-reported criminal activity and examine employment-crime substitution. Exploiting changes in state and federal minimum wage laws from 1997 to 2010, we find that workers who are affected by a change in the minimum wage are more likely to commit crime, become idle, and lose employment. Further, there is an increase of property theft among both unemployed and employed individuals, suggesting that reduced employment effects dominate any wage effects. These findings have implications for policy regarding both the low-wage labor market and efforts to deter criminal activity.

#### 3. Minimum wages poverty reduction effect is minimal since wages don’t impact poverty, but it forces businesses to charge more for products and lay off workers disproportionately harming the poor – this means the harms outweigh the benefits

Wilson 12 [(Mark, Principal at Applied Economic Strategies, 25 years of economic policy experience, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Employment Standards Administration at the U.S. Department of Labor, Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation specializing in workplace policy and tax issues) “The Negative Effects of Minimum Wage Laws” Policy Analysis, No. 701 June 21, 2012] AT

Proposals increase the minimum wage can be politically popular because they are viewed as being a way of helping the poor. However, evidence from a large number of academic studies suggests that minimum wage increases don’t reduce poverty levels. Some of the reasons include Many poor Americans (63.5%) do not work, and thus aren’t earning wages.41 Even among the working poor, the relationship between earning a low hourly wage rate and living in poverty is weak and has become weaker over time. That is because most workers who gain from a minimum wage increase live in nonpoor families and most of the working poor already have wages above the required minimums.42 While an increase in the minimum wage will lift some families out of poverty, other low-skilled workers may lose their jobs, which reduces their income and drops their families into poverty.43 If a minimum wage is partly or fully passed through to consumers in the form of higher prices, it will hurt the poor because they disproportionately suffer from price inflation.44 Relatively few poor households would benefit from a minimum wage increase even if there were no negative employment or other affects. In the recent federal minimum wage increase from $5.15 to $7.25, only 15.8 percent of the workers who were expected to gain from it lived in poor households.45 In the current proposal to raise it to $9.50, only 11.3 percent of the workers who would gain live in poor households.46 And of those who would gain, 63 percent are second or third earners living in households with incomes twice the poverty line. Since 1995, eight studies have examined the income and poverty effects of minimum wage increases, and all but one have found that past minimum wage hikes had no effect on poverty.47 One recent academic study found that both state and federal minimum wage increases between 2003 and 2007 had no effect on state poverty rates.48 These studies generally find that some low-skilled workers Harvard University’s Greg Mankiw notes, “The minimum wage has its greatest impact on the market for teenage labor.” living in poor families who remain employed do see their incomes rise. However, other lowskilled workers lose their jobs or have their work hours substantially reduced, which causes income losses and increased poverty. On net, some studies find that the families of low-skilled workers and less-educated single mothers are no better off and may be made worse off by minimum wage hikes.49 The upshot is that there is no free lunch to this sort of top-down mandated attempt at reducing poverty.

#### 4. Basic economic principles answer this claim

Hazlitt 46 [(Henry, American economist and journalist who wrote for such publications as The Wall Street Journal, The Nation, The American Mercury, Newsweek, and The New York Times) “Economics in One Lesson. The Lesson Applied: Minimum Wage Laws”] AT

Yet it ought to be clear that a minimum wage law is, at best, a limited weapon for combatting the evil of low wages, and that the possible good to be achieved by such a law can exceed the possible harm only in proportion as its aims are modest. The more ambitious such a law is, the larger the number of workers it attempts to cover, and the more it attempts to raise their wages, the more certain are its harmful effects to exceed any possible good effects. The first thing that happens, for example, when a law is passed that no one shall be paid less than $106 for a forty-hour week is that no one who is not worth $106 a week to an employer will be employed at all. You cannot make a man [someone] worth a given amount by making it illegal for anyone to offer him anything less. You merely deprive him [them] of the right to earn the amount that his [their] abilities and situation would permit him to earn, while you deprive the community even of the moderate services that he is capable of rendering. In brief, for a low wage you substitute unemployment. You do harm all around, with no comparable compensation. The only exception to this occurs when a group of workers is receiving a wage actually below its market worth. This is likely to happen only in rare and special circumstances or localities where competitive forces do not operate freely or adequately; but nearly all these special cases could be remedied just as effectively, more flexibly and with far less potential harm, by unionization. It may be thought that if the law forces the payment of a higher wage in a given industry, that industry can then charge higher prices for its product, so that the burden of paying the higher wage is merely shifted to consumers. Such shifts, however, are not easily made, nor are the consequences of artificial wage-raising so easily escaped. A higher price for the product may not be possible: it may merely drive consumers to the equivalent imported products or to some substitute. Or, if consumers continue to buy the product of the industry in which wages have been raised, the higher price will cause them to buy less of it. While some workers in the industry may be benefited from the higher wage, therefore, others will be thrown out of employment altogether. On the other hand, if the price of the product is not raised, marginal producers in the industry will be driven out of business; so that reduced production and consequent unemployment will merely be brought about in another way.

#### Prefer – A) there’s empirical evidence that goes both ways but the basic principles go neg – if empirics defy the laws of economics it’s an indicator your empirics are wrong since those laws have governed economic behavior since the start of economics and B) they are assumed by all economic models, so empirical evidence can’t refute this claim since it relies on the principles that dictate minimum wage will decrese employment

### Poverty Weighing

#### The fact that the minimum wage causes inequality means there is no way aff wins the impact comparison – the minimum wage causes their impact so they cannot compare their impact to mine. This turns their link – to win their inequality advantage they need to win the policies supported by new voters actually solve inequality, but I am denying that link – if I win the disad the aff will lose their advantage

#### Here’s the comparison – the neg impact is that minimum wage causes unemployment and the aff impact is that leftist parties will implement reforms that give resources like welfare or food stamps to the poor – there are 3 reasons employment is the stronger impact

#### A) Financial constraints – resource assistance programs can’t be given in large enough amounts to actually solve poverty, but employment gives people a path out of poverty

Mitchell 11 [(Bill, Professor in Economics and Director of the Centre of Full Employment and Equity at the Charles Darwin University) “The best way to eradicate poverty is to create jobs” Billy Blog Nov 21] AT

It is clear that when we are dealing with the “highly marginalized ultra poor” who live “hand-to-mouth on meager wages from manual labor or by stretching subsistence farming income for months between harvests … it is extremely difficult to use loans for anything other than meeting their most basic food and healthcare needs”. Similarly, the responses from the various international efforts (such as the GAP-Ford Foundation Graduation Program) still consider that “micro-entrepreneurship” is the solution. These models consider the ultra-poor have to first undertake a lengthy (supported) rehabilitation prior to engaging in work proper and skill development. Analysts claim that the problem is one of scale – there are simply too many people in need of support and governments cannot afford to provide the required level of real resource assistance (food, clothing, shelter etc) while the ultra-poor are being rehabilitated and prepared for training and “productive” employment. Programs such as the The Sorenson/Unitus Ultra Poor Initiative attempt to truncate the transition for poverty to workforce by reducing the time involved in “rehabilitation”. They argue: … that if the ultra poor are given an opportunity to start earning a stable income from the program’s outset, they are willing and able to pay for food, healthcare, and other services … launching its program with job-skills training and the resources to start a new activity, it could reduce the cost of its ultra-poor program by as much as 80%. This dramatic reduction greatly improves the prospects for scale … It is clearly important that people break their dependency on welfare by gaining employment and therefore gaining access to stable incomes which allows them to risk manage their own lives. But while fast-tracking the individuals into paid-work will reduce the nominal outlays that government might make in the “rehabilitation” phase these hybrid approaches still miss the point. The problem is one of scale. There are too many people in need for these “market-based” efforts to succeed when aggregate demand is deficient. Once again it is the problem of looking at an issue from a microeconomic lens and thinking that what might “work” at the individual level will translate to a macroeconomic solution.

#### B) Incentives – the aff’s welfare reforms create a backwards system of incentives in which the poor lose money for becoming self-sufficient – creating jobs, not handouts, is the best way to solve poverty

DTG 12\* [(Discover the Networks, describes the networks and agendas of the political Left. Cites several authors: (Heritage Foundation scholar Michael Franc in “Keep That Pay Raise, I Can’t Afford It” National Review Aug 2012) (Rep. Geoff Davis R-Kentucky and Rep. Gwen Moore D-Wisconsin) “HOW THE WELFARE STATE HAS DEVASTATED AFRICAN AMERICANS” \*No date, 2012 is last date cited] AT

Just as welfare policies discourage marriage and the formation of stable families, they also discourage the development of a healthy work ethic. As Heritage Foundation scholar Michael Franc noted in 2012: “[T]he necessity of phasing out [welfare] benefits as incomes rise brings a serious moral hazard. In many cases, economists have calculated, welfare recipients who enter the work force or receive pay raises lose a dollar or more of benefits for each additional dollar they earn. The system makes fools of those who work hard.” In testimony on Capitol Hill, Rep. Geoff Davis (R-Kentucky) concurred that although federal welfare programs “are designed to alleviate poverty while promoting work,” collectively they have “an unintended side effect of discouraging harder work and higher earnings.” “The more benefits the government provides,” he said, “the stronger the disincentive to work.” Yet another Capitol Hill witness, Rep. Gwen Moore (D-Wisconsin)—herself a former welfare recipient—acknowledged in her oral testimony: “I once had a job and begged my supervisor not to give me a 50-cents-an-hour raise lest I lose Title 20 day care.” The same work disincentive came into play when Moore contemplated the health coverage she was receiving through Medicaid. “I would want to work if in fact I didn’t risk losing Medicaid,” she said.

#### C) Root cause – the best way to tackle poverty is by reducing regulations like the minimum wage – they’re only counter-productive and are the root cause of poverty

Daley 13 [(Janet, spent nearly twenty years in academic life before becoming a political commentator) “Does the Left really want to end poverty?” The Telegraph Jan 3] AT

The poverty lobby – as opposed to those who actually want to put an end to poverty – uses the "poor" as a political weapon in its ideological war against the market economy. That argument, which many of us have made over the years, is forcefully reiterated in an excellent post by Philip Booth of the IEA. As Professor Booth points out, the official campaigning groups which make use of the poor as fodder for their anti-capitalist rhetoric never seem to address the critical issue of the cost of living in their accounts of relative poverty, even though excessive charges for home energy, child care and housing (which are heavily inflated by taxation and government regulation) are among the chief drivers of household hardship. Where, he says, is the argument for less regulation and more market competition which would really help poorer households by bringing down their costs? Nowhere in the prospectus of the poverty groupies do these get a mention. The campaigners prefer to preserve the poor as a permanent moral affront with which to castigate our callous capitalist society, instead of contributing to a useful discussion on the factors that are keeping people poor. In spite of the fact that being in work has been shown repeatedly to be the best (and most permanent) antidote to poverty, the public relations arms of the Child Poverty Action Group and the Rowntree Trust (among many others) have been notably disinclined to support the government's welfare reform programme even though it is designed precisely to free the poor from the benefits trap. Nor can I recall them campaigning for tax cuts on the low paid: instead of allowing people to keep more of their earnings which would relieve their hardship and give them more independence, they clamour for the continuation of tax credits which subsidise (and perpetuate) low wages, and foster dependence on the state. The statistical evidence of the past twenty years has become overwhelming: that getting a job is by far the best route out of poverty, that benefit dependency tends to turn temporary hardship into permanent poverty, and that free markets can deliver mass prosperity more effectively than any other form of economic system. It is time for the debate to move on. The old fashioned socialist dogma – that only the state can "lift people out of poverty" – is not just wrong. It is pernicious.

### A2 Squo Can’t Solve Poverty

#### 1. This misunderstands the problem – a low minimum wage is the only reason the poor have a chance at social mobility in the first place since unskilled workers can gain skills to slowly gain higher-paying jobs – but that assumes low-skilled jobs exist in the first place, which a minimum wage increase will crush.

#### 2. It’s not just people in poverty getting out – it’s people struggling to stay out of poverty – minimum wage jobs are held primarily by the young

Wilson 12 [(Mark, Principal at Applied Economic Strategies, 25 years of economic policy experience, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Employment Standards Administration at the U.S. Department of Labor, Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation specializing in workplace policy and tax issues) “The Negative Effects of Minimum Wage Laws” Policy Analysis, No. 701 June 21, 2012] AT

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#### That means the size of the wage isn’t important, but the existence of job opportunities is – without these low-skilled jobs, young people have no shot at working higher-paying jobs that will keep them out of poverty when they are providing for a family – the minimum wage in the next generation into poverty and the status quo keeps them out

## 2N – Crime

### Crime XT + Wall

#### Extend Beauchamp and Chan 13 – empirics from changes in wage laws prove minimum-wage workers are more likely to commit crime after wages are increased – this takes higher wages into account, which indicates that the unemployment caused by crime has a stronger effect than the higher wages.

#### Here is more comparative evidence – wage increases have no effect on crime, but employment does

Doyle 99 summarizes Mathur [(et al, Joanne M. Doyle, James Madison University Associate Professor of Economics Program; Ehsan Ahmed professor and the head of the Economics Department in the College of Business at James Madison University; and Robert N. Horn, Professor of Economics at James Madison University) “The Effects of Labor Markets and Income Inequality on Crime: Evidence from Panel Data” Southern Economic Journal Vol. 65, No. 4 (Apr., 1999), pp. 717-738] AT

Previous research on the effect of economic conditions on crime rates has not come to a consensus on the role labor markets play in inﬂuencing criminal behavior. Within the context of the Becker model, legal wages represent the opportunity cost to crime. Higher wages should reduce criminal activity. However, empirical support of this hypothesis is ambiguous, partly because the variables used to capture market wages differ drastically across studies. In several earlier studies conducted in the 1970s and 1980s with aggregate data, researchers used income measures such as median family income or mean per capita income. Although these variables may capture labor market wages (opportunity cost of crime), they may simultaneously capture the beneﬁts to crime, especially property crime where high wealth in a given region signals good opportunities for crime. So good legal opportunities should lower crime, but high returns to crime should increase crime. It is not surprising then that coefﬁcient estimates of the elasticity of crime with respect to income vary greatly across studies. For example, Tntmbull (1989) uses mean income per capita as a measure of the opportunity cost to crime. Using a cross-section of data on counties in North Carolina, he ﬁnds that mean income has no effect on crime, most likely due to the negative effect of high income on crime being offset by the positive effect high income can have on crime by providing better income-producing criminal opportunities. In a survey of the literature. Eide (I994) reports that there is no systematic relationship between the income measures applied and the estimates obtained in a variety of crime studies, most likely for the reasons mentioned above. It simply is not clear what the various income variables are measuring. Freeman (1996) argues for the inclusion of income inequality measures in empirical models of crime. ln fact, conventional wisdom maintains a positive relationship between income in- equality and crime. However, a causal link is not well documented. Several authors have used income inequality measures in their statistical models. but they differ according to whether inequality captures costs or beneﬁts to crime. Ehrlich (1996) uses an income distribution variable to capture the opporttmity costs of crime and ﬁnds it to be statistically signiﬁcant The argument is that higher inequality results in more people at the bottom end of the income distribution, and these individuals will be more prone to crime because the cost in terms of legal income forgone is quite low. However, this argument does not establish a causal link between income inequality and crime per se but instead uses inequality as a proxy for the opportunity cost of crime, which we believe does have a causal link Still other authors have used income differ- entials to measure the beneﬁts to crime. For example, Mathur (1978) uses the Gini coefﬁcient for this purpose and ﬁnds its effect on crime to be ambiguous. Unemployment rates have been used in crime studies as an additional aspect of the labor market that may inﬂuence criminal activity. To the extent that wages are not ﬂexible enough to clear labor markets, unemployment rates may provide important information regarding job avail- ability. High unemployment rates indicate a lack of legal opportunities and should lead to increases in crime. However. Trumbull (1989) ﬁnds that, on the contrary, high unemployment rates have a negative effect on crime. This result can be explained by recognizing that unemployment rate,. like income measures, may capture more than a lack of legal job opportunities.

#### Next, minimum wage’s harms will outweigh the turns----

#### 1. Youth – minimum wage forces youth into crime

Beauchamp and Chan 13 [(Andrew, Assistant Professor in Department of Economics at Boston College; and Stacey, PhD in Economics, Research Assistant in Economics) “The Minimum Wage and Crime” Under review as of August 23, 2013] AT

Does raising the minimum wage have the unintended effect of increasing crime? Economic reasoning and the recent literature in the minimum wage lead us to believe that the answer may be yes. If increases in the minimum wage lead to unemployment and idleness, some youth may choose crime as an alternative source of income. Research in the new economics of the minimum wage" shows that increases in the minimum wage displace lower-skill workers and cause higher levels of unemployment among youth and workers with weak labor attachment.1 Moreover, increases in the minimum wage raise the probability that teenagers will be idle: they are more likely to leave school and, conditional on not being in school, more likely to be unemployed.2 Numerous studies have shown that idle youth are more likely to engage in crime, whether because they are not in school or not working.

#### Impacts to youth come first – they control the internal link to dangerous career criminals.

Sullivan 13 [(Christopher, Associate Professor in the School of Criminal Justice at the University of Cincinnati) Review of “FROM JUVENILE DELINQUENCY TO ADULT CRIME: CRIMINAL CAREERS, JUSTICE POLICY AND PREVENTION” by Rolf Loeber (Principal Investigator at Pittsburgh Youth Study, Professor of Psychiatry at Univ of Pittsburgh) and David Farrington (Director of Research and Emeritus Professor of Psychological Criminology) Oxford University Press 2012. Criminal Law and Criminal Justice Books, July 2013] AT

In presenting her theory of adolescence-limited offenders, Terrie Moffitt (1993) pointed toward broad shifts in the way that youths come of age in Western nations as one explanatory factor for the shape of the age trend in criminal behavior. Several years later, Jeffrey Arnett (2000) suggested that more recent shifts, such as later age of marriage and increased college attendance leading to later entry into the work force, contribute to an elongated developmental stage between adolescence and full assumption of adult responsibilities. He termed this “Emerging Adulthood” and the volume developed by Rolf Loeber and David Farrington, From Juvenile Delinquency to Adult Crime, focuses on this segment of the life course as pertains to criminal behavior and society’s response to it. The same general crime trends used as a starting point by Moffitt suggest that understanding and responding to criminal behavior during the transition to adulthood may be a linchpin in crime prevention and control more generally as that is the point at which desistance or persistence in offending over the longer life course comes into view. The volume contains works focused on defining the key characteristics of the late adolescence/early adulthood portion of the criminal career (Piquero, Hawkins, and Kazemian), explaining persistence and desistance in offending during that period (Horney, Tolan, and Weisburd; Thornberry, Giordano, Uggen, Matsuda, Masten, Bulten, and Donker; Rosenfeld, White, and Esbensen), and the response in the U.S. (Hoge, Vincent, and Guy; Griffin; Howell, Feld, and Mears; Welsh, Lipsey, Rivara, Hawkins, Aos, and Hollis-Peel) and Europe (Killias, Redondo, and Sarnecki). Together, the editors and chapter authors look at crime in this developmental period from a number of angles, ranging from a description of the problem to research on risk assessment and prediction, justice response, prevention, and wide-reaching prescriptions for policy and practice. Early chapters of the book focus on defining some important criminal career patterns relevant to the discussion and subsequently reviewing explanations for continuity or desistance in offending during the transition to adulthood. Piquero, Hawkins, and Kazemian begin by defining pertinent aspects of criminal career research that set the stage for consideration of the causes, consequences, and response to offending in emerging adulthood. Among the important findings is the degree of continuity in offending from adolescence to early adulthood without appropriate response—particularly for delinquents with more extensive records. Thornberry and colleagues (Chapter 3) then provide a detailed overview of the theoretical perspectives relevant to this question—covering a broad swath of possible explanations for continuity or desistance during this time period in the process (e.g., static models based on enduring differences, dynamic explanations that encompass changes in social situations over time, an integrated framework from developmental psychopathology). In the next chapter, Horney, Tolan, and Weisburd focus on potential contextual influences that are likely to emerge during this phase of development. At that point, individuals may be trying to find places to live, rebuild or maintain relationships with family and friends, and develop occupational skills through training and schooling in order to facilitate a transition to normative adult roles; the result of that process has implications for whether they continue with criminal behavior or take a path more conducive to a prosocial lifestyle. This chapter demonstrates the importance of the social system and opportunities that youth encounter as they approach adulthood, as they may have considerable influence on their criminal behavior. In Chapter 5, Rosenfeld, White, and Esbensen look at special categories of offenders such as drug dealers, gang members, and homicide offenders during this period of development. They conclude that, for the most part, knowledge that comes from general studies of offenders pertains to these special groups in that they tend to follow a lot of the same offending career patterns as those identified in other samples. Drug dealing was found to have greater persistence than other offense types, however. The last several chapters of the book take on practical aspects of responding to offending during (and before) emerging adulthood. If understanding offending in emerging adulthood is predicated on getting a read on the explanatory mechanisms presented by Thornberry and colleagues and Horney and colleagues, the response must draw on assessment and prediction that occurs within the juvenile justice system and related agencies. The chapter by Hoge, Vincent, and Guy reviews the relevant literature in this area and also presents some new analysis of three assessment tools to consider the viability of this practice. Despite the limitations of the literature in this area and risk/needs assessment more generally, the authors reach some important conclusions about core domains that should be included in practical tools (e.g., impulsivity, callousness) and point out that emerging adulthood may be unique in some ways that must be thoughtfully considered in the assessment process and use of results (especially those from other developmental stages). Additionally, they point out that, although there is a lot of continuity, the chances of persistence even among more serious offenders is fairly uncertain, so prediction of behavior across periods can be difficult.

#### 2. And their finding is robust – crime increases across the board, so the results were clear and one-sided

Beauchamp and Chan 13 [(Andrew, Assistant Professor in Department of Economics at Boston College; and Stacey, PhD in Economics, Research Assistant in Economics) “The Minimum Wage and Crime” Under review as of August 23, 2013] JZ

Did raising the minimum wage increase[s] crime in the United States over the past 15 years? The evidence we present suggests the answer is yes. Further, our results indicate that this increase in crime occurs across the board, with increases in theft, drug sale, and violent crime. Among the employed these increases may occur due to a decrease in labor income from reduced work. Our results highlight the importance of providing employment opportunities for young, unskilled- youth given the evidence for a relationship between licit and illicit work. They also point to the dangers both to the individual and to society from policies that restrict the already limited employment options of this group. Our results indicate that crime will increase by 1.9 percentage points among 14-30 year-olds as the minimum wage increases, with effects being even larger among teenagers. With an average overall crime rate at 12.1%, this is a substantial increase. The social costs to raising the minimum wage may not appear in net employment or unemployment changes, but nonetheless appear non-trivial.

### Crime Internal Link O/W

#### This is a stronger internal link to crime than income inequality – strong studies prove inequality doesn’t impact crime but employment does

Doyle 99 [(et al, Joanne M. Doyle, James Madison University Associate Professor of Economics Program; Ehsan Ahmed professor and the head of the Economics Department in the College of Business at James Madison University; and Robert N. Horn, Professor of Economics at James Madison University) “The Effects of Labor Markets and Income Inequality on Crime: Evidence from Panel Data” Southern Economic Journal Vol. 65, No. 4 (Apr., 1999), pp. 717-738] AT

We estimate a model of property crime using a panel data set of the U.S. over the years 1984-1993. We focus on property crime under the assumption that property crime is more likely motivated by ﬁnancial gain and thus the beneﬁts and costs of property crime are more likely to be captured with economic variables than are the beneﬁts and costs of violent crime. For the purpose of comparison, we also present results from estimating the model for violent crime. The use of aggregate data, whether at the country, state, city, or police jurisdiction level, has been criticized since the model at hand is one of individual behavior. In spite of this criticism, such data have nevertheless been used in circumstances where individual data are not available. Given our focus on labor markets, income distribution, and demographics, we believe that aggregate data are well suited for our study since we can use a rich set of variables such as average market wages, sector-speciﬁc wages, unemployment rates, and income inequality measures. Furthermore, variables such as income inequality are not readily available at aggregation levels lower than the state level. Using panel data instead of a simple time series or cross-section allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity across states, which greatly reduces the likelihood of an omitted variable bias. We ﬁnd econometric evidence that partly supports Freeman’s arguments. In particular, we ﬁnd, not surprisingly, that the proportion of young males in the population has a signiﬁcant positive effect on property crime yet a signiﬁcant negative effect on violent crime. More importantly, we ﬁnd strong evidence that favorable labor market conditions have signiﬁcant negative effects on both property crime and violent crime. We measure labor market conditions using an expected wage that takes into account wages, unemployment compensation, and the unemployment rate. We further analyze labor market conditions by replacing the expected wage with a vector of sector-speciﬁc average wages. We ﬁnd that property crime is most responsive to wages in low-skilled sectors. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that, contrary to popular belief, income inequality has no independent effect on crime rates.

#### And we control their internal link – models that measure the effect of inequality on crime lack a causal link – inequality is just a proxy for employment but only I access that impact

Doyle 99 [(et al, Joanne M. Doyle, James Madison University Associate Professor of Economics Program; Ehsan Ahmed professor and the head of the Economics Department in the College of Business at James Madison University; and Robert N. Horn, Professor of Economics at James Madison University) “The Effects of Labor Markets and Income Inequality on Crime: Evidence from Panel Data” Southern Economic Journal Vol. 65, No. 4 (Apr., 1999), pp. 717-738] AT

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#### [A2 Drug Abuse Impact] We subsume this impact – minimum wage increases drug abuse as well

Beauchamp and Chan 13 [(Andrew, Assistant Professor in Department of Economics at Boston College; and Stacey, PhD in Economics, Research Assistant in Economics) “The Minimum Wage and Crime” Under review as of August 23, 2013] JZ

Did raising the minimum wage increase[s] crime in the United States over the past 15 years? The evidence we present suggests the answer is yes. Further, our results indicate that this increase in crime occurs across the board, with increases in theft, drug sale, and violent crime. Among the employed these increases may occur due to a decrease in labor income from reduced work. Our results highlight the importance of providing employment opportunities for young, unskilled- youth given the evidence for a relationship between licit and illicit work. They also point to the dangers both to the individual and to society from policies that restrict the already limited employment options of this group. Our results indicate that crime will increase by 1.9 percentage points among 14-30 year-olds as the minimum wage increases, with effects being even larger among teenagers. With an average overall crime rate at 12.1%, this is a substantial increase. The social costs to raising the minimum wage may not appear in net employment or unemployment changes, but nonetheless appear non-trivial.

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# TBA [work in progress]

#### **That means the Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement never passes**

Kasperowicz 6/26 - staff writer at the hill, (Pete, “House advances offshore energy bills”, 6/26/13, the hill, <http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/307959-house-advances-offshore-energy-bills>, //CJD)

The House voted Wednesday in favor of a rule that will allow it to vote on two energy bills this week that are aimed at expanding the development of offshore energy resources.¶ Members voted 235-187 in favor of the rule, which covers two bills: H.R. 2231, the Offshore Energy and Jobs Act, and H.R. 1613, the Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreements Authorization Act.¶ Republicans supported the first bill as one that would help expand domestic energy development, and said it's needed to counter the Obama administration's restrictions on offshore lease sales.¶ "So in essence you have a bill that makes us more energy independent, drives down the cost of fuel for U.S. families, helps reduce the cost to the federal government, and produces an estimated 1.2 million new jobs. I think by most standards that would be considered a fairly good bill," said Rep. Rob Bishop (R-Utah).¶ Republicans added that President Obama's announcement this week shows Obama is looking to run in the other direction, by seeking to restrict emissions from coal-fired electricity plants. ¶ "The President's latest efforts to impose new energy taxes and government red tape follow four and a half years of erecting American energy roadblocks," House Natural Resources Committee Chairman Doc Hastings (R-Wash.) said.

#### US-Mexico relations are at a *pivotal* point --- failure to ratify the THA erodes trust and *collapses* Mexican relations

**Kerry et al. 12** (JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman ¶ BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana¶ ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee¶ BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho¶ ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida¶ JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma¶ JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina¶ CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia¶ RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming¶ TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah¶ William C. Danvers, Staff Director ¶ Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director, “OIL, MEXICO, AND THE AGREEMENT”, December 2012, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-112SPRT77567/html/CPRT-112SPRT77567.htm)

Perhaps the most important U.S.-specific benefits of the TBA are three-fold. First, the TBA will, for the first time, allow U.S.-listed IOCs to work in partnership with PEMEX, not including service contracts. Many observers are optimistic that **the TBA is the metaphorical camel's nose under the tent,** paving the way to broader reform in Mexico. There is no guarantee of such an outcome, however, **failure for the U.S. to approve the TBA may put a drag on Mexican domestic energy reform momentum**. The TBA helps demonstrate that Mexico's oil patrimony can be protected in a joint production regime with U.S. companies. It was suggested by some senior officials that passage of the TBA could help prompt broader domestic energy reform in Mexico. ¶ **Second, it is unlikely that the U.S. maritime border areas would be developed without the TBA**, whereas a PEMEX official indicated desire to begin exploration on the Mexican side of the border. Potential U.S. opponents of the TBA may argue that given PEMEX's limited ability to explore in deep water, the real effect of the TBA will be to reduce IOCs' competitive advantages. In other words, the opposition argument could state, the U.S. should simply move forward with exploration since our companies have the capital and technology to move more quickly than PEMEX. That criticism neglects the reality that, over the long-term, the IOCs have a greater interest in investing throughout Mexican territory than they do in a sliver of U.S. area along the maritime border. Therefore, those IOCs would not risk enraging the Mexican government by, potentially, draining Mexican resources from U.S. territory. Thus, U.S. interests in increased safe and secure domestic oil production along the border will be best met with the TBA. ¶ Finally, passage of the TBA would boost U.S.-Mexico relations on energy issues, which have traditionally lagged. Mexican officials roundly expressed support for the TBA and expectation for U.S. ratification in conversation with the authors. **The political impact of not approving and implementing the TBA would** set back U.S.-Mexican relations on energy specifically and more broadly. Each of our countries has hot button domestic political issues that take courage for political leaders to address. In Mexico, oil is one such issue, and members of both the PAN and PRI put their political weight behind ratification in Mexico. **The U.S. not fulfilling its side of the agreement would, therefore,** be seen as a violation of trust and could erode confidence**.** In the extreme, although unlikely, if Mexico proceeds with domestic energy reforms, U.S. companies could be shut out of certain opportunities until the TBA is ratified.

#### Relations solve drug trafficking

**Olson 9** (Eric L., M.A., International Affairs, American University; B.A., History and Secondary Education, Trinity College, Associate Director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, as a Senior Specialist in the Department for Promotion of Good Governance at the Organization of American States, January 2009, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/The%20U.S.%20and%20Mexico.%20Towards%20a%20Strategic%20Partnership.pdf>)

It is time to strengthen the U.S. relationship with Mexico. There are few countries—if any—which ¶ are as important to the United States as Mexico. We ¶ share more than just a two-thousand mile border. ¶ Our economies and societies are deeply interwoven ¶ and what happens on one side of our shared border ¶ inevitably affects the other side. As the United ¶ States seeks to redeﬁne its role in the world, it is ¶ vital to start at home, with our neighbors.¶ **Today is a time of great opportunity in our** ¶ **relationship with Mexico**, **but also a time of** severe ¶ challenges.While the two governments have taken ¶ important steps to limit the risk that terrorists ¶ will use the shared border as a launching pad ¶ for attacks, drug trafficking organizations have ¶ developed a lucrative and deadly cross-border trade ¶ that creates signiﬁcant vulnerabilities for both ¶ countries. Mexican drug trafficking organizations ¶ have become increasingly violent in recent years, ¶ with over ﬁve thousand deaths tied to narcotics ¶ trafficking in 2008 alone, and they have gradually ¶ penetrated the institutional framework of the ¶ Mexican state, especially local law enforcement ¶ authorities. These organizations are fueled by ¶ persistent demand in the United States: over ¶ twenty million Americans use illegal drugs each ¶ month and roughly 15 to 25 billion dollars in ¶ proﬁts from U.S. drug sales are pumped back into ¶ to the Mexican economy each year in cash and ¶ weapons. The violence and corruption wrought by ¶ drug trafficking organizations are felt particularly ¶ strongly in border communities, but the effects of ¶ the trade run deep throughout cities and towns in ¶ both countries. Policymakers in the two countries ¶ have a shared interest in working together to ¶ develop a comprehensive and bilateral approach ¶ that limits the reach of organized crime

#### That leads to oil shocks and economic collapse

Moran 9 (7/31/09, Michael, executive editor and policy analyst, Council on Foreign Relations, “Six Crises, 2009: A Half-Dozen Ways Geopolitics Could Upset Global Recovery,” http://fbkfinanzwirtschaft.wordpress.com/2009/08/07/six-crises-2009-a-half-dozen-ways-geopolitics-could-upset-global-recovery/)

Risk 2: Mexico Drug Violence:¶ At Stake: Oil prices, refugee flows, NAFTA, U.S. economic stability¶ A story receiving more attention in the American media than Iraq these days is the horrific drug-related violence across the northern states of Mexico, where Felipe Calderon has deployed the national army to combat two thriving drug cartels, which have compromised the national police beyond redemption.¶ The tales of carnage are horrific, to be sure: 30 people were killed in a 48 hour period last week in Cuidad Juarez alone, a city located directly across the Rio Grande from El Paso, Texas. So far, the impact on the United States and beyond has been minimal. But there also isn’t much sign that the army is winning, either, and that raises a disturbing question: What if Calderon loses?¶ The CIA’s worst nightmare during the Cold War (outside of an administration which forced transparency on it, of course) was the radicalization or collapse of Mexico. The template then was communism, but narco-capitalism doesn’t look much better.¶ The prospect of a wholesale collapse that sent millions upon millions of Mexican refugees fleeing across the northern border so far seems remote. But Mexico’s army has its own problems with corruption, and a sizeable number of Mexicans regard Calderon’s razor-thin 2006 electoral victory over a leftist rival as illegitimate. With Mexico’s economy reeling and the traditional safety valve of illegal immigration to America dwindling, the potential for serious trouble exists.¶ Meanwhile, Mexico ranks with Saudi Arabia and Canada as the three suppliers of oil the United States could not do without. Should things come unglued there and Pemex production shut down even temporarily, the shock on oil markets could be profound, again, sending its waves throughout the global economy. Long-term, PEMEX production has been sliding anyway, thanks to oil fields well-beyond their peak and restrictions on foreign investment.¶ Domestically in the U.S., any trouble involving Mexico invariably will cause a bipartisan demand for more security on the southern border, inflame anti-immigrant sentiment and possibly force Obama to remember his campaign promise to “renegotiate NAFTA,” a pledge he deftly sidestepped once in office.

#### Oil shocks cause great power nuke war

Islam Yasin Qasem 7, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Politics and Social Sciences at the University of Pompeu Fabra (UPF) in Barcelona, MA in International Affairs from Columbia, July 9, 2007, “The Coming Warfare of Oil Shortage,” online: http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne\_islam\_ya\_070709\_the\_coming\_warfare\_o.htm

Recognizing the strategic value of oil for their national interests, superpowers will not hesitate to unleash their economic and military power to ensure secure access to oil resources, triggering worldwide tension, if not armed conflict. And while superpowers like the United States maintain superior conventional military power, in addition to their nuclear power, some weaker states are already nuclearly armed, others are seeking nuclear weapons. In an anarchic world with many nuclear-weapon states feeling insecure, and a global economy in downward spiral, the chances of using nuclear weapons in pursues of national interests are high.

#### Economic collapse causes nuclear war

Cesare Merlini 11, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs, May 2011, “A Post-Secular World?”, Survival, Vol. 53, No. 2

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism**.**

#### Relations also solves Latin American instability

**Shirk 11** (David A., Associate Professor, Political Science, and Director, Trans-Border Institute, University of San Diego, “The Drug War in Mexico Confronting a Shared Threat”, March 2011, pg. 26-27)

**The opportunity for effective U.S.-Mexico cooperation to address these shared concerns has grown,** thanks to the resolve of Mexican leaders to embrace the fight against transnational organized crime. The United States clearly has a vested interest in helping Mexico improve its governance, national security, economic productivity, and quality of life, which are integral to making Mexico a better neighbor and trade par ner in the longer term. Mexico is also eager to continue working toward these ends, and it has embraced unprecedented levels of collaboration.¶ Over the next five years, the best-case scenario will bring a turning point in which authorities gain the upper hand against organized crime, violence dies down to pre-2006 levels, and illicit drug flows diminish dramatically. This would require continued progress in disrupting organized crime groups, with the reduction in drug-related violence the primary metric of policy success. For now, at least, the nightmare scenarios of government collapse, widespread political insurgency, or sudden military takeover are as unlikely in Mexico as they are in Brazil and Colombia, which have even higher levels of violence. **Still, without progress** on the noted recommendations, Mexico’s drug war will drag onward and downward indefinitely, with greater and more geographically dispersed violence, more direct political influences by organized crime, rising instability and fear, growing human and capital flight, and increasing spillover effects to neighboring countries, including the United States.¶ **Challenges and setbacks are inevitable, and building greater trust and cooperation will require sustained efforts.** Events in late 2010 and early 2011, such as WikiLeaks’ disclosure of persistent skepticism within the U.S. embassy in Mexico City of Calderón’s government and military performance, and the death of a U.S. immigration and customs agent at the hands of drug traffickers, **led to an unexpected nadir in U.S.-Mexico relations.** The surprise Obama-Calderón summit of March 2011 reflects both countries’ desire to move past short-term diplomatic disruptions. **The United States can help shift the balance in Mexico’s battle against organized crime and prevent the further spread of violence within Mexico and to its neighbors.** **This will require a serious commitment to U.S. responsibilities** at home, long-term investments to make Mexico a more secure and prosperous neighbor, greater multilateral coopera- tion throughout the region, and a more sensible policy for managing the harms associated with drugs.

#### Latin America instability causes extinction

Manwaring 5 (Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of International Politics at Dickinson College, venezuela’s hugo chávez, bolivarian socialism, and asymmetric warfare, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf)

President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as *Bolivarianismo.* More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Peru’s *Sendero Luminoso* calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65

# Taxes DA

## 1NC

#### The US economy is recovering steadily, but is still vulnerable.

Economic Times 8/2 [“US economy recovering from worst downturn: White House.” Aug 2, 2013, 09.40PM IST. Economic Times. <http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-08-02/news/41008276_1_unemployment-rate-lowest-level-alan-b-krueger>] AJ

WASHINGTON: The US economy is recovering from the worst downturn, the White House said today as the latest figures indicated that the unemployment rate has dropped to 7.4 per cent, the lowest level since December 2008. "While more work remains to be done, today's employment report provides further confirmation that the US economy is continuing to recover from the worst downturn since the Great Depression," Alan B Krueger , Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers to US President Barack Obama said. "It is critical that we remain focused on pursuing policies to speed job creation and expand the middle class, as we continue to dig our way out of the deep hole that was caused by the severe recession that began in December 2007," he said. The latest report from the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) indicates that the unemployment rate declined from 7.6 per cent to 7.4 per cent in July, reaching its lowest level since December 2008. The unemployment rate for African Americans fell from 13.7 per cent to 12.6 per cent, also its lowest level since December 2008. The unemployment rate for women fell from 7.3 per cent to 7.0 per cent, its lowest level since January 2009, and from 7.8 per cent to 7.7 per cent for men. The economy has now added private sector jobs for 41 consecutive months, and a total of 7.3 million jobs have been added over that period. So far this year, 1.4 million private sector jobs have been added. "With the recovery entering its fifth year, we need to build on the progress we have made so far and now is not the time for Washington to impose self-inflicted wounds. The across-the-board budget cuts known as the sequester continue[s] to be a drag on the economy now and in the future," Krueger said. "The Administration continues to urge Congress to replace the sequester with balanced deficit reduction, and promote the investments our economy needs to put more Americans back to work, such as by rebuilding our roads and bridges," he said.

#### CV results in redistributive policies like progressive taxes, since the average preference of the electorate shifts to the ideological left.

Carey and Horiuchi 13 [John M. Carey (John Wentworth Professor in the Social Sciences, Department of Government, Dartmouth College). Yusaku Horiuchi (Associate Professor and Mitsui Chair in the Study of Japan, Department of Government, Dartmouth College). Compulsory Voting and Income Inequality. Prepared for presentation in a seminar on Latin American Politics in the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University on April 23, 2013, and a seminar in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College on April 30, 2013] AJ

The third assumption is that the poor prefer more redistribution than the rich do, such that the poor-rich axis in Figure 1 is a proxy for an ideological space from left to right. It should be no controversy to assume that the poor support policies that yield disproportional benefits to the poor vis-à-vis the rich. Such policies include progressive taxation on incomes and comprehensive tax deductions for the poor. Perhaps more importantly, given that the economically less advantaged people are more susceptible to economic growth (and to job market fluctuation) and more depending on public sector jobs (including jobs created by public works), the poor vis-à-vis the rich should have stronger preference over larger government with larger public spending. Under these reasonable assumptions, how does compulsory voting affect the distribution of policy preferences? If everyone votes, the distribution of economic status is the one with the shaded area in the bottom panel of Figure 1. The median voter position is at M. When voting is voluntary, the relatively higher non-voting rate among poor citizens yields a richer median voter (at M’>M). Therefore, compulsory voting, by diminishing the wealth bias to voluntary non-voting, should shift the redistributive preferences of the median voter back toward the median in the full population.

#### Social redistribution programs, especially progressive taxation, kill business activity – a vast literature verifies that taxes in general hurt growth.

Keating 10 [Raymond J. Keating. Chief Economist of Small Business and Entrepreneurship Council. “Small Business Survival Index 2010: Ranking the Policy Environment for Entrepreneurship Across the Nation.” 15th Annual Edition, December 2010. Small Business and Entrepreneurship Council] AJ

• A March 2005 study, commissioned by the SBA’s Office of Advocacy, was co-authored by Donald Bruce, Ph.D., an economist from the University of Tennessee, and Tami Gurley, titled “Taxes and Entrepreneurial Activity: An Empirical Investigation Using Longitudinal Tax Return Data.” The authors noted: “We find convincing evidence that marginal tax rates have important effects on decisions to enter or remain in entrepreneurial activity.” They found the relative tax costs of wage earnings versus earnings from entrepreneurship matter, and concluded, “Taken together, our empirical results suggest that policies aimed at reducing the relative tax rates on entrepreneurs might lead to increases in entrepreneurial activity and better chances of survival. Additionally, our results indicate that equal-rate cuts in tax rates on both wage and entrepreneurship incomes could yield similar results. Conversely, equal-rate increases in tax rates on both sources of incomes would most likely result in reduced rates of entrepreneurship entry and increased rates of entrepreneurial exit.” How best to sum this up? Raise the relative cost of entrepreneurship, and you’ll get less entrepreneurship. Reduce the relative costs of entrepreneurship, and you get more. • A June 3, 2003, report (“Taxation and Migration”) written by Ohio University Distinguished Professor of Economics Richard Vedder for The Taxpayers Network noted recent trends in net domestic migration among the states (excluding international migration). Vedder split the country in two categories – 25 high tax states and 25 low tax states – based on state and local tax burden as a share of personal income. From 1990 to 1999, low tax states gained 2.05 million people in terms of net domestic migration, while high tax states lost 890,000. This pattern continued in the post-1990s. From 2000 to 2002, as low tax states gained 729,000, and high tax states lost 371,000 in net domestic migration. Vedder also observed that “the in- migration into states without income taxes was impressive – as was the out-migration from high-tax states.” He noted that his accompanying econometric analysis “increases our confidence in the basic conclusion that high taxes in general are perceived as lowering the quality of life in a locality, leading to out-migration.” In addition, Vedder pointed out that “a vast literature shows that high taxation leads to reduced economic growth.” • Vedder also found in a 1995 report for the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress that relatively low tax states grew at almost a one-third faster rate than high tax states over the period of 1960 to 1993; an increase in state and local tax burdens equal to 1 percent of personal income reduced income growth by more than 3.5 percent; and if a state had kept its level of income taxation at the same share of personal income over this period, personal income would have been 30 percent higher in the end.39

#### *Even the smallest link will matter – small businesses are vulnerable due to high tax rates in the status quo.*

*Winograd 8/8 [David Winograd. “Some Small Businesses Pay Tax Rates More Than Double Those Of Large Corporations: Study.” Huffington Post. 8/8/2013] AJ*

*The businesses that sponsor your local little league team and pour your morning coffee may end up paying higher tax rates than some of America’s largest, most profitable corporations, a new study suggests. When tax credits and deductions are included, two of the most common types of small businesses pay a percentage on their income to the government more than double that of large corporations, the study commissioned by the National Federation of Independent Businesses and the S Corporation Association found. That's because those types of businesses -- known as S corporations and partnerships -- pay taxes at the individual rate, rather than as a corporate entity, making them ineligible for certain tax benefits, according to The Hill. The result is an average corporate tax rate of just 12.6 percent, according to Government Accountability Office. That's compared to the 31.6 percent and 29.4 percent that S corporations and partnerships pay respectively, according to the study. The findings come as many of America’s biggest businesses face criticism for avoiding their fair share in taxes. Many corporations, including Apple, Google and Amazon, wind up paying less than the top Federal tax rate of 35 percent, in part because they report international revenues in countries with lower tax rates, known as tax havens. Some companies, such as General Electric have been known to pay negative tax rates, meaning they actually gain money from paying taxes due to federal tax subsidies and other tax benefits. Meanwhile, recent calls by President Obama to reform the corporate tax code have been criticized by small business owners who say such efforts would only further reduce the burden paid by corporations while doing nothing for businesses who are taxed at the individual rate.*

#### Small businesses have the strongest internal link to the economy

Clark and Saade 10 [L. Clark III and Radwan Saade - September 2010. The Role of Small Business in Economic Development of the United States: From the End of the Korean War (1953) to the Present. SBA Office of Advocacy]

Small businesses currently represent 98 percent of all businesses in the United States and they generate nearly 64 percent of all net new jobs in this country. xxxix Moreover, small businesses are generally considered to be the first line of employment and thus the initial training grounds for this nation’s workforce. xl There are twenty-nine million small businesses in the United States. xli The SBA estimates that just over half of all employees in the U.S. work for a small firm, and that small business employers provide approximately 44.5 percent of payroll in the private sector. Ninety-seven percent [97%] of all exporters are small business owners, comprising 29 percent of total exports. xlii The most powerful statistic, however, is that 60 to 80 percent of all new jobs come from small businesses. This number fluctuates when some small businesses grow enough to become classified as large businesses, and when new small businesses are created. From 1999 to 2000, small businesses accounted for 75 percent of all new jobs created. By 2010, small businesses account for three quarters of net new jobs in the United States. xliii Small businesses[and] have a long history of being this nation’s primary job creator, but as outlined above in the history of this nation’s economic policy formation, small businesses were not at the forefront in this nation’s policy manpower formation. The congressional policy “…that the government should aid, counsel, assist…the interest of small business concerns in order to preserve competitive enterprise….”, in the 1953 Small Business Act carried very little potency as it can be seen in the creation of the Labor Surplus area program. Xliv

#### Economic collapse causes extinction.

Bearden 2000 [(Thomas, Lt. Col in US Army) “The Unnecessary Energy Crisis”, Free Republic, June 24, p. online wyo-tjc]

History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China-whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States-attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.

## 2N Frontlines

### UQ

#### Small businesses are barely making any gains – on the brink now.

Reuters 6/5 [“U.S. small businesses cut jobs in May –NFIB.” Wed Jun 5, 2013 10:07am EDT. Reuters] AJ

WASHINGTON, June 5 (Reuters) - U.S. small businesses cut back on staff slightly in May, the first decline in six months and a sign of weakness in the job market recovery. The National Federation of Independent Business said on Wednesday employment shrank by 0.04 workers per firm last month. It was the second report of the day to augur poorly for the government's national employment report due on Friday, which is expected to show a modest 170,000 jobs were created last month. Earlier on Wednesday, payroll processing firm ADP said U.S. companies added 135,000 workers in May, well below the 165,000 forecast by analysts polled by Reuters.

### CV Link

#### Countries with CV are more redistributive fiscally due to demographic shifts in the electorate.

Chong and Olivera 08 [Alberto Chong and Mauricio Olivera. “DOES COMPULSORY VOTING HELP EQUALIZE INCOMES?” Economics and Politics, Volume 20, Number 3. November 2008. Blackwell Publishing] AJ

For all the countries in which data are available (World Bank, 2004), we find further corroborating evidence that the adoption of compulsory-voting laws are linked with substantial increases in social expenditure, as a percentage of gross domestic product. In Fiji, a country that instituted such laws in 1996, the three-year average in social expenditure before the law change went from 16.2% to 17.1% of GDP, three years later, on average. Analogously, countries that dropped compulsory-voting laws saw a sub- sequent decrease in social spending. This is the case of the Netherlands, where the three-year average in social expenditure went from 20% to a three- year average of 19.2% of GDP after the laws were eliminated in 1967. This is also the case of [and] Venezuela where social expenditure fell from 9.1 to 8.4 after the compulsory-voting law was eliminated in 1993.6

### 2N Redistribution Bad

#### Progressive taxation kill small business and entrepreneurship

Keating 11 [Raymond J. Keating. Chief Economist of Small Business and Entrepreneurship Council. “Small Business Survival Index 2010: Ranking the Policy Environment for Entrepreneurship Across the Nation.” 16th Annual Edition, November 2011. Small Business and Entrepreneurship Council] AJ

The Joint Economic Committee in Congress released an analysis on May 6, 2003, entitled “How the Top Individual Income Tax Rate Affects Small Business.” Among the report’s findings were: “Taxpayers in the highest income bracket are often entrepreneurs and small business owners, not just highly-paid executives or people living off their investments. Small business owners typically report their profits on their individual income tax returns, so the individual income tax is effectively the small business tax.” “Small businesses generally pay their income taxes through the individual income tax systems, not the corporate tax system. Sole proprietorships, partnerships, and S-Corporations are the three main organizational forms chosen by small business owners.” “Economists who have studied the effects of taxes on sole proprietorships have found that high marginal tax rates discourage entrepreneurs from investing in new capital equipment and, conversely, that reducing taxes encourages new investment.” “At higher marginal tax rates, [or] hiring employees[,] can become a less attractive proposition as a higher fraction of any additional income that a new hire might generate for the business is taxed and diverted to the federal government.” ⎥ “Investment also promotes small business growth, since how much a worker can produce for a company depends on the amount and quality of the equipment that the worker has to work with. That is why when low marginal tax rates spur a business to make new capital investments in software, computers, or machinery, for example, that company’s workers become more productive, causing the company to grow. One study has shown that when the marginal tax rate for small businesses is reduced by 10 percent, those businesses’ gross receipts increase by over 8 percent.” • An August 2004 analysis released by the Tax Foundation, written by foundation president Scott Hodge and senior economist J. Scott Moody, pointed out that “an extraordinarily high proportion of high-income taxpayers have some form of business income and that as their incomes rise, so too does the likelihood that they have business activity.” It turned out that 74 percent of the top 1 percent of income earners had business activity. This group broke down as 68 percent of those with incomes between $317,000 and $499,999 had business activity; 77 percent between $500,000 and $999,999; and 83 percent with incomes of $1 million or more.

## 2N Weighing

### Small Biz Key

#### Small businesses are the strongest internal link to the economy – strongest driver of growth and they’re the most vulnerable

Shepherdson 9/1 [Ian Shepherdson, contributor for Forbes, “Small Businesses Are The (Missing) Key To A Full Economic Recovery”]

You can’t understand the current state of the U.S. economy without understanding the role of small businesses. Big companies have been performing well for the past four years, thanks in part to huge support from the Fed in the early days after the meltdown of the financial system, but the small business sector is barely growing at all, if the monthly survey from the National Federation of Independent Business is to be believed. Small firms account for about half of GDP and employ about half the workforce, so if they are struggling it is very hard for the economy as a whole to grow in line with its long-term trend. Most small firms are tiny, with fewer than 10 employees, so their only external source of finance, apart from the owner’s pocket, is the bank. The stock of bank lending to commercial and industrial companies fell by about a quarter in the two years after Lehman, continuing to contract long after the capital markets, which provide most of the finance for big companies, re-opened for business. Small firms were not responsible for the boom or the bust, but they are an easy target for banks which have to shrink their balance sheets in a hurry. The Fed and the administration saved the banking system, but they did nothing to prevent the massive credit crunch which then engulfed small businesses. Bank lending began to recover in late 2010 and the stock of lending to companies has now returned to its pre-Lehman level, just. But this takes no account of inflation, and it will take at least another year for real lending to return to its previous peak. Until that happens, small firms will be constrained in their ability to hire, build inventory and spend on capital equipment, new software, buildings and research and development. And in the meantime, measures of small business activity and sentiment will remain much weaker than those of larger businesses, and the rate of economic growth will be stranded between the two, as it has been since the recovery began in 2009. Wall Street is fixated on public companies and doesn’t get the importance of the smallest companies, which is why analysts fall back on the idea that sluggish growth is now the “new normal”.

#### Sheer number of small businesses means harming them will tank the economy – they’re key to jobs

Sugars 12 [Brad, writer for NBC News, “How Many Jobs Can Your Startup Create This Year?”]

This, in my view, makes your entrepreneurial efforts not only one of the most creative endeavors you can undertake, but also one of the most noble and important. A small business can have major effects--sometimes invisible or not immediately seen--on its owners, employees, customers and suppliers. It also can share its resources with nonprofit groups, charities or religious institutions in the local community. Estimates place the number of small businesses in the U.S. at between 25 million and 27 million. Although many of these are "micro-companies" or are run by "solo-preneurs," the statistics are pretty consistent in showing that 60 percent to 80 percent of all U.S. jobs are created by small businesses. Just think what could happen to our unemployment rate--as well as our GDP--if every small business grew enough this year to hire just one additional person. A job would be created for each of the 13 million or so who are currently unemployed, and we'd have to find other new hires for the remaining 12 million companies.

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# Econ Stuff

## Frontlines

### A2 Budget

#### Democrat-controlled Congresses have never balanced the budget in the last 4 decades – zero risk of a link turn

Jeffrey 10 [(Terrence, editor in chief of CNSNews.com, editor of Human Events for CS News, alternative news source the Media Research Center considers less biased) “No Congress in which the Democrats controlled both the House and Senate has balanced the federal budget since fiscal 1969--more than 40 years ago.” CS News March 15] AT

(CNSNews.com) - Many leading Democrats in Washington these days like to point to the fact that the federal budget was balanced for part of the time that President Bill Clinton was in office. What they do not mention is that those balanced budgets occurred only when Republicans controlled both houses of Congress. In fact, according to the historical data published by the Office of Management and Budget in the Obama White House, no Congress in which the Democrats controlled both the House and Senate has balanced the federal budget since fiscal 1969--more than 40 years ago. The federal appropriations made for that fiscal year—which began on July 1, 1968 and ended on June 30, 1969--were approved by a Democrat-controlled Congress elected in 1966. They were signed by lame-duck Democratic President Lyndon Johnson, who had decided not to run for reelection in 1968. (Until 1977, the federal fiscal year began on July 1 and ended on June 30. Since 1977, it has begun on Oct. 1 and ended on Sept. 30. Federal fiscal years are numbered by the calendar year in which they end.) President Eisenhower in 1960 was the last Republican president to preside over a balanced budget. A Democrat-controlled Congress elected in 1958 approved the appropriations for that fiscal year in 1959. More recently, the federal budget was balanced in fiscal years 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001. A Republican-controlled Congress approved the appropriations for each one of those years and Democratic President Bill Clinton signed them. In fiscal years 1994 and 1995, when President Clinton governed with a Democrat-controlled Congress, the federal government ran deficits of $203.2 billion and $163.9 billion respectively. The Republican majority Congress elected in November 1994 presided over two fiscal years with declining deficits—fiscal 1996 and 1997—before it initially balanced the budget in fiscal 1998. In fiscal 1996 and 1997, the deficits were $107.4 billion and $21.9 billion respectively. In the 2000 election, Republicans retained control of the House but the Senate split 50-50 between Republicans and Democrats. In May 2001, Sen. Jim Jeffords of Vermont switched parties from Republican to Independent and began caucusing with the Democrats, giving the Democrats the effective majority and making then-Sen. Tom Daschle (D.-S.D.) the majority leader. That split Congress was responsible for the appropriations for fiscal 2002, which put the federal government back into a deficit. After Republicans regained control of the Senate in the November 2002 elections (thus taking control of the budget process for fiscal 2004 which would begin on Oct. 1, 2003), the all-Republican Congress continued running deficits for four fiscal years (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). During that time, with President George W. Bush in the White House, the Republicans controlled both the legislative and executive branches but failed to balance the budget. In the November 2006 elections, Democrats won back the majority in both the House and Senate, and in the three fiscal years that have started since then (2008, 2009, 2010), they have run record deficits of $458.6 billion, $1.41 trillion and $1.55 trillion. The estimated deficit for this fiscal year (2010) of $1.55 trillion is more than three times as large as the $458.6 billion deficit that President George W. Bush presided over with a Democratic Congress in fiscal 2008. In fiscal 2010, of course, Democrats controlled both Houses of Congress as well as the White House.

#### Prefer this evidence – it’s specific to how Congress influences the budget, not the President – Congress signs the annual government budget, not the President

Morrison 12 [(Michael, Ph.D. Candidate, Research Assistant, and Teaching Assistant Dept of Economics at Univ of New Mexico) “Do Republicans Do a Better Job with the Economy? What Does the Evidence Say” Decisions Based on Evidence, Oct 23] AT

I’m of the belief that Presidents get too much credit for an economy that’s growing and too much blame for economic downturns or recoveries. The reality is 1) Congress has control of the budget and IRS tax code; 2) the Federal Reserve has control of monetary policy; and 3) there’s something called the normal business cycle.

## Impacts

### Turns Democracy

#### Economic growth leads to more democracy, while economic recession hurts democracy – the academic consensus is overwhelming, it’s just a question of long-term effects.

Barro 99 [Robert J. Barro. Paul M. Warburg Professor of Economics at Harvard University. “Determinants of democracy.” Journal of Political Economy Vol. 107, No. S6 (December 1999), pp. S158-S183. 1999] AJ

A panel study of over 100 countries from 1960 to 1995 finds that improvements in the standard of living predict increase in democracy, as measured by a subjective indicator of electoral rights. The propensity for democracy rises with per capita GDP, primary schooling, and a smaller gap between male and female primary attainment. For a given standard of living, democaracy tends to fall with urbnization and with a greater reliance on natrual resources. Democracy has little relation to country size but rises with the middle‐class share of income. The apparently strong relation of democracy to colonial heritage mostly disappears when the economic variables are held constant. Similarly, the allowance for these economic variables weakens the interplay between democracy and religious affiliation. However, negative effects from Muslim and non‐religious affiliations remain intact.

#### He continues:

Barro 99 [Robert J. Barro. Paul M. Warburg Professor of Economics at Harvard University. “Determinants of democracy.” Journal of Political Economy Vol. 107, No. S6 (December 1999), pp. S158-S183. 1999] AJ

Inspection of the cross-country data suggests that countries at low levels of economic development typically do not sustain democracy. For example, the political freedoms installed in most of the newly independent African states in the early 1960s did not tend to last. Conversely, nondemocratic places that experience substantial economic development tend to become more dramatic. Examples include Chile, South Korea, Taiwan, Spain, and Portugal. Moreover, the countries of central and eastern Europe—which have been reasonably advanced economically for some time, especially in terms of education—eventually became more democratic.

#### Weighing

#### Magnitude: Decreases in civil liberties are a much worse violation of citizens’ preferences than lower turnout, which has no real impact since the basic democratic framework will still exist.

#### I control the internal link: Civil liberties are a key form of political participation, and they outweigh since there’s a much greater chance for expression.

#### Rollbacks: There’s no point in small democratic benefits if the whole system will collapse in a few years – your arguments are impossible if the entire democratic system is undermined

#### Scope – growth affects people not just in democracies, but also helps non-democracies become more democratic so it affects more people on net

### Turns Poverty/Inequality

#### Economic growth is the single best way to reduce poverty – solves even better than social spending policies

Bhagwati 11 [(Jagdish, University Professor of Law and Economics at Columbia University, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, served in top-level advisory positions for the WTO and UN, Economic Policy Adviser to the Director-General, GATT, Special Adviser to the UN on globalization) “Does Redistributing Income Reduce Poverty?” Project Syndicate Oct. 27, 2011] AT

NEW YORK – Many on the left are suspicious of the idea that economic growth helps to reduce poverty in developing countries. They argue that growth-oriented policies seek to increase gross national product, not to ameliorate poverty, and that redistribution is the key to poverty reduction. These assertions, however, are not borne out by the evidence. Since the 1950’s, developmental economists have understood that growth in GNP is not synonymous with increased welfare. But, even prior to independence, India’s leaders saw growth as essential for reducing poverty and increasing social welfare. In economic terms, growth was an instrument, not a target – the means by which the true targets, like poverty reduction and the social advancement of the masses, would be achieved. A quarter-century ago, I pointed out the two distinct ways in which economic growth would have this effect. First, growth would pull the poor into gainful employment, thereby helping to lift them out of poverty. Higher incomes would enable them to increase their personal spending on education and health (as seems to have been happening in India during its recent period of accelerated growth). Second, growth increases state revenues, which means that the government can potentially spend more on health and education for the poor. Of course, a country does not necessarily spend more on such items simply because it has increased revenue, and, even if it does, the programs it chooses to fund may not be effective. In almost willful ignorance of the fact that the growth-centered model has proved itself time and again, skeptics advocate an alternative “redistributive” developmental model, which they believe will have a greater impact on reducing poverty. Critics of the growth model argue that it is imperative to redistribute income and wealth as soon as possible. They claim that the Indian state of Kerala and the country of Bangladesh are examples where redistribution, rather than growth, has led to better outcomes for the poor than in the rest of India. CommentsYet, as Columbia University economist Arvind Panagariya’s recent work shows, Kerala’s social statistics were better than those in the rest of the country even before it instituted its current redistributive model. Moreover, Kerala has profited immensely from remittances sent home by its émigré workers in the Middle East, a factor unrelated to its redistributive policy. As for Bangladesh, the United Nations’ Human Development Index, admittedly a problematic source, ranks it below India. In impoverished countries where the poor exceed the rich by a huge margin, redistribution would increase the consumption of the poor only minimally – by, say, a chapati a day – and the increase would not be sustainable in a context of low income and high population growth. In short, for most developing countries, growth is the principal strategy for inclusive development – that is, development that consciously includes the marginal and poorest members of a society.

### Turns Heg

#### Economic slowdown causes fast decline – outweighs the aff

Khalilzad 11 [Zalmay Khalilzad, fromer US ambasadaor to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the UN, “The Economy and National Security”, National Review Online, February 8, 2011] AT

We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution ofpower. These trends [which] could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition[.] among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. Thestakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars[.] among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars.American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions. As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression.

### Turns Fossil Fuels/Warming

#### Falling economy causes massive increase in fossil fuel consumption

Sanders 90 [Jerry W. Sanders 90, Prof. Peace and Conflict Studies, UC, Berkeley [“Global Ecology and World Economy: Collision Course or Sustainable Future”, Bulletin of Peace Proposals Vol. 21 (4) p. 395-401] AT

What will be the likely impact of economic stagnation and increasing competition on the environment? Prospects of slower growth might be greeted as good news — all other things being equal. But other things are seldom equal, the factors critical to environmental balance being no exception. Whatever ecological respite that might be expected to accrue from the overall decrease of industrial activity will be more than offset by the impact of increasingly desperate efforts to remain competitive. This will be true for rich and poor alike, Among the United States, Japan, Germany, and others in the top industrial tier of nations, the race will be on to develop the breakthrough technologies that can accelerate productivity and spur a new era of growth — micro-electronics, biotechnology, telecommunications, new sources of energy including nuclear power, and other potentially high-payoff sectors yet to be discovered. The more intense the competition and the greater the conflict, the less likely potential environmental risks will be accurately assessed and given proper weight in strategic planning and investment decision. Meanwhile, slower growth will lower the costs of fossil fuels, removing economic incentives for conservation. To make matters worse, heightened competition will make cheaper and dirtier forms of energy like soft coal that much more attractive. Thus, the hoped-for benefits of limited growth will be canceled out by less environmentally sensitive paths of production. Among the poorest countries, particularly those burdened by debt, we can except that a shrinking world market and declining terms of trade will serve to accelerate deforestation and soil exhaustion as nations seek to maximize agricultural, mining, and other commodity exports in a losing effort to stay even. Paradoxically, therefore, stagnant growth very likely will produce increases in carbon dioxide and other trace gases that trigger global warming, acid rain, and toxic waste that poison ground water, and desertification that makes the spread of fallow land a growing danger in many regions of the Third World.

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# Nuclear Deterrence DA

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### 1NC Shell

#### Republicans have a strong advantage in the 2014 elections

Bartash 10/8 [Jeffry Bartash. “Why House Republicans aren’t sweating the 2014 election.” Market Watch. October 8, 2013, 1:20 PM. <http://blogs.marketwatch.com/capitolreport/2013/10/08/why-house-republicans-arent-sweating-the-2014-election/>] AJ

The public fingers Republicans for most of the blame over the government shutdown, but that doesn’t mean the GOP faces grave danger of losing power in the House come the 2014 midterm elections. Two articles, one from the left-leaning New Republic and another from the right-leaning Weekly Standard, see slim to no chance that Democrats will capture the House in 2014. And by some accounts, Republicans face not-insurmountable odds of taking control of the Senate. Can it really be possible? The latest Washington Post poll, for example, shows that 70% of Americans disapprove of Republican tactics in the budget impasse. Yet as both the New Republic and Standard articles point out, Democrats face a number of tall hurdles to winning the House. First and foremost, they haven’t recruited enough good candidates to challenge the most susceptible Republicans, most of whom are entrenched incumbents with moderate voting records. [Second,] Americans also have notoriously short political memories. So the fiscal fights of 2013 are likely to have faded in the minds of most persuadable voters by November 2014 — unless the more dangerous stalemate over the debt ceiling triggers an economic calamity. Consider what happened in 1996. Voters only threw out three Republican House members just a mere nine months after an extended government shutdown for which conservatives were widely blamed. The GOP even won two Senate seats to extend its majority in that chamber. Another hurdle for Democrats is the once-a-decade redistricting process that took place in 2010. Republicans controlled more state governments than Democrats and they used their influence to solidify the GOP’s grip on the party’s more vulnerable districts. That helps explain why Republicans only lost eight seats in 2012 even though Democrats won 1.7 million more votes nationwide in congressional races. By far the biggest obstacle is history: mid-term elections heavily favor the party not in the White House. The opposition party has picked up seats in 24 of the 28 midterm elections since 1900, in many cases making big gains. Read Stuart Rothenberg on why the House is not in play right now. More crucially, the president’s party has never won control of the House after being in the minority ahead of the midterms. Put another way, Democrats are trying to do what’s never been done before. They need to win 17 seats to oust Republicans, but even in the four midterms when the president’s own party did well, the gains ranged from just five to 11 seats.

#### Democrats would make huge electoral gains under CV, comfortably winning the House and Senate.

Leon 13 [Fernanda L L de Leon. Assistant Professor. School of Economics. University of East Anglia. “Adding Ideology to the Equation: New Predictions for Election Results under Compulsory Voting.” No 44, University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series. April 15, 2013] AJ

Turning to the results, if the current voting population had the ideological prefer-ences of a compulsory electorate, Democrats would gain an average of 8.7 p[ercent] .p. to their vote shares and would win (i.e. obtain more than 50% of votes) in 68% (=44/64) of the compulsory elections, as opposed to 43.75% (=28/64) as predicted for voluntary elections. They actually won 48.4% (=31/64) of total races. The actual value and predictions for Democratsívote share in the 2000 and 2004 senatorial race are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. In Figure 1, I present the data sorted by predicted vote share for voluntary voting to ease the comparison with compulsory voting predictions. It shows (and more formal analysis conÖrms) that candidates with expected lower vote shares are the ones that benefit more from compulsory elections.15 These are mostly Democrats that run for elections in red states like Wyoming, Indiana, and Mississippi. It is possible that Democrats that self-select to run for election in "safe Republican" states are weaker than other Democrats (those in toss-up state, for example.) This Önding is also in line with the "Two-e§ect hypothesis" proposed by DeNardo (1980). According to this concept, higher turnout helps the minority party within an electorate, since this is the a¢ liation of "peripheral" voters (those who vote occasionally). The mechanism driving these results are that, under compulsory voting, peripheral voters or moderates become a larger fraction of the electorate. According to this paperís predictions, in the 2000 Wyoming election, the Democrat challenger, mine worker and Örst-time runner Mel Logan, would obtain 54.8% of total votes and beat the Republican incumbent Craig Thomas, a hard-core conservative according to On The Issuesís ratings.16 Figure 1 also shows that those with higher vote share are the ones who lose more votes under compulsory elections (but still would win the election). According to the model, the Democrat incumbent Ron Wyden would see his vote share decrease from 72.5% in CV to 64.4% in VV, but would still beat the Republican candidate Al King. There are still some cases in which the voting system would not make a di§erence in deciding the election outcome or candidatesívote share. One example is the 2000 New York election, a high-proÖle open race in which Hillary Clinton run against Rick Lazio and won the election.

#### *Compulsory voting means democrats control the government*

*Lexington 12 [“If America had compulsory voting, would Democrats win every election?” The Economist, Sep 28th 2012] AT*

*But here is the thing, I suggested to Mr Metcalfe. The poorest and least educated are overwhelmingly Democrats when asked, but—far from comprising Barack Obama’s base—they mostly do not vote (less than 40% of adult high-school drop-outs voted in 2008, for instance, and about 50% of the unemployed). America—a land that takes its liberties seriously—is unlikely to copy Belgium or Australia and adopt compulsory voting. But if it did, Mr Obama would romp home in November. Are you not in fact lucky that so many welfare recipients do not vote, I asked him? He did not agree.*

#### Democratic control causes cuts in nuclear budget – guts deterrence and causes allied prolif and arms races, causing nuclear war

Mazurak 13 [(Zbigniew, defense analyst with 6 years of experience in the field, specializing in the defense budget, nuclear weapons strategy, and missile defense. I also have B.A. and M.A. degrees in history “Stop the Democrats’ unilateral cuts in the US nuclear deterrent!” Conservative Daily News Jun 13, 2013] AT

The Left never ceases to attempt to weaken, sabotage, and undermine the US and its defenses. Its biggest target these days is the nuclear deterrent. As the House moves to consider the annual defense authorization bill, the Democrats have filed a slew of amendments which, if they pass (God forbid), would deeply and unilaterally cut America’s already barely sufficient nuclear deterrent – at a time when no one else is cutting theirs and all adversaries of the US are growing and modernizing their nuclear arsenals. The Intercepts blog at DefenseNews.com reports that an entire slew of such amendments will be introduced by the Democrats during the floor debate; they’ll also attempt to cut the defense budget further, deeper than sequestration. The Left absolutely must be stopped from cutting the (already barely adequate and aging) nuclear deterrent any further. By any means necessary. Here’s why. Cutting the US nuclear deterrent – contrary to the Left’s lies – has not and will never make America and the world more secure. On the contrary, there is abundant evidence it will make America, its allies (including Israel), and the world much less secure, and the world will get much less peaceful. Why? Because cutting America’s defenses makes the US, its allies, and the world less secure, not more. It is military strength that safeguards peace and security, and military weakness that jeopardizes them. Nowhere is this more obvious tha in the nuclear deterrence realm. Cutting the US nuclear deterrent further will make it too small and thus much easier for America’s potential adversaries, like Russia and China, to destroy [it] in a disarming first strike – which Russia reserves the right to conduct, and which China has refused to rule out. Cutting America’s arsenal will also reduce the number of enemy assets (bases, units, stockpiles, industrial facilities, etc.) that the US can hold at risk and threaten to destroy in retaliation – thus precipitously reducing America’s retaliatory power. This is what the Dems’ treasonous policies would do. Russia’s and China’s nuclear arsenals, militaries, and base infrastructure are so large and so redundant and disperses that the US needs thousands, not mere hundreds, of nuclear warheads to deter them – especially to deter both of them. And both of them will have the ability to reduce the US arsenal in a preemptive first strike, if it’s cut as deeply as the Dems’ and their pacifist bankrollers like the Council for a Livable World want to. Russia has 2,800 strategic and up to 4,000 tactical nuclear warheads, deployed and nondeployed. It has 434 ICBMs (most of them multiple/warhead/armed), 251 strategic bombers (each carrying up to 6 nuclear cruise missiles and many also carrying a nuclear freefall bomb), and 14 ballistic missile subs with 16-20 missiles each, and 4-12 warheads per missile, depending on its type (Sinyeva missiles carry only 4 warheads; Liner missiles carry 12). Russian boomer subs can launch their missiles while being homeported. Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal is even larger. It consists of up to 4,000 warheads in various forms: nuclear depth charges, nuclear bombs, warheads for short-range missiles, nuclear artillery shells, etc. Russia can deliver them by many means: surface warships, submarines, cruise missiles, artillery pieces, SRBMs, etc. What’s more, Russia and China are GROWING, not shrinking, their nuclear arsenals. Russia has been doing so since New START ratification – as allowed to do so by that one-sided treaty, which requires cuts only in the US arsenal. Russia is adding warheads as well as delivery systems. It has resumed Tu-160 bomber production from stockpiled parts. China also has a large arsenal – contrary to the false claims of pacifist groups. It has at least 1,800, and up to 3,000, nuclear warheads according to General Viktor Yesin (former Russian missile force chief of staff) and Professor Philip Karber, respectively. It has recently built 3,000 miles of tunnels and bunkers for its nuclear missiles and warheads. You don’t build such a vast network for only a few hundred warheads. China currently has 87 ICBMs (20 DF-4s, 36 DF-5s, at least 30 DF-31/31As, and at least one DF-41), over 1,600 SRBMs, hundreds of ground-launched cruise missiles, at least 100 MRBMs (DF-21s and DF-3s), 6 ballistic missile submarines (5 Jin class, 1 Xia class, with at least 12 nuclear-armed missiles per boat), and 440 nuclear-capable aircraft (H-6, Q-5, JH-7). Both Russia and China are also rapidly modernizing their entire arsenals of warheads and delivery systems. Russia is developing or producing several new ICBM types: the Yars silo-based and Yars-M road-mobile ICBM, a rail-mobile ICBM, the “Avangard” ICBM (little is known about it), a “pseudo-ICBM” with a 6,000 km range, and another ICBM recently mentioned by deputy PM Dmitry Rogozin. Plus the “Son of Satan” ICBM intended to replace the SS-18 heavy ICBM. Russia is also developing a next-generation bomber and has recently fielded the Kalibr sub-launched cruise missile, the Kh-102 air-launched cruise missile, new warheads, and the Su-34 attack aircraft. Moscow is not only growing its arsenal but also becoming more aggressive as well. In the last 12 months, Russia has practiced simulated nuclear bomber strikes on US missile defense facilities five times, each time flying dangerously close to US or allied airspace, and three times flying into Air Defense Identification Zones – forcing US or allied fighters to scramble. For more, see here and here. “Who told you that the Cold War was ever over? It transforms; it is like a virus,” said Russian KGB/FSB defector Sergei Tretyakov in an interview with FOX News in 2009. And yet, the Left wants America to disarm unilaterally in the face of such an aggressive Russia wielding thousands of nuclear weapons! China is also modernizing by fielding new ICBMs (DF-31As, DF-41s), a new air-launched cruise missile (CJ-20), the new Jin class of SSBNs, improved variants of the JL-2 sub-launched ballistic missile with a 12,000 km range, and a sub-launched cruise missile. It’s also developing a new class of SSBNs (follow-on to the Jin class) and has ordered 36 Tu-22M bombers. Concurrently, both China and Russia are also developing missile defenses. Moscow and Beijing aren’t the only nuclear threats to America, though. North Korea has 8-12 nuclear warheads, ICBMs capable of reaching the US, and – through its successful satellite test conducted last December – demonstrated capability to mate nuclear payloads to missiles, confirmed by the DIA and by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel. North Korea has, since the last crisis, announced it will grow, not give up, its nuclear arsenal – and has recently test-fired several SRBMs again. Meanwhile, Iran is racing towards nuclear weapons. And yet, the Dems want America to dramatically and unilaterally cut America’s nuclear deterrent in the face of all of these nuclear threats! What’s more, they lie that cutting America’s deterrent unilaterally will make her and the world safer and more peaceful! Do you see the idiocy of this, Dear Reader? Meanwhile, America’s allies are slowly losing trust in America’s nuclear umbrella, which is being continually cut and undermined by the Dems. Already, 66.5% of South Koreans want their country to have nuclear weapons, and Japan has recently opened a facility that can produce enough plutonium for 3,600 warheads in several months if need be… that is, if the US cuts its nuclear umbrella further. If the US continues doing so, America’s allies will have no choice but to develop their own arsenals, as they cannot afford to bet their security, and indeed their very existence, on the Democrats’ “unilateral disarmament will make us safer” fantasies – or on America breaking free of Democrat rule in 2016. What’s more, the US needs to be able to deter nuclear threats not only today, but well into the future – decades from now. That cannot be done with a tiny nuclear deterrent, because the arsenals of America’s adversaries, already large, will only grow in the future. Thus, so must America’s arsenal. Remember: in the nuclear deterrence business, there is zero allowable margin of risk and zero room for error. Cutting America’s nuclear deterrent has only made her, her allies, and the world much less secure and peaceful. The US has reduced its arsenal by over 75% since the Cold War’s end; stopped designing, producing, or testing new warheads; hasn’t deployed a new ICBM since 1986 and a new bomber since the early 1990s; hasn’t modernized its nuclear warheads or facilities since the Cold War’s end; and is not seriously modernizing what arsenal it has left. (This is a deliberate Obama administration policy: their Undesecretary of State for Arms Control has said, “We’re not modernizing. That has been one of the basic tenets and principles of our policy.”) Meanwhile, Russia has begun rebuilding its nuclear arsenal, China has dramatically increased its, and two new states – Pakistan and North Korea – have joined the nuclear club. Iran is well on its way there, defying all international sanctions. Judged by the results, “arms control” – cutting the US nuclear arsenal deeply – has been an utter failure which has made America, its allies, and the world dramatically less secure while encouraging nuclear proliferation. The US should do the exact opposite of what the Democrats demand. It should modernize and grow, not cut, its nuclear arsenal. UPDATE: The debate is now ongoing on the House floor. Liberal Democrat Jim Cooper of Tennessee, one of the most vociferous Democrat opponents of America’s nuclear deterrent, has just made the ridiculous statement that “What’s good for a missile base in Wyoming is not necessarily good for our country.” The missile base he referred to is Francis E. Warren Air Force Base in WY. Do you believe, Congressman, that having a strong, large, and dispersed nuclear deterrent, consisting of three legs (ICBMs, bombers, submarines) is a bad thing? That having a large nuclear deterrent to dissuade Russia, China, and North Korea is a bad thing? Because that is exactly what you suggest when you make such claims. This is not about one missile base in Wyoming. This is about preserving the nuclear deterrent – the part of our defenses which is responsible for protecting America and its allies against the gravest threats we face - Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. And ICBMs are by far the cheapest, most ready, and most responsive part of that deterrent, costing only 1 bn dollars per year to maintain. No real savings can be achieved by cutting them. Congressman Cooper is a fool and needs to apologize to the folks in WY and to the Air Force. UPDATE #2: The House has passed an amendment to preserve America’s current ICBMs in operational status, thus barring Obama from scrapping them. While 7 Democrats voted for it, 4 pseudoconservative “libertarian” Republicans voted against it: Justin Amash of MI, Mick Mulvaney of SC, Thomas Massie of KY, and Putin lover Dana Rohrabacher of CA. In so doing, these 4 RINOs essentially voted to give Obama a free hand to scrap America’s ICBMs – the cheapest, most ready, most responsive, and most dispersed leg of the nuclear triad, joining 185 liberal Democrats – their true ideological allies. There is absolutely NO excuse – military, fiscal or other – for what they’ve done. The entire ICBM fleet costs only 1 billion per year to maintain, so even scrapping it completely would save only 1 bn dollars – not even a drop in the bucket that the budget deficit is. In addition to being the cheapest, the ICBM leg of the triad is also the most ready, most responsive, and most dispersed one, deployed in 450 different (and hardened) siloes across North Dakota, Montana, and Wyoming and with a 95-99% readiness rate at any moment. It could be launched minutes after the President giving the order. And perhaps that’s why the Left – including leftist anti-defense Republicans like Amash, Massie, Mulvaney, and Rohrabacher have targeted it – because it’s so powerful, so ready, and so responsive at such a little fiscal cost. The only good thing they’ve done by voting against maintaining America’s ICBMs is to show the entire nation that they are pseudoconservatives and are, in fact, strident anti-defense liberals/libertarians, and do not belong in the GOP or in the Congress. There is no excuse for voting against preserving ICBMs – the cheapest, most ready, and most responsive leg of the nuclear triad.

### Extra Impacts

#### Cuts kill the nuclear triad and gut deterrence of space weapons

Maginnis 11 [(Robert, retired Army lieutenant colonel, and a national security and foreign affairs analyst for radio and television) ‘CATASTROPHIC’ DEFENSE CUTS SEEN AS TIPPING POINT OF U.S. MILITARY SUPREMACY, 10/20/11, Human Events] AT

Our nuclear deterrence could diminish. Cuts would undermine our nuclear triad—our ability to detect and defend against missile attack, nuclear weapons inventories, and satellite space-launch capabilities. These cuts could cause allies and adversaries to question our ability to provide a nuclear response to an attack, concludes the Republican staff. Military infrastructure and the industrial base could suffer a serious blow. Shipyards could be closed, long-planned military construction projects may be scuttled, and a new round of Base Realignment and Closure would be necessary. Much of the armed services’ equipment modernization and recapitalization could be put on hold or canceled, including the Joint Strike Fighter and the much-needed aerial refueling tanker. Defense spending may be discretionary, but constitutionally national security is government’s top responsibility. We live in a dangerous world which demands a significant armed force to protect America across all domains—air, land, sea, space and cyberspace. America must get its fiscal house in order, and defense should share the burden. But providing national security on the cheap to avoid cutting social programs to help Democrats’ political fortunes is wrongheaded, and may in fact create a tipping point for America as the world’s leading military power.

#### Space weaponization causes Extinction

Mitchell 1 [Gordon Mitchell et al, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Pittsburg, 7/2001. ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defense no. 6] AT

A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble intentions of 'peace through strength' deterrence, but this rationale glosses over the tendency that '… the presence of space weapons…will result in the increased likelihood of their use'.33 This drift toward usage is strengthened by a strategic fact elucidated by Frank Barnaby: when it comes to arming the heavens, 'antiballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare technologies go hand-in-hand'.34 The interlocking nature of offense and defense in military space technology stems from the inherent 'dual capability' of spaceborne weapon components. As Marc Vidricaire, Delegation of Canada to the UN Conference on Disarmament, explains: 'If you want to intercept something in space, you could use the same capability to target something on land'. 35 To the extent that ballistic missile interceptors based in space can knock out enemy missiles in mid-flight, such interceptors can also be used as orbiting 'Death Stars', capable of sending munitions hurtling through the Earth's atmosphere. The dizzying speed of space warfare would introduce intense 'use or lose' pressure into strategic calculations, with the spectre of split-second attacks creating incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated 'hair trigger' devices. In theory, this automation would enhance survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, by taking the decision to commit violence out of human hands and endowing computers with authority to make war, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict. Yale sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed 'complexly interactive, tightly coupled' industrial systems such as space weapons, which have many sophisticated components that all depend on each other's flawless performance. According to Perrow, this interlocking complexity makes it impossible to foresee all the different ways such systems could fail. As Perrow explains, '[t]he odd term "normal accident" is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable'.36 Deployment of space weapons with pre-delegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable, given the susceptibility of such systems to 'normal accidents'. It is chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a space war. According to retired Lt. Col. Robert M. Bowman, 'even a tiny projectile reentering from space strikes the earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous damage — even more than would be done by a nuclear weapon of the same size!'. 37 In the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defence analyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing offensive weapons ever conceived: 'One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people'.38 Given this unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to imagine that any nation subjected to space weapon attack would retaliate with maximum force, including use of nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons. An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen.

#### Nuclear triad solves three unique scenarios for nuclear war – allied proliferation, hostile aggression, and crisis escalation

Williams 10 [(David, Major in U.S. Air Force) “A Review of U.S. First-Strike Ambiguity and the Triad Nuclear Force,” Defense Threat Reduction Journal 10 October] AT

The Case for Continuity The case for the continuity of current U.S. nuclear policies and structure involves consideration of their benefits in terms of security, international prestige, domestic politics, and technology. 8 From a security perspective, nuclear weapons ensure security because the potential usage of nuclear weapons during a conflict raises the cost of war to an unacceptable level. 9 Scott Sagan notes that: Nuclear declaratory policy is meant to enhance deterrence of potential adversaries by providing a signal of the intentions, options and proclivities of the U.S. government in different crisis and war-time scenarios. 10 I would argue, however, that an ambiguous U.S. first use policy of nuclear weapons creates valuable uncertainty on the part of potential adversaries. This uncertainty, coupled with U.S. nuclear and conventional superiority, makes overt state aggression against the U.S. or its’ allies a very uncertain and potentially disastrous proposition, thus not likely to happen. After all, no state has started a war with the U.S. since it acquired nuclear weapons. No part of the U.S. nuclear triad can be eliminated without creating an adverse impact on deterrence. This is the case because each element of the triad fills a unique role that makes U.S. nuclear forces lethal, survivable, and visible. Submarines offer the greatest degree of survivability, but the lowest degree of accuracy and become vulnerable upon surfacing. Bombers are the most accurate and only recallable option, but they are vulnerable to defensive counter-air missions and groundbased anti-aircraft fire. ICBMs are the most reliable means of delivery and the only sovereign launched option, yet are all located at known, stationary sites that are easily targeted by enemy ICBM forces, special operations teams, or terrorist surrogates. One may not consider the visibility of nuclear forces to be desirable, but the visibility of bombers and ICBMs allows for clear signaling to potential adversaries about U.S. intentions during a crisis. Take the Cuban Missile Crisis for example: President Kennedy used naval and air forces in order to signal his intent toward Premier Khrushchev. This signaling ensured there were no doubts about U.S. willingness to go to war to prevent Soviet missiles from being placed in Cuba. Future conflicts may require signaling of a similar nature to prevent deadly exchanges. For example, if Kim Jong Il were notified that the U.S. was uploading nuclear-armed bombers in response to North Korean deployments of nuclear-armed missiles, he might reconsider his actions. From the perspective of international prestige, other powers are retaining and in some cases enhancing their nuclear capability, yet as Younger points out, the U.S. is not modernizing any aspect of its inventory. 11 Instead, the U.S. is relying on mathematical projections and estimations regarding the reliability of its systems and deploying them well beyond what most states would consider a reasonable service-life. Further reductions in strategic nuclear forces could be seen as evidence of retrenchment on the part of the U.S. by ambitious rising or reemerging powers, thus increasing the risk of war. The U.S. could be characterized as a declining power by rising powers who are seeking either initial or enhanced nuclear technology. Rising powers, after all, will work to realign the international balance of power in their favor: one way of doing so is through countering U.S. military capabilities. If the U.S. were to reduce its capability by eliminating portions of the triad, then it would essentially be making it easier for other powers to challenge the current U.S. position. Further, without the potential threat of a nuclear first strike, U.S. allies might feel less secure about U.S. security commitments, especially in light of current troop commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such insecurity has the potential to lead these allies to pursue nuclear capabilities of their own, as well as embolden hostile states to gamble on a lack of U.S. retaliation for WMD usage or conventional aggression. For example, when the U.S. considered reducing troop levels in South Korea, the government in Seoul signaled a potential shift in policy toward a nuclear capability to protect itself from possible North Korean aggression. 12 This threat resulted in very quick U.S. reassurances about troop levels and its commitment to defending South Korea

### Nukes Turn Heg

#### Extended deterrence is the vital internal link to hegemony

Lind 7 [(Michael. Senior Fellow at New America) “Beyond American Hegemony” The National Interest, June 07] AT

During the Cold War, the United States was the stronger of two superpowers in a bipolar world. The anti-Soviet alliance was not a traditional alliance of equals, but a hegemonic alliance centered on the United States. West Germany, Japan and South Korea were semi-sovereign U.S. protectorates. Britain and France were more independent, but even they received the benefits of "extended deterrence," according to which the United States agreed to treat an attack on them as the equivalent of an attack on the American homeland. America’s Cold War strategy was often described as dual containment -- the containment not only of America’s enemies like the Soviet Union and (until the 1970s) communist China, but also of America’s allies, in particular West Germany and Japan. Dual containment permitted the United States to mobilize German and Japanese industrial might as part of the anti-Soviet coalition, while forestalling the re-emergence of Germany and Japan as independent military powers. The Cold War officially ended in Paris in 1990, but the United States has continued to pursue a dual containment strategy based on three principles: dissuasion, reassurance and coercive non-proliferation. Dissuasion -- directed at actual or potential challengers to the United States -- commits the United States to outspend all other great military powers, whether friend or foe. This policy’s goal -- in the words of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance draft leaked from then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney’s Pentagon -- is the dissuasion or "deterring [of] potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role." By the end of the 1990s, as Charles Krauthammer noted in these pages four years ago: "The result is the dominance of a single power unlike anything ever seen. Even at its height Britain could always be seriously challenged by the next greatest powers. Britain had a smaller army than the land powers of Europe and its navy was equaled by the next two navies combined. Today, American military spending exceeds that of the next twenty countries combined. Its navy, air force and space power are unrivaled." This approach flies in the face of the strategy usually adopted by traditional status quo great powers, which sought to ensure that they belonged to alliances with resources that exceeded those of potential challengers. It is no surprise that, despite the absence of any threat to the United States equivalent to that of the Soviet Union, our defense spending today, as a share of our total GDP, is nearly at the Cold War average. High levels of defense expenditures are not merely to overawe potential challengers. (In outlining possible competitors, Krauthammer noted, "Only China grew in strength, but coming from so far behind it will be decades before it can challenge American primacy -- and that assumes that its current growth continues unabated.") To again quote from the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance, "we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order." Reassurance, the second prong of the hegemonic strategy, entails convincing major powers not to build up their military capabilities, allowing the United States to assume the burdens of ensuring their security instead. In other words, while outspending allies like Germany and Japan on defense, the United States should be prepared to fight wars on behalf of Germany and Japan, sparing them the necessity of re-arming -- for fear that these countries, having "renationalized" their defense policies and rearmed, might become hostile to the United States at some future date. For example, even though the threats emanating from the spillover of the Balkan conflicts affected Germany and its neighbors far more than a geographically far-removed United States, Washington took the lead in waging the 1999 Kosovo war -- in part to forestall the emergence of a Germany prepared to act independently. And the Persian Gulf War was, among other things, a reassurance war on behalf of Japan -- far more dependent on Persian Gulf oil than the United States -- confirmed by the fact that Japan paid a substantial portion of the United States’ costs in that conflict. Today, the great question is whether or not two other Asian giants -- India and China -- will eschew the development of true blue-water navies and continue to allow the United States to take responsibility for keeping the Gulf open. Finally, the global hegemony strategy insists that America’s safety depends not on the absence of a hostile hegemon in Europe, Asia and the Middle East -- the traditional American approach -- but on the permanent presence of the United States itself as the military hegemon of Europe, the military hegemon of Asia and the military hegemon of the Middle East. In each of these areas, the regional powers would consent to perpetual U.S. domination either voluntarily, because the United States assumed their defense burdens (reassurance), or involuntarily, because the superior U.S. military intimidated them into acquiescence (dissuasion). American military hegemony in Europe, Asia and the Middle East depends on the ability of the U.S. military to threaten and, if necessary, to use military force to defeat any regional challenge-but at a relatively low cost. This is because the American public is not prepared to pay the costs necessary if the United States is to be a "hyperpower."

### Stable Heg Module

#### Hegemonic transition inevitable.

Haass 8 [(Richard, Pres at Council on Foreign Relations) “Bottom of Form The Age of Nonpolarity What Will Follow U.S. Dominance”, Foreign Affairs May/June] AT

But even if great-power rivals have not emerged, unipolarity has ended. Three explanations for its demise stand out. The first is historical. States develop; they get better at generating and piecing together the human, financial, and technological resources that lead to productivity and prosperity. The same holds for corporations and other organizations. The rise of these new powers cannot be stopped. The result is an ever larger number of actors able to exert influence regionally or globally. A second cause is U.S. policy. To paraphrase Walt Kelly's Pogo, the post-World War II comic hero, we have met the explanation and it is us. By both what it has done and what it has failed to do, the United States has accelerated the emergence of alternative power centers in the world and has weakened its own position relative to them. U.S. energy policy (or the lack thereof) is a driving force behind the end of unipolarity. Since the first oil shocks of the 1970s, U.S. consumption of oil has grown by approximately 20 percent, and, more important, U.S. imports of petroleum products have more than doubled in volume and nearly doubled as a percentage of consumption. This growth in demand for foreign oil has helped drive up the world price of oil from just over $20 a barrel to over $100 a barrel in less than a decade. The result is an enormous transfer of wealth and leverage to those states with energy reserves. In short, U.S. energy policy has helped bring about the emergence of oil and gas producers as major power centers. U.S. economic policy has played a role as well. President Lyndon Johnson was widely criticized for simultaneously fighting a war in Vietnam and increasing domestic spending. President Bush has fought costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, allowed discretionary spending to increase by an annual rate of eight percent, and cut taxes. As a result, the United States' fiscal position declined from a surplus of over $100 billion in 2001 to an estimated deficit of approximately $250 billion in 2007. Perhaps more relevant is the ballooning current account deficit, which is now more than six percent of GDP. This places downward pressure on the dollar, stimulates inflation, and contributes to the accumulation of wealth and power elsewhere in the world. Poor regulation of the U.S. mortgage market and and the credit crisis it has spawned have exacerbated these problems. The war in Iraq has also contributed to the dilution of the United States' position in the world. The war in Iraq has proved to be an expensive war of choice -- militarily, economically, and diplomatically as well as in human terms. Years ago, the historian Paul Kennedy outlined his thesis about "imperial overstretch," which posited that the United States would eventually decline by overreaching, just as other great powers had in the past. Kennedy's theory turned out to apply most immediately to the Soviet Union, but the United States -- for all its corrective mechanisms and dynamism -- has not proved to be immune. It is not simply that the U.S. military will take a generation to recover from Iraq; it is also that the United States lacks sufficient military assets to continue doing what it is doing in Iraq, much less assume new burdens of any scale elsewhere. Finally, today's nonpolar world is not simply a result of the rise of other states and organizations or of the failures and follies of U.S. policy. It is also an inevitable consequence of globalization. Globalization has increased the volume, velocity, and importance of cross-border flows of just about everything, from drugs, e-mails, greenhouse gases, manufactured goods, and people to television and radio signals, viruses (virtual and real), and weapons. Globalization reinforces nonpolarity in two fundamental ways. First, many cross-border flows take place outside the control of governments and without their knowledge. As a result, globalization dilutes the influence of the major powers. Second, these same flows often strengthen the capacities of nonstate actors, such as energy exporters (who are experiencing a dramatic increase in wealth owing to transfers from importers), terrorists (who use the Internet to recruit and train, the international banking system to move resources, and the global transport system to move people), rogue states (who can exploit black and gray markets), and Fortune 500 firms (who quickly move personnel and investments). It is increasingly apparent that being the strongest state no longer means having a near monopoly on power. It is easier than ever before for individuals and groups to accumulate and project substantial power. NONPOLAR DISORDER The increasingly nonpolar world will have mostly negative consequences for the United States -- and for much of the rest of the world as well. It will make it more difficult for Washington to lead on those occasions when it seeks to promote collective responses to regional and global challenges. One reason has to do with simple arithmetic. With so many more actors possessing meaningful power and trying to assert influence, it will be more difficult to build collective responses and make institutions work. Herding dozens is harder than herding a few. The inability to reach agreement in the Doha Round of global trade talks is a telling example. Nonpolarity will also increase the number of threats and vulnerabilities facing a country such as the United States. These threats can take the form of rogue states, terrorist groups, energy producers that choose to reduce their output, or central banks whose action or inaction can create conditions that affect the role and strength of the U.S. dollar. The Federal Reserve might want to think twice before continuing to lower interest rates, lest it precipitate a further move away from the dollar. There can be worse things than a recession. Iran is a case in point. Its effort to become a nuclear power is a result of nonpolarity. Thanks more than anything to the surge in oil prices, it has become another meaningful concentration of power, one able to exert influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, the Palestinian territories, and beyond, as well as within OPEC. It has many sources of technology and finance and numerous markets for its energy exports. And due to nonpolarity, the United States cannot manage Iran alone. Rather, Washington is dependent on others to support political and economic sanctions or block Tehran's access to nuclear technology and materials. Nonpolarity begets nonpolarity.

#### US arsenal makes the transition stable preventing great power war.

Alagappa 8 [(Editor. Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow at East-West Center) “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, p. 484] AT

The fear of escalation to nuclear war conditions the role of force in major power relations and circumscribes strategic interaction among them. By restraining measures and actions that could lead to conflict escalation, nuclear weapons limit the competitive strategic interaction of major powers to internal and external balancing for deterrence purposes; constrain their resort to coercive diplomacy and compellence; and shift the burden of international competition and adjustment in status and influence to the economic, political, and diplomatic arenas. They also render remote the possibility of a hegemonic war should a power transition occur in the region. More immediately, nuclear weapons enable Russia and China to deter the much stronger United States and mitigate the negative consequences of the imbalance in conventional military capability. Nuclear weapons reinforce India’s confidence in dealing with China. By reducing military vulnerabilities and providing insurance against unexpected contingencies, nuclear weapons enable major powers to take a long view and engage in competition as well as cooperation with potential adversaries. Differences and disputes among them arc frozen or settled through negotiations. Though they are not the only or even primary factor driving strategic visions and policies, nuclear weapons are an important consideration, especially in the role of force in major power strategic interaction. They prevent the outbreak of large-scale war. Military clashes when they occur tend to be limited.

## 2N Add-Ons

### 2N Impact Calc – Deterrence

#### The DA outweighs the case:

#### ( ) Inevitability – even if the aff solves the scenario in the 1AC, some other conflict is inevitable – that non-uniques their impacts.

Layne 9 [(Chris, Gates Chair in Intel at Texas A&M) “The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics,” 2009, Pg 317] AT

The international system’s polarity affects extended deterrence’s efficacy. During the Cold War, the bipolar nature of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry in Europe stabilized the superpower relationship by demarcating the continent into U.S. and Soviet spheres of influence that delineated the vital interests of both superpowers. Each knew it courted disaster if it challenged the other’s sphere. Also, the superpowers were able to exercise control over their major allies to minimize the risk of being chain-ganged into a conflict. In the early twenty-first century, however, the international system will be multipolar and, arguably, less stable and more conflict prone than a bipolar international system. Spheres of influence will not be delineated clearly. In addition, because other states will have more latitude to pursue their own foreign and security policy agendas than they did during the Cold War, the risk will be much greater that the United States could be chain-ganged into a conflict because of a protected state’s irresponsible behavior.

#### ( ) But deterrence solves all causes of war – this also means there is no risk of extinction in the neg world since the arsenal solves their impacts

Morgan and Paul 9 [Patrick and Tom. Proliferation Experts. Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age, 2009, Pg 9-10] AT

Among the great powers (the five permanent members of the UNSC), nuclear weapons are largely seen as a hedge against the emergence of great-power conflict in the future. The great-power relationships in the post-cold war era are characterized by "recessed general deterrence", or dissuasion, in which states do not expect immediate militarized conflict, but weapons are kept in the background as insurance given the inherent uncertainties of world politics. The end of the cold war witnessed substantial changes in the deterrence dynamics involving great powers and, as a result, general deterrence and dissuasion became operational concepts. Although they do maintain large arsenals, neither the United States nor Russia is presumed to hold automatic launch-on-warming attack plans anymore, although some of the elements of the previous era are continuing. In addition, they have reduced the number of weapons they possess, although the numbers still exceed a minimum nuclear deterrence posture. The three other old nuclear powers - china, the UK, and France, - also have been maintaining smaller arsenals, but this might change as Chinese nuclear force modernization plans come to fruition in the coming decades. The logic behind the maintenance of nuclear capabilities is that the great powers want to be prepared in case their relations deteriorate in the future. Nuclear capability can also be construed as an assurance against the expansionist pathologies of great powers as described in perspectives such as offensive realism. Moreover, uncertainties in Russia and China give pause to Western nuclear powers while, for Moscow, the fear of American influence in its former spheres in Eastern Europe and Central Asia is the cardinal source of anxiety. For the rising power, China, nuclear weapons offer a major insurance against direct assault on its strategic sphere, allowing it to rise peacefully. Nuclear weapons also offer a limited but crucial deterrent against potential conflict escalation between the US and China involving Taiwan. The great-power deterrence calculations are thus based on "recessed general deterrence" as well as "existential deterrence": no immediate expectations of war exist among them. However, as Patrick Morgan states, "if serious conflicts emerge again, then deterrence will be in vogue - if not, at least for a lengthy period, then deterrence will operate offstage, held in reserve, and will not be the cornerstone of security management for the system." This does not mean that the relations in the US-Russia and US-China dyads would remain the same in the long run. Power transition has invariably been turbulent in the international system, and herein lies the role that nuclear weapons may play in deterring a transition war. US-Russia relations could deteriorate, and deterrence could become even more relevant if tensions build up over the establishment of missile defenses in Eastern Europe and over Russian efforts to repudiate major arms control agreements in its effort to regain its lost superpower status. As discussed in Morgan and Paul's chapter in this volume, nuclear deterrence in this context has offered the major powers greater maneuverability. It has allowed the major power states to sustain their credentials as system managers and has prevented the emergence of active security dilemmas among them that can be caused by conventional arms races and technological breakthroughs. Absent the fear of existential wars, the potentially rival states have engaged in greater economic interactions. The increasing trade relations between the United States and China and China and India, an emerging power, suggest that general nuclear deterrence may offer economic spin-off benefits. To some extent, the stability in relations among the great powers, with no war in sight between them, points to the pacifying role that nuclear weapons may be playing, although other causes are present as well. In that sense, nuclear weapons may act as crucial factors in preventing a power-transition war akin to those that the world experienced in the 19th and 20th centuries. For Russia, the superpower that declined, nuclear deterrence offers an opportunity not to be excessively alarmed by the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

### 2N Impact Calc - Space Wep

#### Extend Mitchell – space weaponization causes extinction – couple reasons it outweighs----

#### ----A) Instability – fast space weapons prolif undermines stable deterrence and causes miscalculation making war more likely – it introduces use or lose pressures – nuclear weapons have stable deterrence since countries already have them

#### ----B) Deterrence breakdowns­ – false alarms are more likely since orbiting weapons can be destroyed by space debris – even a paper clip can trigger accidental global wars in space

Ritchie 82 (David, IT Business Relationship Manager at SELEX S&AS, Spacewar, http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1768/)

Perhaps the greatest danger posed by the militarization of space is that of war by accident. At any given time, several thousand satellites and other pieces of equipment -- spent booster stages and the like -- are circling the earth, most of them in low orbit. The space immediately above the atmosphere has begun to resemble an expressway at rush hour. It is not uncommon for satellites to miss each other by only a kilometer or two, and satellites crashing into each other may explain some of the mysterious incidents in which space vehicles simply vanish from the skies. One civillian TV satellite has been lost in space; it never entered its intended orbit, and no signals were heard from it to indicate where it might have gone. Collision with something else in space seems a reasonable explanation of this disappearance. Even a tiny fragment of metal striking a satellite at a relative velocity of a few kilometers per second would wreck the satellite, ripping through it like a Magnum slug through a tin can. Now suppose that kind of mishap befell a military satellite -- in the worst possible situation, during a time of international tension with all players in the spacewar game braced for attacks on their spacecraft. The culpable fragment might be invisible from the ground; even something as small and light as a paper clip could inflict massive damage on a satellite at high velocity. Unaware of the accident, a less than cautious leader might interpret it as a preconceived attack. Wars have begun over smaller incidents.

#### ----C) Empirics – Nuclear war hasn’t ever happened even through all the tensions in the past – empirically disproves your scenario – space weaponization is the only unique cause of war – Mitchell says it the most destructive since it makes draw-in and accidental war inevitable

#### ----D) Magnitude – future weapons are more destructive than nuclear weapons – they’re capable of far greater destruction; also this forces countries to retaliate with larger weapons; my impacts uniquely cause all-out launch of the entire arsenal – countries won’t show restraint

### 2N Prolif Impact

#### Extend Mazurak – cuts in the arsenal means allies don’t perceive the US arsenal as enough to protect them anymore, causing them to proliferate for self-defense.

#### Prolif risks war and nuclear terrorism

Roberts 99 [Brad, Institute for Defense Analyses, Fall 1999, Nonproliferation Review] AT

But the standard answers don’t really take us very far into this problem any more. To grasp the full stake requires a broader notion of stability—and an appreciation of the particular historical moment in which we find ourselves. It is an accident of history that the diffusion of dual-use capabilities is coterminous with the end of the Cold War. That diffusion means that we are moving irreversibly into an international system in which the wildfire-like spread of weapons is a real possibility. The end of the Cold War has brought with it great volatility in the relations of major and minor powers in the international system. What then is at stake? In response to some catalytic event, entire regions could rapidly cross the threshold from latent to extant weapons capability, and from covert to overt postures, a process that would be highly competitive and risky, and which likely would spill over wherever the divides among regions are not tidy. This would sorely test Ken Waltz’s familiar old heresy that “more may be better”7—indeed, even Waltz assumed proliferation would be stabilizing only if it is gradual, and warned against the rapid spread of weapons to multiple states. At the very least, this would fuel NBC terrorism, as a general proliferation of NBC weaponry would likely erode the constraints that heretofore have inhibited states from sponsoring terrorist use of these capabilities. Given its global stature and media culture, America would be a likely target of some of these terrorist actions.

### 2N I/L Wall

#### The link is linear and large – the FAST PACE at which they reduce the arsenal UNIQUELY collapses deterrence

Nye 9 [(Joseph, University Distinguished Service Professor of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, renowned expert on IR and US hegemony) “Hearing of the Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee” 25 June, The Fed News Service,] AT

Well, having once worked on nonproliferation way back in the Carter administration, it's worth recalling that we're not doing quite as badly as the daily headlines would imply. John F. Kennedy expected there to be 25 countries with nuclear weapons by the 1970s; there are nine. That's better than was expected. So the nonproliferation regime -- the treaties and so forth -- have had some beneficial effect. Though, they there are now severely challenged by both North Korea and Iran. I think the important thing to realize is that there's an inherent dilemma in nonproliferation, which is that as you approach zero nuclear weapons, things may become more unstable rather than more stable, because a little bit of cheating can go a long way, whereas, when you have larger numbers, a little bit of cheating probably doesn't matter as much. And this raises the following paradox, which is that part of the reason that there hasn't been more proliferation is because we have been able to extend guarantees of our nuclear umbrella over others. Japan obviously has the capacity to go nuclear if it so wished. It hasn't felt the need because we've extended deterrence. So the dilemma is that if we were to go too fast, too hard, too close to zero, we would bring nuclear deterrence -- extended deterrence into question. And I think that's why I said in my testimony -- important to focus on the fact that extended deterrence rests very heavily on credibility, not just capability. In other words, the fact that there are 50,000 American troops forward based in Japan is tremendously important, just like the presence of American troops in Berlin allowed us to defend Berlin in the Cold War in situations when the Soviets had local superiority.

#### And we’re at the brink – any US reduction pushes us over and guarantees wildfire prolif

Perry 9 [William J. Perry. James R. Schlesinger. Harry Cartland, Fred Ikle, John Foster, Keith Payne, John Glenn, Bruce Tarter, Morton Halperin, Ellen Williams, Lee Hamilton, James Woolsey, “America’s Strategic Posture”] AT

Nuclear weapons have safeguarded our security for decades during the Cold War by deterring an attack on the United States or its allies. We will need to maintain this deterrence capability for some years to come. On the other hand, if nuclear weapons were to fall into the hands of a terror organization, they could pose an extremely serious threat to our security, and one for which deterrence would not be applicable. This is not a theoretical danger. Al Qaeda, for example, has declared that obtaining a nuclear weapon is a “holy duty” for its members. Fortunately, no terror group is able to build a nuclear weapon from scratch, but as new nations achieve a nuclear weapons capability, the probability increases that one of these new nuclear powers will either sell or lose control of its fissile material or even one of its bombs. This is also not a theoretical danger, as illustrated by A. Q. Khan’s black market in nuclear materials and technology. Thus, preventing nuclear terrorism is closely tied to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But we are in danger of losing the battle to stop proliferation. Under the guise of a nuclear power program, North Korea has developed a small nuclear arsenal in the last few years. Iran appears to be following in its footsteps, and other nations, particularly in the Mideast, are starting nuclear power programs using Iran as a model. Thus, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and fissile materials is dangerously close to a “tipping point.”

### 2N NoKo Module (A2 Turns)

#### Extend Mazurak – Drawdown of the arsenal decks the credibility of America’s deterrent – specifically it causes North Korean launch and Korean and Japanese prolif

Payne 7 [(Keith, President of the National Institute for Public Policy) “On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance” Security Studies Quarterly, Summer 07] AT

That officials and commentators in key allied countries perceive great value in US nuclear weapons for extended deterrence suggests strongly that these weapons do have unique assurance value. There is a direct connection between allied perceptions of the assurance value of US nuclear weapons for extended deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation. There may seem to be an incongruity between the US maintenance of its own nuclear arsenal for deterrence and its simultaneous advocacy of nuclear nonproliferation; a prominent member of Congress has likened this seeming incongruity to a drunkard advocating abstinence. However, given the obvious importance of US nuclear weapons for its extended deterrence responsibilities and the critical role which US extended nuclear deterrence plays in nonproliferation, there is no incongruity. Sustaining US capabilities for extended nuclear deterrence is critical for nuclear nonproliferation. Such allied commentary does not demonstrate directly the value of nuclear weapons for deterrence—again, it is US opponents who ultimately determine the deterrence value of US nuclear weapons. It is, however, significant evidence of the importance of US nuclear weapons for the assurance of allies via extended deterrence. It also is important to recognize that for North Korea’s closest neighbors, including Japan and South Korea, the question of the value of US nuclear weapons is not an academic or theoretical debate about preferred utopian futures. It is a most serious concern among these Asian leaders who undoubtedly understand North Korea at least as well as US commentators. They believe that US nuclear weapons are critical to the deterrence of North Korea and thus their own assurance. These are only perceptions; their perceptions, however, may be particularly well-informed, and both deterrence and assurance fundamentally are about perceptions. The apparent importance of US nuclear weapons for extended deterrence, assurance, and thus nonproliferation may distress US commentators who would prefer US deterrence threats to be largely or exclusively nonnuclear. Just as deterrent effect ultimately is determined by opponents, however, what does or does not assure allies is not decided by the preferences of US commentators, but by the allies themselves. The United States can decide what priority it places on the assurance of allies and how it will proceed to support that goal, but only the allies can decide whether they are assured. In the contemporary environment, available evidence suggests strongly that assurance is an important goal and that US nuclear weapons are critical to the assurance of key allies to a level they deem adequate. The United States could decide to withdraw the nuclear umbrella and provide only a nonnuclear commitment. As discussed above, however, it is likely that the US withdrawal of its nuclear extended deterrent coverage would create new and powerful incentives for nuclear proliferation among its friends and allies who, to date, have felt sufficiently secure under the US extended nuclear deterrent to remain nonnuclear.53 This linkage is not speculative; it is voiced by allies who feel increasingly at risk. Extreme care should be exercised before moving in a direction that carries the risk of unleashing a nuclear proliferation “cascade”—such as moving prematurely in the direction of a wholly nonnuclear force structure. As a 2007 report by the Department of State’s International Security Advisory Board concludes, There is clear evidence in diplomatic channels that US assurances to include the nuclear umbrella have been, and continue to be, the single most important reason many allies have foresworn nuclear weapons. This umbrella is too important to sacrifice on the basis of an unproven ideal that nuclear disarmament in the US would lead to a more secure world . . . a lessening of the US nuclear umbrella could very well trigger a cascade [of nuclear proliferation] in East Asia and the Middle East.

#### North Korea war causes extinction

Chol 2 [(Kim, Exec Director of the Center for Korean-American Peace) “Agreed Framework is Brain Dead: Shotgun Wedding is the Only Option to Defuse Crisis” www.nautilus.org 10/24/08] AT

The second choice is for the Americans to initiate military action to knock out the nuclear facilities in North Korea. Without precise knowledge of the location of those target facilities, the American policy planners face the real risk of North Korea launching a full-scale war against South Korea, Japan and the U.S. The North Korean retaliation will most likely leave South Korea and Japan totally devastated with the Metropolitan U.S. being consumed in nuclear conflagration. Looking down on the demolished American homeland, American policy planners aboard a special Boeing jets will have good cause to claim, "We are winners, although our homeland is in ashes. We are safely alive on this jet." The third and last option is to agree to a shotgun wedding with the North Koreans. It means entering into package solution negotiations with the North Koreans, offering to sign a peace treaty to terminate the relations of hostility, establish full diplomatic relations between the two enemy states, withdraw the American forces from South Korea, remove North Korea from the list of axis of evil states and terrorist-sponsoring states, and give North Korea most favored nation treatment. The first two options should be sobering nightmare scenarios for a wise Bush and his policy planners. If they should opt for either of the scenarios, that would be their decision, which the North Koreans are in no position to take issue with. The Americans would realize too late that the North Korean mean what they say. The North Koreans will use all their resources in their arsenal to fight a full-scale nuclear exchange with the Americans in the last war of [hu]mankind. A nuclear-armed North Korea would be most destabilizing in the region and the rest of the world in the eyes of the Americans. They would end up finding themselves reduced to a second-class nuclear power. [this evidence has been gender modified]

#### And the unique situation of Asia magnifies all the risks of a nuclear arsenal – this turns all their offense – it’s the most likely scenario for war so it also outweighs their impacts

Cimbala 8 [Stephen, Distinguished Prof. Pol. Sci. – Penn. State Brandywine, Comparative Strategy, “Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia”, 27] AT

If the possibility existed of a mistaken preemption during and immediately after the Cold War, between the experienced nuclear forces and command systems of America and Russia, then it may be a matter of even more concern with regard to states with newer and more opaque forces and command systems. In addition, the Americans and Soviets (and then Russians) had a great deal of experience getting to know one another’s military operational proclivities and doctrinal idiosyncrasies, including those that might influence the decision for or against war. Another consideration, relative to nuclear stability in the present century, is that the Americans and their NATO allies shared with the Soviets and Russians a commonality of culture and historical experience. Future threats to American or Russian security from weapons of mass destruction may be presented by states or nonstate actors motivated by cultural and social predispositions not easily understood by those in the West nor subject to favorable manipulation during a crisis. The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural crosscurrents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War, in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.12 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another’s vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and NorthKorea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strike-vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. For policymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.16 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.

#### Only credibility of threats can prevent Kim Jong Un from initiating conflict

David S. Maxwell 12, the Associate Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies and the Security Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University, “IS THE KIM FAMILY REGIME RATIONAL AND WHY DON’T THE NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE REBEL?”, January, Foreign Policy Research Institute, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201201.maxwell.nkorea.html

With the death of Kim Jong-il and the ensuing temporary focus on North Korea, I was recently asked some questions that I think are worth considering. In light of the negative reaction of the South Korean stock markets to the rumor that the North had conducted a nuclear test, I was asked whether the North would ever carry out the irrational act of using its very limited nuclear weapons against the South when such an action would cause the end of the regime? In addition, given the horrendous suffering of the North, many rightly question why North Koreans do not rebel against the tyrannical and criminal dictatorship -- arguably one of the worst violators of human rights in modern history -- of the Kim Family Regime (KFR)? This paper will provide some thoughts on the answers to these separate but inter-related questions.¶ IS NORTH KOREA RATIONAL?¶ The political entity North Korea, or more specifically the Kim Family Regime, is very rational in the sense that it knows what it wants and works tirelessly to achieve it. The regime’s operating strategy can be broken down as follows:¶ Vital national interest: survival of the Kim Family Regime (not the nation-state but the regime).¶ Strategic aim: reunification of the Peninsula under the control of the DPRK (the only way to ensure the long-term survival of the KFR -- because anything else means that it will not survive)¶ Key condition to achieve its strategic aim: get US forces off the Peninsula (or in Sun Tzu terms “split the alliance”).¶ International political aim: to be recognized as a nuclear power.¶ Why does the North want (or need in its calculus) nuclear weapons? First and foremost it believes that it needs its nuclear program as a necessary deterrent. We should understand that the lessons that the regime has learned from Iraq and Libya are that their downfalls were a result of their not yet having developed nuclear weapons. Of course if anything happens to limit Iran’s development of such weapons (like what happened to Syria’s covert reactor several years ago) that lesson will only be reinforced.¶ Second, the nuclear program has proved to be an extremely useful strategic instrument in its diplomatic toolkit that has resulted in a range of political and economic concessions over the years and it will exploit that tool for as long as the regime is in existence.¶ Third, in my opinion, the regime is not suicidal at all and everything that it does and will do is focused on protecting its vital national interest. However, as irrational as it may seem to us that could include launching a war (particularly if the regime believes it is threatened and has no other alternative). And what is really dangerous to the region is that by the nature of the system no one is going to tell Kim Jong-un that his military is not capable of winning and the information that he receives from people around him (who have to act like sycophants in order to survive) can make a very irrational decision to us seem very rational to him.¶ Fourth, deterrence has been effective against the North. Hwang Jong Yop's debriefings suggest that the North has never initiated an attack on the ROK because it knows that it cannot win a nuclear war with the US and it believes that the US would use nuclear weapons against it. [1] This calculation drove its need for its own nuclear deterrent, which the regime had been trying to develop since the 1950's. Ironically, the very effectiveness of our deterrent drove the North to possess its own.¶ Lastly, I think an examination of the regime's actions over the past 60 years shows that it has been very rationally following its own "play book" to protect its vital national interests based on its understanding of the international and peninsula security situation. It has been singularly focused on its vital national interest and achieving its strategic aim as well as using provocations to gain political and economic concessions.¶ Of course on the flip side there are myriad reasons to judge the North as irrational: Is it rational to think it can win a war with the ROK, let alone with the ROK-US alliance? Is it rational to use provocations up to and including either the use or sale of nuclear weapons or capabilities? Is it rational to starve some 23 million people to allow the regime to survive? Was it rational to attack and hijack the Pueblo? Is it rational to attempt multiple assassinations to kill the South Korean leadership (at least twice in Seoul and once in Rangoon) and to use terrorist action against the South and international community? Is it rational to trade in myriad illicit activities to include being one of the world's largest and most proficient counterfeiters (to include that of US currency but also cigarettes and drugs such as Viagra and methamphetamines)? Is it rational to turn down Chinese help for economic reform (because such reform would likely end the regime)? Of course from our perspective the answer to my rhetorical questions is no but we cannot just view the problem from our perspective or even through the eyes of South Koreans, who are now vastly different than the North Korean regime. From the Kim Family Regime’s perspective, it has acted in a very rational way and, if we look at things carefully, we should see it has acted in a very predictable way over the past 60 years.

## A2 Arsenal Bad

### Overview + Disads

#### I access and turn these impacts ---- here is the top-level framing issue on the arsenal debate – the US arsenal uniquely deters other states from proliferating so if the US reduces its arsenal, other states will proliferate – it’s not a question of whether the US arsenal is good but whether it’s better than other countries developing new arsenals – that non-uniques all of their offense. All the following turns will be unique but their offense won’t---

#### First – the US arsenal is uniquely on the brink – Mazurak says the democrats will reduce the arsenal just enough to destroy credible deterrence but no more. The perception of deterrence will decrease strongly but the risk of their turns will only decline marginally since the number of weapons is only slightly lower – my offense will outweigh theirs on strength of link

#### Second [read a turn]

### ----Small Arsenals DA [Miscalc]

#### ( ) Small arsenals aren’t sufficient to deter – new proliferators will escalate to nuclear wars

James 2000 [Carolyn C., prof at Department of Political Science at Iowa State University, “Nuclear Arsenal Games: Coping with Proliferation in a World of Changing Rivalries”, Canadian Journal of Political Science] AT

Mini-arsenal presents more specifically a minimal nuclear capability and its relation to crisis behaviour. This is perhaps the most complex, and therefore difficult, level to describe. First, a mini-arsenal state is capable of acquiring, at best, two or three, crude Hiroshima or Nagasaki-style warheads. Fat Man, the bomb dropped on Nagasaki, was about 20 kilotons, the more powerful of the two used by the United States in 1945. This pales in comparison to thermonuclear weapons, that are measured in megatons. India, Israel and Pakistan, which can project significant nuclear threats, are beyond this category since the arsenals they are believed to possess contain qualitatively and quantitatively much more destructive power. Second, the most critical distinction of the mini-arsenal is that, while potential damage may be extreme, destruction of state or society is not assured. A strike from a mini-arsenal state may be survivable-militarily, politically and socially. This perception, which may be held both by the mini-arsenal state leadership and its potential enemies, is expected to result in preferences and behaviour that do not match actions of states with more deadly arsenals. Leadership that is more willing to risk domestic populations may consciously choose to escalate wars to nuclear levels if the state and its government may survive. Of the four levels of nuclear capability, mini-arsenal dyads promise to be the most unstable during crises as the deadliest of cost-benefit analyses are expected to take place.

#### But even small nuclear wars are sufficient to cause extinction

Davidson 6 [(Chronicle Science Writer) 12/12/2006 “Small nuclear war could severely cool the planet” San Francisco Chronicle] AT

A regional nuclear war between Third World nations could trigger planetwide cooling that would likely ravage agriculture and kill millions of people, scientists reported Monday. For many years, Western military scientists and strategists have assumed that the damage from small-scale regional nuclear wars would be limited to continents on which they occurred. Now, in a revamping of the "nuclear winter" debate of the 1980s, new and far more sophisticated computer models show that even these little nuclear wars could create global devastation. Scientists, reporting their findings at the American Geophysical Conference in San Francisco, said vast urban firestorms ignited by war would send thick, dark clouds into the upper atmosphere, blocking the sun's rays and cooling much of the planet, with severe climatic and agricultural results. The soot might remain in the upper atmosphere for up to a decade. "All hell would break loose," said Prof. Richard Turco of UCLA's department of atmospheric and ocean sciences. In some places, the planet could cool more than it did during the so-called Little Ice Age of the 17th century, when glaciers advanced over much of northern Europe, said Alan Robock of Rutgers University, speaking Monday at a news conference at the Moscone Center, where the conference is being held this week. "It would be very difficult for agriculture," he said. The scientists' research is a new twist on the nuclear winter hypothesis, which attracted attention in the early 1980s. Back then, planetary scientist Carl Sagan and others warned that a much larger nuclear war between the United States and Soviet Union would lead to extensive atmospheric cooling and agricultural failure on a much greater scale and kill far more people. The hypothesis sparked widespread scientific and political controversy. It faded from public attention toward the end of the Cold War, after which many U.S. strategists concluded that major nuclear wars that threatened all civilization were improbable. But that judgment was premature, because of the recent emergence of small- and medium-sized nations that either have or are trying to develop nuclear weapons, the scientists warned. They said that worldwide, a regional nuclear war could kill tens of millions of people, partly because even a small number of nuclear blasts could generate enough smoke to trigger a global climate change. The nuclear explosions and smoke could also damage the ozone layer in the upper atmosphere, they said. That layer shields Earth's surface from cancer-causing radiation from the sun. Initially, about 20 percent of the soot would be washed out of the atmosphere by rainfall, said Turco, who was one of the pioneers of the original nuclear winter hypothesis. However, much of the rest of the soot would rise skyward and warm as it was baked by the sun. That warming would make the soot more buoyant and force it even higher into the sky until it penetrated the stratosphere -- just above the tops of thunderclouds -- where high-speed winds would quickly spread the soot throughout the atmosphere, Turco and his colleagues said.

### ----Fast Prolif DA [Miscalc]

#### ( ) Fast prolif DA----

#### A) The Mazurak evidence proves drawdown of the US arsenal triggers allied prolif – since they know the US can’t protect them they’ll build arsenals to protect themselves, which threatens their rivals causing them to proliferate as well – this cascades into sudden wildfire prolif

#### And here’s more evidence – drawdown also guts international restraint on prolif, causing nuclear war

Utgoff 2 [Victor, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses and former Senior Member of the National security Council Staff, Survival, “Proliferation, Missile Defense and American Ambitions”, 44: 2, Summer, p. 87] AT

Further, the large number of states that became capable of building nuclear weapons over the years, but chose not to, can be reasonably well explained by the fact that most were formally allied with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Both these superpowers had strong nuclear forces and put great pressure on their allies not to build nuclear weapons. Since the Cold War, the US has retained all its allies. In addition, NATO has extended its protection to some of the previous allies of the Soviet Union and plans on taking in more. Nuclear proliferation by India and Pakistan, and proliferation programmes by North Korea, Iran and Iraq, all involve states in the opposite situation: all judged that they faced serious military opposition and had little prospect of establishing a reliable supporting alliance with a suitably strong, nuclear-armed state. What would await the world if strong protectors, especially the United States, were no longer seen as willing to protect states from nuclear-backed aggression? At least a few additional states would begin to build their own nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to distant targets, and these initiatives would spur increasing numbers of the world’s capable states to follow suit. Restraint would seem ever less necessary and ever more dangerous. Meanwhile, more states are becoming capable of building nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Many, perhaps most, of the world’s states are becoming sufficiently wealthy, and the technology for building nuclear forces continues to improve and spread. Finally, it seems highly likely that at some point, halting proliferation will come to be seen as a lost cause and the restraints on it will disappear. Once that happens, the transition to a highly proliferated world would probably be very rapid. While some regions might be able to hold the line for a time, the threats posed by wildfire proliferation in most other areas could create pressures that would finally overcome all restraint.

#### B) Fast prolif uniquely makes deterrence breakdowns more likely, risking war – it’s worse than the stable US deterrent

Roberts 99 [Brad, Institute for Defense Analyses, Fall 1999, Nonproliferation Review] AT

But the standard answers don’t really take us very far into this problem any more. To grasp the full stake requires a broader notion of stability—and an appreciation of the particular historical moment in which we find ourselves. It is an accident of history that the diffusion of dual-use capabilities is coterminous with the end of the Cold War. That diffusion means that we are moving irreversibly into an international system in which the wildfire-like spread of weapons is a real possibility. The end of the Cold War has brought with it great volatility in the relations of major and minor powers in the international system. What then is at stake? In response to some catalytic event, entire regions could rapidly cross the threshold from latent to extant weapons capability, and from covert to overt postures, a process that would be highly competitive and risky, and which likely would spill over wherever the divides among regions are not tidy. This would sorely test Ken Waltz’s familiar old heresy that “more may be better”7—indeed, even Waltz assumed proliferation would be stabilizing only if it is gradual, and warned against the rapid spread of weapons to multiple states. At the very least, this would fuel NBC terrorism, as a general proliferation of NBC weaponry would likely erode the constraints that heretofore have inhibited states from sponsoring terrorist use of these capabilities. Given its global stature and media culture, America would be a likely target of some of these terrorist actions.

### ----Secret Arsenals DA [Miscalc/Accidents]

#### ( ) Secret Arsenals DA----

#### A) New proliferators will develop their arsenals covertly, risking accidental launch or safety failures

Sagan 3 [Scott D. Sagan, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Co-Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, “More Will Be Worse” The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, W.W. Norton, 2003] AT

Waltz asked why we should expect new nuclear states to experience greater difficulties than did the old ones. The number of near-accidents with U.S. nuclear weapons during the cold war suggests that there would he reason enough to worry about nuclear accidents in new nuclear states even if their safety difficulties were “only” as great as those experienced by old nuclear powers. Unfortunately, there are also five strong reasons to expect that new nuclear states will face even greater risks of nuclear accidents. First, some emergent nuclear powers lack the organizational and financial resources to produce adequate mechanical safety devices and safe weapons design features. Although all countries may start with “crude nuclear arsenals,” in Waltz’s terms, the weapons of poorer states will likely be more crude, and will remain so for a longer period of time. Evidence supposing this prediction can be found in the case of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, as United Nations’ inspectors discovered soon after the 1991 Persian Gulf War: The inspectors found out one other thing about the Iraqi bomb [design]— it is highly unstable. The design calls for cramming so much weapon grade uranium into the core, they say, that the bomb would inevitably be on the verge of going off—even while sitting on the workbench. “It could go off if a rifle bullet hit it,” one inspector says, adding: “1 wouldn’t want to be around if it fell off the edge of this desk.” Second, the “opaque” (or covert) nature of nuclear proliferation in the contemporary world exacerbates nuclear weapons safety problems. Fearing the international diplomatic consequences of a public crossing of the nuclear threshold, most new proliferants have developed weapons capabilities in a secret manner. Israel, India (until 1998), South Africa, Pakistan, (until 1998) and possibly North Korea fit this pattern. There are, however, both organizational and technical reasons to believe that this opaque path to nuclear weapons status is inherently less safe. Organizationally, the secrecy and tight compartmentalization of such programs suggests that there will not be thorough monitoring of safety efforts, and the lack of public debate about nuclear issues in such states increases the likelihood that narrow bureaucratic and military interests will not be challenged. (For example, even in the case of India—a very democratic state—the nuclear weapons complex is not thoroughly monitored and supervised by political leaders. 76) Finally, an important technical innovation initiates the safety problem in such states: the inability to have full scale nuclear weapons tests hinders the development of effective safety designs. For example, when the South African weapons engineers examined their first (untested) nuclear device, they considered it to be based on “an unqualified design that could not meet the rigid safety, security, and reliability specifications then under development.” The third reason why new nuclear states will be accident prone is that their tight-coupling problem will be significantly worse at the beginning of this experience with nuclear weapons, since they are in closer proximity to their expected adversaries than were the United States and the Soviet Union. At the start of the cold war, during the strategic bomber era, the superpowers had many hours to determine whether warnings were real or false; later, in the 1960s, they had approximately thirty minutes to react to reports of TCBM attacks; and only after many years of experience with nuclear arsenals did they have to face less than ten minutes of warning time, once missile submarines were deployed off the coasts in the 1970s. New and potential future nuclear rivals— Iran and Iraq, India and Pakistan, North and South Korea— will immediately have very small margins of error at the outset of nuclear rivalries, since they have contiguous borders with their adversaries. Moreover, the poorer of these states are likely to have less reliable warning systems trying to operate successfully in this more challenging environment. Fourth, the risk of an accidental nuclear war will be particularly high if the leader of a government of a new nuclear power, fearing a “decapitation attack” (an attack against the central leadership) by an enemy, delegates the authority to use nuclear weapons to lower level commanders. Proliferation optimists argue that this will not happen because they assume that the leaders of new proliferators would never delegate authority for the use of nuclear weapons to subordinate officers due to fears of coups or insubordination. Although we lack detailed information about nuclear predelegation decisions within new nuclear states, the evidence concerning predelegation of biological and chemical weapons authority in Iraq during the Gulf War supports a more alarming view that predelegation is likely and that it can produce serious risks of accidental war due to responses to false warnings.

#### B) Covert development guts deterrence and causes miscalculation, risking war

Preston 7 (Thomas, associate professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at Washington State University, From Lambs to Lions, Pages 251-252) AT

Since few biostates will overtly announce either bioweapons capabilities or link them formally to deterrence strategies by stating their existing targeting philosophies governing their bioarsenals, the security relationships likely to develop between states in the biological realm will be of the existential de¬terrence variety (Bundy 1982). Opponents will be aware of their rival's un¬acknowledged BW programs and understand that were war to erupt, their ri¬vals would potentially be capable of effectively employing bioweapons against them. This "bugs in the basement" posture would resemble the "bombs in the basement" existential deterrence postures adopted by India and Pakistan prior to their overt testing of nuclear weapons in 1998. Unfortunately, such opaque deterrence postures are not as stable as overt, above-the-board nuclear postures and leave open considerable room for misperception and miscalculation by opponents regarding their opponent's bio¬forces. For example, a lack of understanding about an enemy's motivations or willingness to take risks to defend areas of central interest could lead to misperceptions regarding the will of opponents to actually use their bioarsenals. Similarly, mistaken beliefs about the technical capabilities, or the complexi¬ties of launching a mass-casualty attack, might lead opponents to entertain unjustified notions about the "contestability" of an enemy's bioweapons potential. In either case, these misperceptions or miscalculations serve to undermine the credibility of a state's implicit biological deterrent threats.

#### And safety failures cause war

Sagan 3 [Scott D. Sagan, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Co-Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, “More Will Be Worse” The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, W.W. Norton, 2003] AT

In short, while there have been no catastrophic nuclear weapons accidents in the new nuclear states yet, there are good reasons to anticipate that the probabilities will be high over time. Any serious nuclear weapons accident will have tragic consequences for the local community; and if an accidental detonation, false warning, or unauthorized use of a weapon leads to “mistaken retaliation” and accidental war, the consequences would be even more catastrophic. As long as would-be nuclear states choose not to cross the final threshold of “weaponization” by actually deploying fully assembled nuclear weapons and launchers, these safety problems will largely remain dormant. Once these states begin to deploy arsenals, however, such organizational safety problems are likely to emerge rapidly. The current positive safety record is therefore likely to be only the lull before the storm.

### ----Early Warning DA [Miscalc]

#### ( ) Early warning systems DA – New proliferators don’t have them, risking accidental war

Sagan 3 [Scott D. Sagan, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Co-Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, “More Will Be Worse” The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, W.W. Norton, 2003] AT

Waltz asked why we should expect new nuclear states to experience greater difficulties than did the old ones. The number of near-accidents with U.S. nuclear weapons during the cold war suggests that there would he reason enough to worry about nuclear accidents in new nuclear states even if their safety difficulties were “only” as great as those experienced by old nuclear powers. Unfortunately, there are also five strong reasons to expect that new nuclear states will face even greater risks of nuclear accidents. First, some emergent nuclear powers lack the organizational and financial resources to produce adequate mechanical safety devices and safe weapons design features. Although all countries may start with “crude nuclear arsenals,” in Waltz’s terms, the weapons of poorer states will likely be more crude, and will remain so for a longer period of time. Evidence supposing this prediction can be found in the case of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, as United Nations’ inspectors discovered soon after the 1991 Persian Gulf War: The inspectors found out one other thing about the Iraqi bomb [design]— it is highly unstable. The design calls for cramming so much weapon grade uranium into the core, they say, that the bomb would inevitably be on the verge of going off—even while sitting on the workbench. “It could go off if a rifle bullet hit it,” one inspector says, adding: “1 wouldn’t want to be around if it fell off the edge of this desk.” Second, the “opaque” (or covert) nature of nuclear proliferation in the contemporary world exacerbates nuclear weapons safety problems. Fearing the international diplomatic consequences of a public crossing of the nuclear threshold, most new proliferants have developed weapons capabilities in a secret manner. Israel, India (until 1998), South Africa, Pakistan, (until 1998) and possibly North Korea fit this pattern. There are, however, both organizational and technical reasons to believe that this opaque path to nuclear weapons status is inherently less safe. Organizationally, the secrecy and tight compartmentalization of such programs suggests that there will not be thorough monitoring of safety efforts, and the lack of public debate about nuclear issues in such states increases the likelihood that narrow bureaucratic and military interests will not be challenged. (For example, even in the case of India—a very democratic state—the nuclear weapons complex is not thoroughly monitored and supervised by political leaders. 76) Finally, an important technical innovation initiates the safety problem in such states: the inability to have full scale nuclear weapons tests hinders the development of effective safety designs. For example, when the South African weapons engineers examined their first (untested) nuclear device, they considered it to be based on “an unqualified design that could not meet the rigid safety, security, and reliability specifications then under development.” The third reason why new nuclear states will be accident prone is that their tight-coupling problem will be significantly worse at the beginning of this experience with nuclear weapons, since they are in closer proximity to their expected adversaries than were the United States and the Soviet Union. At the start of the cold war, during the strategic bomber era, the superpowers had many hours to determine whether warnings were real or false; later, in the 1960s, they had approximately thirty minutes to react to reports of TCBM attacks; and only after many years of experience with nuclear arsenals did they have to face less than ten minutes of warning time, once missile submarines were deployed off the coasts in the 1970s. New and potential future nuclear rivals— Iran and Iraq, India and Pakistan, North and South Korea— will immediately have very small margins of error at the outset of nuclear rivalries, since they have contiguous borders with their adversaries. Moreover, the poorer of these states are likely to have less reliable warning systems trying to operate successfully in this more challenging environment. Fourth, the risk of an accidental nuclear war will be particularly high if the leader of a government of a new nuclear power, fearing a “decapitation attack” (an attack against the central leadership) by an enemy, delegates the authority to use nuclear weapons to lower level commanders. Proliferation optimists argue that this will not happen because they assume that the leaders of new proliferators would never delegate authority for the use of nuclear weapons to subordinate officers due to fears of coups or insubordination. Although we lack detailed information about nuclear predelegation decisions within new nuclear states, the evidence concerning predelegation of biological and chemical weapons authority in Iraq during the Gulf War supports a more alarming view that predelegation is likely and that it can produce serious risks of accidental war due to responses to false warnings.

### ----Civilian Controls [Miscalc]

#### ( ) Civilian controls DA----

#### A) New proliferators have military governments

Sagan 95 [(Scott, Associate Professor of Political Science and Chair of the International Relations Program at Stanford University) “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate,” p.49] AT

Second, I argue that there are strong reasons to believe that future nuclear-armed states will lack the positive mechanisms of civilian control. Many current and emerging proliferators have either military-run governments or weak civilian-led governments in which the professional military has a strong and direct influence on policymaking. In such states, the biases, routines, and parochial interests of powerful military organizations, not the "objective" interests of the state, can determine state behavior. In addition, military organizations in many proliferators are "inward-looking," focusing primarily on issues of domestic stability and internal politics, rather than on external threats to national security. When such militaries are in power, senior officers' energies and interests necessarily shift away from professional concerns for the protection of national security; when civilians are in power, but are extremely fearful of military coups, defense policy is designed to protect their regime, not the nation's security, and officers are promoted according to their personal loyalty to current leaders, not their professional competence. In either case, such extensive military involvement in domestic politics, whether active or latent, means that the military's professional competence as a fighting force, and also as a manager of a deterrent force, will suffer. Finally, some new nuclear states have been "born nuclear": Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union without inheriting its stable civil-military relations, historical learning experience, or extensive command and control mechanisms.

#### B) That guts deterrence – military control makes preemptive strikes inevitable

Clark 97 [(Mark, associate professor of political science and director of the national security studies program at California State University) “Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age-book reviews: Neorealism versus Organizational Theory”] AT

Sagan's critique is a healthy antidote to Waltz's optimism. In his view, there are two principal arguments that suggest pessimism about any future with a greater number of nuclear-armed adversaries. From his study of militaries, Sagan finds that their organizational behavior inclines them towards deterrence failure. It is not that militaries want war but that, of all groups in a society, they are the most likely to believe war is probable and are most inclined to adopt preventive or preemptive strategies. Military officers are more skeptical of nonmilitary solutions to conflicts than are their civilian counterparts, according to Sagan. It also makes sense, in classical military terms, to adopt preventive or preemptive strategies, since no military prefers to fight on its adversary's terms. Taking the offensive alleviates some of these problems. Secondly, Sagan argues that newly armed nuclear states will lack the positive mechanisms of civilian control. Here, Sagan's critique is very strong. By examining the history of the U.S. nuclear safety record he is able to document many near accidents and bureaucratic snafus that could have led to catastrophic accidents, and in this way he points out the weakness in Waltz's arguments. Sagan comments: Waltz asked why should we expect new nuclear states to experience greater difficulties than did the old ones? The evidence of the number of near-accidents with U.S. nuclear weapons during the Cold War suggests that there would be reason enough to worry about nuclear accidents in new nuclear states even if their safety difficulties were "only" as great as those experienced by old nuclear powers (p. 80). He adds six reasons why new nuclear powers are unlikely to compile the safety record of the United States. But if the problem is acute for newly emergent nuclear powers that develop their programs indigenously, it will be doubly so for those that inherit or buy their programs. They will lack even the discipline that a new nuclear nation will accrue by investing enormous amounts of time, talent, and treasure into developing its nuclear program.

#### Military control means states won’t develop second-strike capabilities – that guts deterrence

Sagan 3 [(Scott, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Co-Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation) “More Will Be Worse” The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, W.W. Norton, 2003] AT

Why would professional militaries not develop invulnerable nuclear forces if left to their own devices? Five reasons emerge from the logic of organizational theory. First, military bureaucracies, like other organizations, are usually interested in having more resources: they want more weapons, more men in uniform, more of the budget pie. This could obviously lead to larger than necessary nuclear arsenals. Yet programs for making nuclear arsenals less vulnerable to attack (for example building concrete shelters or missile—carrying trains) are very expensive, and therefore decrease the resources available for the military hardware, the missiles or aircraft, that the organization values most highly. Military biases can therefore lead to more weapons but not necessarily more survivable weapons. Second, militaries, like other organizations, favor traditional ways of doing things and therefore maintain a strong sense of organizational “essence.” Since efforts to decrease the vulnerability of nuclear forces often require new missions and weapon systems—and, indeed, often new organizational units—one would expect that the existing organizations would be resistant. Third, if organizational plans for war and conceptions of deterrence do not require invulnerable forces, militaries will not have incentives to pursue building them. Thus, if military officers believe that they are likely to engage in preventive war, preemptive attacks, or even launch-on-warning options, then survivability measures may be perceived as simply unnecessary. Fourth, military organizations inevitably develop routines to coordinate actions among numerous individuals and subunits, and such routines are commonly inflexible and slow to change. Even if the technical requirements for invulnerability are met, however, poorly designed standard operating proceed tires and military routines can undermine a survivable military force. In particular, organizational routines of military forces can produce “signatures” to enemy intelligence agencies; these signatures can inadvertently reveal secret information and the location of otherwise “hidden” military units. Fifth, organizational learning tends to occur only after fail tires. Military organizations, like other organizations, have few incentives to review and adjust operations when they believe they are successful. Thus, if the first four problems create an undesirable survivability problem with nuclear forces, military organizations are unlikely to fix the problem until after an attack has revealed how vulnerable their forces really were.

### ----Terror

#### ( ) Terrorism – new proliferators are uniquely likely to give bombs to terrorists – they have poorer safeguards

Below 8 [TIM D. Q. BELOW, Wing Commander for the Royal Air Force, (Master of Arts degree in Defence Studies from Kings College London), “OPTIONS FOR US NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: EXEMPLARY LEADERSHIP OR EXTRAORDINARY LUNACY?,” A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS, AIR UNIVERSITY MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA, JUNE 2008] AT

Although significant obstacles exist, it is possible for terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons or material. The necessary infrastructure required to develop nuclear weapons is of such a scale as to render such an option unfeasible to any but a state actor, and it has already been observed that even radical states such as Iran may be reticent about providing nuclear arms to terrorist groups. Therefore, the prime acquisition route available to terrorists appears to be through theft or illicit diversion of bombs or materials. Graham Allison observes that there are hundreds of complete weapons and even more non-assembled critical weapon components “currently stored in conditions that leave them vulnerable to theft by determined criminals.”More concerning is Allison’s contention that this parlous state of nuclear security has not gone unnoticed by the criminal fraternity, and almost every month somebody is apprehended trying to steal or smuggle nuclear weapons or materials.

#### Nuclear terror causes extinction

Ayson 10 Robert – Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington – “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July] AT

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks, FN 40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint. FN 40. One way of reducing, but probably not eliminating, such a prospect, is further international cooperation on the control of existing fissile material holdings.

### A2 TURNS

### A2 Deterrence Failures

#### Deterrence failure is STATISTICALLY LESS LIKELY than the harms associated with disarm – this is comparative evidence that rational policymakers should prefer deterrence because it saves far more lives than it ends

Preston ‘7 [Thomas. Assc Prof IR @ Washington State Univ. From Lambs to Lions: Future Security Relationships in a World of Biological and Nuclear Weapons, 2007, Pg 31-2] AT

Advocates of deterrence seldom take the position that it will always work or that it cannot fail. Rather, they take the position that if one can achieve the requisite elements required to achieve a stable deterrent relationship between parties, it vastly decreases the chances of miscalculation and resorting to war - even in the contexts where it might otherwise be expected to occur (George and Smoke 1974; Harvey 1997a; Powell 1990, 2003). Unfortunately, critics of deterrence take the understandable, if unrealistic, position that if deterrence cannot be 100 percent effective under all circumstances, then it is an unsound strategic approach for states to rely upon, especially considering the immense destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Feaver (1993) for example, criticizes reliance on nuclear deterrence because it can fail and that rational deterrence theory can only predict that peace should occur most of the team. Yet, were we to apply this standard of perfection to most other policy approaches concerning security matters - whether it be arms control or proliferation regime efforts, military procurement policies, alliance formation strategies, diplomacy, or sanctions - none could be argued with any more certainty to completely remove the threat of equally devastating wars either. Indeed, one could easily make the argument that these alternative means have shown themselves historically to be far less effective than nuclear arms in preventing wars. Certainly, the 20th century was replete with examples of devastating conventional conflicts which were not deterred through non-nuclear measures. Although the potential costs of a nuclear exchange between small states would indeed cause a frightful loss of life, it would be no more costly (and likely far less so) than large-scale conventional conflicts have been for combatants. Moreover, if nuclear deterrence raises the potential costs of war high enough for policymakers to want to avoid (rather than risk) conflict, it is just as legitimate (if not more so) for optimists to argue in favor of nuclear deterrence in terms of the lives saved through the avoidance of far more likely recourses to conventional wars, as it is for pessimists to warn of the potential costs of deterrence failure. And, while some accounts describing the immense weaknesses of deterrence theory would lead one to believe deterrence was almost impossible to either obtain or maintain, since 1945 there has not been one single historical instance of nuclear deterrence failure (especially when this notion is limited to threats to key central state interests like survival, and not to minor probing of peripheral interests). Moreover, the actual costs of 20th-century conventional conflicts have been staggeringly immense, especially when compared to the actual costs of nuclear conflicts (for example, 210,000 fatalities in the combined 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings compared to 65 million killed overall during World War II, over three million dead in both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, etc.). Further, as Gary (1999) observes, "it is improbable that policymakers anywhere need to be educated as to the extraordinary qualities and quantities of nuclear armaments." Indeed, the high costs and uncontestable, immense levels of destruction that would be caused by nuclear weapons have been shown historically to be facts that have not only been readily apparent and salient to a wide range of policymakers, but ones that have clearly been demonstrated to moderate extreme policy or risk-taking behavior (Blight 1992). Could it go wrong? Of course. There is always that potential with human beings in the loop. Nevertheless, it has also been shown to be effective at moderating policymaker behavior and introducing an element of constraint into situations that otherwise would likely have resulted in war (Hagerty 1998).

### A2 Accidents

#### No accidents – US arsenal has authorization requirements, PALs, and de-targeting that checks accidents – also answers your argument that we’re on a hair trigger

Slocombe 9 [Walter. Former Undersecretary of Defense. “De-Altering: Diagnoses, Prescriptions, and Side-Effects”, a paper presented at the seminar on Re-framing De-Altert. June 2009, www.ewi.info/systems/files/Slocombe.pdf ] AT

Let’s start with Technical Failure – the focus of a great deal of the advocacy, or at least of stress on past incidents of failures of safety and control mechanisms.4 Much of the “de-alerting” literature points to a succession of failures to follow proper procedures and draw from that history the inference that a relatively simple procedural failure could produce a nuclear detonation. The argument is essentially that nuclear weapons systems are sufficiently susceptible of pure accident (including human error or failure at operational/field level) that it is essential to take measures that have the effect of making it necessary to undertake a prolonged reconfiguration of the elements of the nuclear weapons force for a launch or detonation to be physically possible. Specific measures said to serve this objective include separating the weapons from their launchers, burying silo doors, removal of fuzing or launching mechanisms, deliberate avoidance of maintenance measures need to permit rapid firing, and the like. . My view is that this line of action is unnecessary in its own terms and highly problematic from the point of view of other aspects of the problem and that there is a far better option that is largely already in place, at least in the US force – the requirement of external information – a code not held by the operators -- to arm the weapons. Advocates of other, more “physical,” measures often describe the current arrangement as nuclear weapons being on a “hair trigger.” That is – at least with respect to US weapons – a highly misleading characterization. The “hair trigger” figure of speech confuses “alert” status – readiness to act quickly on orders -- with susceptibility to inadvertent action. The “hair trigger” image implies that a minor mistake – akin to jostling a gun – will fire the weapon. The US StratCom commander had a more accurate metaphor when he recently said that US nuclear weapons are less a pistol with a hair trigger than like a pistol in a holster with the safety turned on – and he might have added that in the case of nuclear weapons the “safety” is locked in place by a combination lock that can only be opened and firing made possible if the soldier carrying the pistol receives a message from his chain of command giving him the combination. Whatever other problems the current nuclear posture of the US nuclear force may present, it cannot reasonably be said to be on a “hair trigger.” Since the 1960s the US has taken a series of measures to insure that US nuclear weapons cannot be detonated without the receipt of both external information and properly authenticated authorization to use that information. These devices – generically Permissive Action Links or “PALs” – are in effect combination locks that keep the weapons locked and incapable of detonation unless and until the weapons’ firing mechanisms have been unlocked following receipt of a series of numbers communicated to the operators from higher authority. Equally important in the context of a military organization, launch of nuclear weapons (including insertion of the combinations) is permitted only where properly authorized by an authenticated order. This combination of reliance on discipline and procedure and on receipt of an unlocking code not held by the military personnel in charge of the launch operation is designed to insure that the system is “fail safe,” i.e., that whatever mistakes occur, the result will not be a nuclear explosion. Moreover, in recent years, both the US and Russia, as well as Britain and China, have modified their procedures so that even if a nuclear-armed missile were launched, it would go not to a “real” target in another country but – at least in the UScase - to empty ocean. In addition to the basic advantage of insuring against a nuclear detonation in a populated area, the fact that a missile launched in error would be on flight path that diverged from a plausible attacking trajectory should be detectable by either the US or the Russian warning systems, reducing the possibility of the accident being perceived as a deliberate attack. De-targeting, therefore, provides a significant protection against technical error.5

#### No impact to an accident – US-Russian understanding solves without undermining deterrence

Ford 8 [Chris. Senior Fellow @ Hudson. “Dilemmas of Nuclear Force” The International Peace Institute – Policy Forum, 10/7/8. [www.hudson.org](http://www.hudson.org)] AT

De-alerting is not the only way to reduce accident risks. Unlike de-alerting measures – which are opposed by the main nuclear powers – the United States and Russia, for instance, have already agreed in principle to transparency and confidence-building measures (e.g., JDEC) designed to ameliorate some of the very accident and error risks that advocates of de-alerting seek to address. Moreover, proposals such as JDEC would not entail the crisis stability costs that would be imposed by de-alerting measures such as the physical warhead separation recommended by the Canberra Commission. (Indeed, something like JDEC might be very valuable as a transparency and confidence-building measure in time of crisis.)

### A2 Terror

#### Terrorists don’t want nukes.

Waltz 2000 [Kenneth, Prof. Emeritus of Pol. Sci – UC Berkeley, “Interview: Is Kenneth Waltz Still M.A.D. about Nukes?” Winter/Spring, <http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia_winspr00f.html>] AT

Would they want them? I think that the answer is no. Terrorists have always been in the position where they could have done more damage than they have chosen to inflict. As Brian Jenkins, one of the great experts on terrorism, said a long time ago: “Terrorists want more people watching, not more people dead.” They are trying to make a point. They are fighting what looks to be a weak and hopeless cause, and they adopt these drastic measures because they do not have the strength to make their cases in an acceptable fashion.

#### Terrorists can’t detonate them even if they get them

Chitkara 3 [(MG, author) Combating Terrorism. APH Publishing Corporation, 2003] AT

Activating the weapon would require special technical skills intimate knowledge of sophisticated electronic codes. Only a few nuclear scientists with experience in the assembly of ADMs could be expected to have the skills necessary for the purpose. Overcoming the hurdles of breaking electronic locks would be infinitely more difficult and, besides state-of-the-art super computers and personnel trained to operate them, would require a highly advanced intelligence gathering system. Neither Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda, nor any of the other large terrorist organizations supporting it, is likely to have acquired the ability to trigger a modern brief case nuke that it may have bought or stolen, especially if the Tritium triggers needed to ignite them have decayed.

#### US arsenal has theft protection

CFR 6 [“Loose Nukes” Council on Foreign Relations, June] AT

The United States protects its nuclear weapons with barriers, guards, surveillance cameras, motion sensors, and background checks on personnel. Several other nuclear powers—though not all—take similar precautions. Russia ’s security measures are flimsier. Guards at nuclear weapons facilities have gone unpaid for months at a time, and even basic security arrangements such as fences, doors, and padlocks remain inadequate in many locations. Futhermore, while U.S. nuclear weapons are engineered with “built-in” security mechanisms, we know very little about what sort of built-in safeguards there may be on Russia’s or Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals to prevent unauthorized detonations.

### A2 DEFENSE

### A2 START = No Aggression

[IF YOU ONLY READ THE GREEN/BLUE]

#### 1. START doesn’t solve –Russia is still growing its arsenal, they’re becoming more aggressive, and they can still destroy our arsenal

Mazurak 13 [(Zbigniew, defense analyst with 6 years of experience in the field, specializing in the defense budget, nuclear weapons strategy, and missile defense. I also have B.A. and M.A. degrees in history “Stop the Democrats’ unilateral cuts in the US nuclear deterrent!” Conservative Daily News Jun 13, 2013] AT

The Left never ceases to attempt to weaken, sabotage, and undermine the US and its defenses. Its biggest target these days is the nuclear deterrent. As the House moves to consider the annual defense authorization bill, the Democrats have filed a slew of amendments which, if they pass (God forbid), would deeply and unilaterally cut America’s already barely sufficient nuclear deterrent – at a time when no one else is cutting theirs and all adversaries of the US are growing and modernizing their nuclear arsenals. The Intercepts blog at DefenseNews.com reports that an entire slew of such amendments will be introduced by the Democrats during the floor debate; they’ll also attempt to cut the defense budget further, deeper than sequestration. The Left absolutely must be stopped from cutting the (already barely adequate and aging) nuclear deterrent any further. By any means necessary. Here’s why. Cutting the US nuclear deterrent – contrary to the Left’s lies – has not and will never make America and the world more secure. On the contrary, there is abundant evidence it will make America, its allies (including Israel), and the world much less secure, and the world will get much less peaceful. Why? Because cutting America’s defenses makes the US, its allies, and the world less secure, not more. It is military strength that safeguards peace and security, and military weakness that jeopardizes them. Nowhere is this more obvious tha in the nuclear deterrence realm. Cutting the US nuclear deterrent further will make it too small and thus much easier for America’s potential adversaries, like Russia and China, to destroy in a disarming first strike – which Russia reserves the right to conduct, and which China has refused to rule out. Cutting America’s arsenal will also reduce the number of enemy assets (bases, units, stockpiles, industrial facilities, etc.) that the US can hold at risk and threaten to destroy in retaliation – thus precipitously reducing America’s retaliatory power. This is what the Dems’ treasonous policies would do. Russia’s and China’s nuclear arsenals, militaries, and base infrastructure are so large and so redundant and disperses that the US needs thousands, not mere hundreds, of nuclear warheads to deter them – especially to deter both of them. And both of them will have the ability to reduce the US arsenal in a preemptive first strike, if it’s cut as deeply as the Dems’ and their pacifist bankrollers like the Council for a Livable World want to. Russia has 2,800 strategic and up to 4,000 tactical nuclear warheads, deployed and nondeployed. It has 434 ICBMs (most of them multiple/warhead/armed), 251 strategic bombers (each carrying up to 6 nuclear cruise missiles and many also carrying a nuclear freefall bomb), and 14 ballistic missile subs with 16-20 missiles each, and 4-12 warheads per missile, depending on its type (Sinyeva missiles carry only 4 warheads; Liner missiles carry 12). Russian boomer subs can launch their missiles while being homeported. Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal is even larger. It consists of up to 4,000 warheads in various forms: nuclear depth charges, nuclear bombs, warheads for short-range missiles, nuclear artillery shells, etc. Russia can deliver them by many means: surface warships, submarines, cruise missiles, artillery pieces, SRBMs, etc. What’s more, Russia and China are GROWING, not shrinking, their nuclear arsenals. Russia has been doing so since New START ratification – as allowed to do so by that one-sided treaty, which requires cuts only in the US arsenal. Russia is adding warheads as well as delivery systems. It has resumed Tu-160 bomber production from stockpiled parts. China also has a large arsenal – contrary to the false claims of pacifist groups. It has at least 1,800, and up to 3,000, nuclear warheads according to General Viktor Yesin (former Russian missile force chief of staff) and Professor Philip Karber, respectively. It has recently built 3,000 miles of tunnels and bunkers for its nuclear missiles and warheads. You don’t build such a vast network for only a few hundred warheads. China currently has 87 ICBMs (20 DF-4s, 36 DF-5s, at least 30 DF-31/31As, and at least one DF-41), over 1,600 SRBMs, hundreds of ground-launched cruise missiles, at least 100 MRBMs (DF-21s and DF-3s), 6 ballistic missile submarines (5 Jin class, 1 Xia class, with at least 12 nuclear-armed missiles per boat), and 440 nuclear-capable aircraft (H-6, Q-5, JH-7). Both Russia and China are also rapidly modernizing their entire arsenals of warheads and delivery systems. Russia is developing or producing several new ICBM types: the Yars silo-based and Yars-M road-mobile ICBM, a rail-mobile ICBM, the “Avangard” ICBM (little is known about it), a “pseudo-ICBM” with a 6,000 km range, and another ICBM recently mentioned by deputy PM Dmitry Rogozin. Plus the “Son of Satan” ICBM intended to replace the SS-18 heavy ICBM. Russia is also developing a next-generation bomber and has recently fielded the Kalibr sub-launched cruise missile, the Kh-102 air-launched cruise missile, new warheads, and the Su-34 attack aircraft. Moscow is not only growing its arsenal but also becoming more aggressive as well. In the last 12 months, Russia has practiced simulated nuclear bomber strikes on US missile defense facilities five times, each time flying dangerously close to US or allied airspace, and three times flying into Air Defense Identification Zones – forcing US or allied fighters to scramble. For more, see here and here. “Who told you that the Cold War was ever over? It transforms; it is like a virus,” said Russian KGB/FSB defector Sergei Tretyakov in an interview with FOX News in 2009. And yet, the Left wants America to disarm unilaterally in the face of such an aggressive Russia wielding thousands of nuclear weapons! China is also modernizing by fielding new ICBMs (DF-31As, DF-41s), a new air-launched cruise missile (CJ-20), the new Jin class of SSBNs, improved variants of the JL-2 sub-launched ballistic missile with a 12,000 km range, and a sub-launched cruise missile. It’s also developing a new class of SSBNs (follow-on to the Jin class) and has ordered 36 Tu-22M bombers. Concurrently, both China and Russia are also developing missile defenses. Moscow and Beijing aren’t the only nuclear threats to America, though. North Korea has 8-12 nuclear warheads, ICBMs capable of reaching the US, and – through its successful satellite test conducted last December – demonstrated capability to mate nuclear payloads to missiles, confirmed by the DIA and by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel. North Korea has, since the last crisis, announced it will grow, not give up, its nuclear arsenal – and has recently test-fired several SRBMs again. Meanwhile, Iran is racing towards nuclear weapons. And yet, the Dems want America to dramatically and unilaterally cut America’s nuclear deterrent in the face of all of these nuclear threats! What’s more, they lie that cutting America’s deterrent unilaterally will make her and the world safer and more peaceful! Do you see the idiocy of this, Dear Reader? Meanwhile, America’s allies are slowly losing trust in America’s nuclear umbrella, which is being continually cut and undermined by the Dems. Already, 66.5% of South Koreans want their country to have nuclear weapons, and Japan has recently opened a facility that can produce enough plutonium for 3,600 warheads in several months if need be… that is, if the US cuts its nuclear umbrella further. If the US continues doing so, America’s allies will have no choice but to develop their own arsenals, as they cannot afford to bet their security, and indeed their very existence, on the Democrats’ “unilateral disarmament will make us safer” fantasies – or on America breaking free of Democrat rule in 2016. What’s

#### [IF YOU READ ALL OF IT]

#### 1. The Mazurak evidence specifically pre-empts this

#### Despite the passage of the New START treaty, Russia has continued to grow its arsenal – they’ve added warheads and delivery systems

#### Russia can still first strike the US and destroy its entire arsenal despite reductions

#### They are becoming more aggressive – treaties empirically haven’t reined in Russian aggression

#### 2. Absolutely non-responsive – we still have several independent scenarios for extinction

#### A) China can still first strike us – that’s the Mazurak evidence – they have a large enough arsenal to challenge us, but will only do so if they can destroy our arsenal

#### B) North Korea scenario – we need the arsenal to deter a first strike, which is increasingly likely because North Korea is expanding its arsenal – this causes extinction

Chol 2 [(Kim, Exec Director of the Center for Korean-American Peace) “Agreed Framework is Brain Dead: Shotgun Wedding is the Only Option to Defuse Crisis” www.nautilus.org 10/24/08] AT

The second choice is for the Americans to initiate military action to knock out the nuclear facilities in North Korea. Without precise knowledge of the location of those target facilities, the American policy planners face the real risk of North Korea launching a full-scale war against South Korea, Japan and the U.S. The North Korean retaliation will most likely leave South Korea and Japan totally devastated with the Metropolitan U.S. being consumed in nuclear conflagration. Looking down on the demolished American homeland, American policy planners aboard a special Boeing jets will have good cause to claim, "We are winners, although our homeland is in ashes. We are safely alive on this jet." The third and last option is to agree to a shotgun wedding with the North Koreans. It means entering into package solution negotiations with the North Koreans, offering to sign a peace treaty to terminate the relations of hostility, establish full diplomatic relations between the two enemy states, withdraw the American forces from South Korea, remove North Korea from the list of axis of evil states and terrorist-sponsoring states, and give North Korea most favored nation treatment. The first two options should be sobering nightmare scenarios for a wise Bush and his policy planners. If they should opt for either of the scenarios, that would be their decision, which the North Koreans are in no position to take issue with. The Americans would realize too late that the North Korean mean what they say. The North Koreans will use all their resources in their arsenal to fight a full-scale nuclear exchange with the Americans in the last war of [hu]mankind. A nuclear-armed North Korea would be most destabilizing in the region and the rest of the world in the eyes of the Americans. They would end up finding themselves reduced to a second-class nuclear power. [this evidence has been gender modified]

#### C) Allied proliferation – wildfire prolif causes extinction

Roberts 99 [Brad, Institute for Defense Analyses, Fall 1999, Nonproliferation Review] AT

But the standard answers don’t really take us very far into this problem any more. To grasp the full stake requires a broader notion of stability—and an appreciation of the particular historical moment in which we find ourselves. It is an accident of history that the diffusion of dual-use capabilities is coterminous with the end of the Cold War. That diffusion means that we are moving irreversibly into an international system in which the wildfire-like spread of weapons is a real possibility. The end of the Cold War has brought with it great volatility in the relations of major and minor powers in the international system. What then is at stake? In response to some catalytic event, entire regions could rapidly cross the threshold from latent to extant weapons capability, and from covert to overt postures, a process that would be highly competitive and risky, and which likely would spill over wherever the divides among regions are not tidy. This would sorely test Ken Waltz’s familiar old heresy that “more may be better”7—indeed, even Waltz assumed proliferation would be stabilizing only if it is gradual, and warned against the rapid spread of weapons to multiple states. At the very least, this would fuel NBC terrorism, as a general proliferation of NBC weaponry would likely erode the constraints that heretofore have inhibited states from sponsoring terrorist use of these capabilities. Given its global stature and media culture, America would be a likely target of some of these terrorist actions.

### A2 Cuts Are Small

#### 1. They have missed the boat on the link debate – it’s about a credible threat, not the number of nukes – efforts by the left to reduce the arsenal trigger the link

Schneider 9 [(Mark, Fellow @ National Institute for Public Policy) “Prevention Through Strength: Is Nuclear Superiority Enough” Comparative Strategy, April 2009] AT

Western nuclear powers—the United States, Britain, and France—vastly outgun the rogue states in every measurable respect. However, this alone may not be enough to ensure deterrence. The problem, as Dr. Keith B. Payne has observed, is that, “Effective deterrence threats must be credible to the opponents. Unfortunately, leaders of terrorist states and tyrants who recognize the appropriate priority we place on avoiding civilian casualties may not believe U.S. deterrent threats that would produce the high yields and moderate accuracies of the remaining Cold War arsenal.”36 The problem is complicated by the ceaseless efforts of the political left to delegitimize nuclear deterrence. In the pre–World War II era, or even during the late Cold War, the use of chemical and biological agents by a minor nation against a great power would have been suicidal. Today, however, we have to take the threat of WMD attacks, even by a much weaker nation, very seriously in significant part because of the delegitimization of nuclear deterrence in the Western world. In my view, the delegitimization of nuclear deterrence by the political left is one of the most serious problems we face in dealing with WMD proliferation. The left-wing view of nuclear weapons in the United States has moved, to some degree, into the mainstream. Distinguished former American leaders such a George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, despite the manifest failure of arms control to constrain the WMD threat, call for “A world free of Nuclear Weapons” because “ . . . the United States can address almost all of its military objectives by non-nuclear means.”37 This view ignores the complete lack of plausibility of creating a verification regime involving the abolition of nuclear weapons with acceptable risk, the consequences of cheating and the lack of any credible response option if it is actually discovered that an authoritarian regime had retained a sizable nuclear stockpile, and the military implication of the other types of weapons of mass destruction—chemical and biological (CBW) attack, including the advanced agents now available to potential enemies of the United States and our allies. A credible U.S. nuclear deterrent is necessary to deal with existing threats to the very survival of the U.S., its allies, and its armed forces if they are subject to an attack using WMD. As former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch wrote in The Wall Street Journal, “However, the goal, even the aspirational goal, of eliminating all nuclear weapons is counterproductive. It will not advance substantive progress on nonproliferation; and it risks compromising the value that nuclear weapons continue to contribute, through deterrence, to U.S. security and international stability.”38 If WMD attacks were actually made against Western cities, the reaction to them by civilian populations would likely be extreme but it would be too late to impact deterrence. There would likely be overwhelming demand by the affected populations to make the attacks stop. The U.S. National Strategy for Combating the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction recognized that we must respond to WMD attack rapidly and that, “The primary objective of a response is to disrupt an imminent attack or an attack in progress, and eliminate the threat of future attacks.”39 In the words of Dr. William Graham, Chairman of the Congressional Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Commission: Failure to provide a credible deterrent will result in a wave of nuclear proliferation with serious national security implications. When dealing with the rogue states the issue is not the size of the U.S. nuclear deterrent but the credibility of its use in response to chemical or biological weapons use and its ability to conduct low collateral damage nuclear attacks against WMD capabilities and delivery systems including very hard underground facilities for purposes of damage limitation. We must also have the capability to respond promptly. The United States nuclear guarantee is a major deterrent to proliferation. If we do not honor that guarantee, or devalue it, many more nations will obtain nuclear weapons.40 There are only two ways to achieve a rapid end to a conflict: surrender or, alternatively, prompt and effective counterforce strikes designed to limit damage by destroying the adversary’s offensive capability. In such a charged atmosphere there likely would be demands in many states for massive retaliation against the attacker. Prewar debates about nuclear strategy, proportionality, and international law may vanish once the scope of the tragedy was fully appreciated.

#### 2. And the proposal explicitly endorsed by the Democrats is sufficient to trigger a link

Thompson 13 [Dr. Loren B. Thompson- Chief Operating Officer at the Lexington Institute. “Nuclear Weapons: How Few Is Too Few?”. Forbes. May 18, 2013] NM

He said that when both sides agree to reduce to 1,000 weapons and one side hides ten extra, that probably won’t affect the military balance much. If the two sides then reduce to 100 weapons and ten more are hidden by one side, that could have some bearing on the military balance. But if the two sides agree to completely disarm — they go [then] to zero nuclear weapons — then the side that has hidden ten rules the world. Well, maybe that’s a bit of an exaggeration, but you get the point: a handful of nuclear weapons confers huge power when nobody else has any. How likely is it that we will ever have the kind of air-tight inspection regime that prevents a hermit kingdom like North Korea from squirreling away a few fission devices? But you don’t need to go down to zero before problems start arising that lead to instability, given the deeply-felt desire of nuclear-armed adversaries to escape the balance of terror. Imagine that President Obama has his way and the U.S. nuclear arsenal is reduced to 1,000 deployed warheads. And let’s say for counting purposes that the remaining warheads are distributed equally between bombers, land-based ICBMs and submarine[s]-based ballistic missiles. An adversary with perfect intelligence could destroy two-thirds of the U.S. retaliatory force with 1-2% of his force because the bombers are deployed at only two or three bases and the sea-based warheads are deployed on a dozen or so submarines. That’s less than 20 aim-points that need to be hit to leave the U.S. with nothing but land-based ICBMs — and who knows what combination of kinetic and non-kinetic effects a future adversary might be able to employ to impede the launching of silo-based missiles? The silos might withstand blast, heat and radiation effects from a nuclear attack, but what about the command links enabling transmission of launch codes? Current U.S. strategy calls for riding out a nuclear attack if necessary, which reduces the danger of having to launch on warning — before all the facts are known — but increases the danger of being caught on the ground in a surprise attack.

## Misc Frontlines

### A2 Obama Non-Uniques

#### Obama’s bill faces major setbacks. It will not pass.

Woolf 13 [Amy F. Woolf-Specialist in National Defense in the Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service (CRS). “Next Steps in Nuclear Arms Control with Russia: Issues for Congress”. Congressional Research Service June 19, 2013.] NM

In his 2013 State of the Union Address, President Obama stated that the United States would “engage Russia to seek further reductions in our nuclear arsenals.” These reductions could include limits on strategic, nonstrategic and nondeployed nuclear weapons. Yet, arms control negotiations between the United States and Russia have stalled, leading many observers to suggest that the United States reduce its nuclear forces unilaterally, or in parallel with Russia, without negotiating a new treaty. Many in Congress have expressed concerns about this possibility, both because they question the need to reduce nuclear forces below New START levels and because they do not want the President to agree to further reductions without seeking the approval of Congress.

### Link XT – Dems Cut the Arsenal

#### And this is true of democrats as a whole – even if they say they want to protect the US they’ll still cut the arsenal

CBS 12 [CBS News. Democrats unveil their national platform. Columbia Broadcasting System. Septemeber 3, 2012. NM]

Democrats back further reductions in the nuclear weapons stockpile, building on the hard-fought U.S.-Russia treaty that Obama got through the Senate in December 2010. Democrats also say they have an "unshakable commitment to Israel's security," and Obama will do all in his power to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Democrats say they want to maintain a strong military, but argue that in the current fiscal environment, tough budgetary decisions must include defense spending. They noted that Democrats and Republicans agreed last summer in the deficit-cutting plan to reduce military spending.

#### Republicans key to stopping Obama’s nuclear agenda – failure will cause prolif

Tapper 10 [(Jake, ABC News' senior White House correspondent) “Nuclear Policy Enrages Republicans, Administration Argues It Will Make U.S. Safer”, 4/7]

President Obama says his new nuclear policy restricts the use of weapons while continuing to protect the United States and its allies, but some Republican critics argue that the world is now less safe and that the president's vision of a nuclear-free world is unrealistic. Republicans voice concern over the president's change in U.S. nuclear policy. It's unclear if the pushback will impact the pending Senate vote on ratification of the U.S.-Russian nuclear disarmament treaty that Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev are scheduled to sign Thursday in Prague. White House officials are increasingly expressing concern that the polarized political atmosphere might impact what is traditionally a bipartisan vote. On Tuesday, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs again brought up past votes on arms treaties: the 1972 SALT I [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement], which was ratified by a vote of 88-2, START I in 1992 (93-6), START II in 1996 (87-4) and SORT [Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty] in 2003 (95-0). In a major policy shift, the president is pledging to not use nuclear weapons against any country that has signed and is abiding by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, even if they attack the United States with chemical or biological weapons. The United States also will not conduct any new nuclear testing or develop new nuclear weapons, but it will continue to modernize its infrastructure and bolster the development of other conventional weapons. The new nuclear policy, announced Tuesday, has Republican critics up in arms. They argue that the U.S. government is making the concessions without getting anything in return. "If you look at the issue of threat based, the world is not getting safer, the risks to the United States are certainly increasing," Rep. Michael R. Turner, R-Ohio, ranking member of the House Armed Services subcommittee on strategic forces, told ABC News. "It does overall diminish our options, and I think certainly that the American people should be concerned that the president would take this kind of action and get nothing in return." The House does not vote on treaties, but Turner said he would need to further study the new agreement with Russia before being able to express support for it. GOP senators from Arizona John McCain and Jon Kyl expressed concern about the message the new policy will send to countries seeking nuclear weapons. "The Obama Administration must clarify that we will take no option off the table to deter attacks against the American people and our allies," they said in a combined statement. "We believe that preventing nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation should begin by directly confronting the two leading proliferators and supporters of terrorism, Iran and North Korea. "The Obama administration's policies, thus far, have failed to do that and this failure has sent exactly the wrong message to other would-be proliferators and supporters of terrorism." Across the airwaves, the president's pledge fueled the outrage of conservatives. "I think the only thing that would work with Iran is they're thinking that there's a military consequence that could be faced if they become nuclear, and the farther he moves away from that, the more difficult his role with Iran is going to be," former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani said on CNN.

### A2 Kritik

#### It’s not that proliferates are inferior, they’re imperfect

Sagan 3 (Scott, political science professor at Stanford, The Spread of nuclear weapons; a debate renewed, p.106-107) AT

Nuclear South Asia will be a dangerous place, not because of will or irrationality among government leaders, nor because of any unique cultural inhibitions against strategic thinking in both countries. India and Pakistan face a dangerous nuclear future because they have become like other nuclear powers. Their leaders seek security through nuclear deterrence, but imperfect humans inside imperfect organizations control their nuclear weapons. If my theories are right these organizations will someday fail to produce secure nuclear deterrence. Unfortunately, the evidence from these first years of South Asia’s nuclear history suggest that the pessimistic predictions of organizations theory are likely to come true, even though I cannot predict the precise pathway by which deterrence will breakdown.

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# Spending DA

### 1NC

#### Republicans have a strong advantage in the 2014 elections

Bartash 10/8 [Jeffry Bartash. “Why House Republicans aren’t sweating the 2014 election.” Market Watch. October 8, 2013, 1:20 PM. <http://blogs.marketwatch.com/capitolreport/2013/10/08/why-house-republicans-arent-sweating-the-2014-election/>] AJ

The public fingers Republicans for most of the blame over the government shutdown, but that doesn’t mean the GOP faces grave danger of losing power in the House come the 2014 midterm elections. Two articles, one from the left-leaning New Republic and another from the right-leaning Weekly Standard, see slim to no chance that Democrats will capture the House in 2014. And by some accounts, Republicans face not-insurmountable odds of taking control of the Senate. Can it really be possible? The latest Washington Post poll, for example, shows that 70% of Americans disapprove of Republican tactics in the budget impasse. Yet as both the New Republic and Standard articles point out, Democrats face a number of tall hurdles to winning the House. First and foremost, they haven’t recruited enough good candidates to challenge the most susceptible Republicans, most of whom are entrenched incumbents with moderate voting records. [Second,] Americans also have notoriously short political memories. So the fiscal fights of 2013 are likely to have faded in the minds of most persuadable voters by November 2014 — unless the more dangerous stalemate over the debt ceiling triggers an economic calamity. Consider what happened in 1996. Voters only threw out three Republican House members just a mere nine months after an extended government shutdown for which conservatives were widely blamed. The GOP even won two Senate seats to extend its majority in that chamber. Another hurdle for Democrats is the once-a-decade redistricting process that took place in 2010. Republicans controlled more state governments than Democrats and they used their influence to solidify the GOP’s grip on the party’s more vulnerable districts. That helps explain why Republicans only lost eight seats in 2012 even though Democrats won 1.7 million more votes nationwide in congressional races. By far the biggest obstacle is history: mid-term elections heavily favor the party not in the White House. The opposition party has picked up seats in 24 of the 28 midterm elections since 1900, in many cases making big gains. Read Stuart Rothenberg on why the House is not in play right now. More crucially, the president’s party has never won control of the House after being in the minority ahead of the midterms. Put another way, Democrats are trying to do what’s never been done before. They need to win 17 seats to oust Republicans, but even in the four midterms when the president’s own party did well, the gains ranged from just five to 11 seats.

#### Democrats would make huge electoral gains under CV, comfortably winning the House and Senate.

Leon 13 [Fernanda L L de Leon. Assistant Professor. School of Economics. University of East Anglia. “Adding Ideology to the Equation: New Predictions for Election Results under Compulsory Voting.” No 44, University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series. April 15, 2013] AJ

Turning to the results, if the current voting population had the ideological prefer-ences of a compulsory electorate, Democrats would gain an average of 8.7 p[ercent] .p. to their vote shares and would win (i.e. obtain more than 50% of votes) in 68% (=44/64) of the compulsory elections, as opposed to 43.75% (=28/64) as predicted for voluntary elections. They actually won 48.4% (=31/64) of total races. The actual value and predictions for Democratsívote share in the 2000 and 2004 senatorial race are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. In Figure 1, I present the data sorted by predicted vote share for voluntary voting to ease the comparison with compulsory voting predictions. It shows (and more formal analysis conÖrms) that candidates with expected lower vote shares are the ones that benefit more from compulsory elections.15 These are mostly Democrats that run for elections in red states like Wyoming, Indiana, and Mississippi. It is possible that Democrats that self-select to run for election in "safe Republican" states are weaker than other Democrats (those in toss-up state, for example.) This Önding is also in line with the "Two-e§ect hypothesis" proposed by DeNardo (1980). According to this concept, higher turnout helps the minority party within an electorate, since this is the a¢ liation of "peripheral" voters (those who vote occasionally). The mechanism driving these results are that, under compulsory voting, peripheral voters or moderates become a larger fraction of the electorate. According to this paperís predictions, in the 2000 Wyoming election, the Democrat challenger, mine worker and Örst-time runner Mel Logan, would obtain 54.8% of total votes and beat the Republican incumbent Craig Thomas, a hard-core conservative according to On The Issuesís ratings.16 Figure 1 also shows that those with higher vote share are the ones who lose more votes under compulsory elections (but still would win the election). According to the model, the Democrat incumbent Ron Wyden would see his vote share decrease from 72.5% in CV to 64.4% in VV, but would still beat the Republican candidate Al King. There are still some cases in which the voting system would not make a di§erence in deciding the election outcome or candidatesívote share. One example is the 2000 New York election, a high-proÖle open race in which Hillary Clinton run against Rick Lazio and won the election.

#### *Compulsory voting means democrats control the government*

*Lexington 12 [“If America had compulsory voting, would Democrats win every election?” The Economist, Sep 28th 2012] AT*

*But here is the thing, I suggested to Mr Metcalfe. The poorest and least educated are overwhelmingly Democrats when asked, but—far from comprising Barack Obama’s base—they mostly do not vote (less than 40% of adult high-school drop-outs voted in 2008, for instance, and about 50% of the unemployed). America—a land that takes its liberties seriously—is unlikely to copy Belgium or Australia and adopt compulsory voting. But if it did, Mr Obama would romp home in November. Are you not in fact lucky that so many welfare recipients do not vote, I asked him? He did not agree.*

#### Democrats in power increases the debt

Rector et al 9 [(Robert Rector, senior research fellow at The Heritage Foundation and expert on poverty issues Katherine Bradley, and Rachel Sheffield) “Obama to Spend 10.3 Trillion on Welfare: Uncovering the Full Cost of Means-Tested Welfare or Aid to the Poor” Heritage Special Report Published by The Heritage Foundation September 16, 2009] AT

Of course, part of this increase can be explained by inflation. Chart 18 shows total welfare spending by decade with all figures adjusted for inflation into constant 2008 dollars. Measured in constant 2008 dollars, welfare spending in the coming decade will still be $8.8 trillion. This is 42 percent more or $2.6 trillion higher than spending in the previous decade. Adjusting for inflation, total welfare spending in the next decade will be twice the spending in the decade when George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton were in the Oval Office (1989 to 1998). A large portion of the $10.3 trillion in means-tested spending over the next decade will come from increases in government borrowing and expansions of the national debt. Obama’s budget plans call for regular federal deficits in excess of $500 billion per year even after the end of the current recession. Obama proposes to add some $9 trillion to the national debt over the next decade, raising the debt from 37 percent of GDP in 2008 to a shocking 60 percent of GDP in 2018.33 The bottom line is that Obama’s strategy to expand welfare and “spread the wealth” today will be financed by placing an ever-larger debt burden on future generations

#### Every dollar of debt increases the chances of US-China trade war

Rumbelow 11 [(Helen, staff writer) “War is over: it’s economics for the Pentagon” The Times, August 12 2011]

Yet this was no ordinary “war game”, the deadly serious exercises that the US and the British Ministry of Defence alike run to prepare for traditional battle. This was the Pentagon’s first economic war game, though the authorities are loath to talk about it. Economic war? It sounds preposterous. Except it gets less so with every dollar of debt run up by America: currently $14.3 trillion and counting. This summer these figures have added grey hairs to President Obama’s head, and not just for the obvious reasons. Behind the scenes it is the military who are worried about the market. For who owns much of this debt? China, the US’s most powerful rival and threat. And that makes America vulnerable to a new kind of bloodless but ruthless war. You see, Rickards is not a soldier but a banker. He was joined in the war game by dozens of his Wall Street colleagues, flown in from Manhattan to this bunker at the Applied Physics Laboratory in Maryland for the two-day event in 2009, when the Pentagon started to get really alarmed. It could have been subtitled not, as in Dr Strangelove, “how I learnt to stop worrying and love the bomb” but “forget the bomb: how the Pentagon learnt to start worrying about the banks.” The group was split into five teams: America, Russia, China, Pacific Rim, and a “grey team” representing shady outfits such as terrorist organisations. The writer Tom Wolfe once likened Wall Street bankers to “masters of the universe”; now the US Government asked these men to play as if that was what they really wanted to become. They were sent into “bunker rooms” and told to use financial or economic tools — currency, debt, stocks, gold — to bring their enemies to their knees. Everything was conducted via computer, and they could be as devious and ruthless as they liked. The bankers liked. “These people would normally never come together. But there is nothing more fun than to take a Wall Street guy and tell him to be a bad guy,” says Rickards, a former senior executive who was involved in planning and executing the war game. When the game was halted, the result left the military men quiet and sobered. Why did the bankers scare the soldiers? The answer lies in the way the world is now interconnected as never before. For some, that is the key to its stability — the idea that we are in some way “beyond history” because for a nation to damage another only hurts itself. But recently, those in the top levels of government have reconsidered. Over the past few years China has been buying up US government debt, and is now its biggest holder. If China were to dump this debt, it would — not to get too technical — totally screw with the economy. China could, hypothetically, win any number of foreign policy objectives by making it impossible for you to pay your mortgage. Of course, the naysayers are right to point out that there are a million reasons why this wouldn’t happen. But an impossibility? No, and the threat of such extreme action — as in the Cold War — is having a political effect. Paul Bracken is a professor and expert in private equity at the Yale School of Management who serves on government advisory committees at the US Department of Defence. He was one of the key players behind the 2009 economic war game, and the smaller versions that have been played out since. “The atmosphere that day was one of surprise at the magnitude of the threat,” he says. “The Pentagon people were used to dealing in terms of military battles: how many ships, how many missiles. This opened up whole new strategies.” Of course, economic warfare is not new. God’s plagues on the Egyptian pharaoh’s crops, as reported in the Book of Exodus, were an early skirmish. Winston Churchill created a Ministry of Economic Warfare, to run as a “new instrument of war” against Hitler. Embargoes and sanctions have been targeted at dozens of countries, from South Africa to the Soviet Union. But this is different. The markets are now global, the holdings in each other’s finances deep, and the technical ability to manipulate them instantaneous. In the 1970s the West feared that its enemies had their fingers on a nuclear button. The modern equivalent may be China’s ability to press the button on US Treasury bills. China is, says Bracken, “the huge threat”, but Russia, with its oil and gas, has shown no compunction in waging economic war on its neighbours, and could do so on a larger scale. Another possibility is that major oil-producing countries could destabilise America by switching to euros instead of dollars as the currency in which oil is priced — so-called “petrodollar warfare”. Or a terrorist organisation might trigger a financial crash via some kind of shady hedge fund or computer attack. After the global financial collapse of 2008, the US Department of Defence commissioned a study into whether it could have been triggered by financial terrorism. “That’s nonsense. They’re not that smart — yet,” says Bracken. “But the threat of terrorists to act this way is credible. You’d be a fool to think they’re not trying to develop it, possibly with the assistance of a government.” What the economic war game showed Bracken was that military and economic decision-making has to be more unified. Banks and bonds are now weapons, just as much as bombs. “That makes the military nervous, as they had always been in charge of operations. That’s why they know they need to understand this,” says Bracken. Rickards is one of the few people with a foot in both worlds: finance and foreign policy. He has held senior positions at banks such as Citibank and, in his capacity as lawyer, negotiated in events such as the 1981 release of US hostages in Iran. He sees it as his mission to “help the two sides exchange views”. In a presentation to Pentagon officials on economic warfare, he said: “Strategically we are back to Cold War theories of deterrence. “For an enemy that cannot match the US on land, sea or air, the temptation to fight in the financial markets is great. The markets are more vulnerable than ever, the methods for attacking them are easy and inexpensive, and the returns in terms of destruction of wealth and confidence are inestimable. An enemy in a credible position need only threaten to do so to have the desired impact on policymakers.” Of course, Rickards says, people rebut this idea by saying that for China to hurt America would be to hurt itself, the pair’s fortunes are so intertwined. To dump US Treasury bills would be to ruin their value to the Chinese, too. “But nothing is free. If you’re going to confront the US military, you would spend billions. But if you can do so just as effectively in financial space, and it would cost less, why not? This is not a Pearl Harbor scenario, more a case of tit-for-tat escalation and threats.” Perhaps Britain felt a taste of this last year, with some stock market shocks that wiped millions off three British companies. BT lost £969 million on one afternoon in August, Next £275 million. Security services had to probe the possibility that it was not technical faults, as initially supposed, but a concerted attack by a nation state. This summer the International Monetary Fund’s IT system suffered a major breach, and its former senior security adviser said he believed it was the work of state-backed perpetrators. John Bassett, a fellow of the Royal United Services Institute, says that our Government, too, is just waking up to the new order. “If those were deliberate attacks on the London stock market, it was highly unlikely to be a criminal gang, much more likely an economic rival,” he says. “This is a ruthless competition for global economic supremacy, and the West isn’t winning.”

#### **That destroys the global economy and causes US-China war**

Droke 10 [(Clif, Editor – Momentum Strategies Report) “America and the Next Major War’, Green Faucet, 3-29]

It’s evident that as much as China’s internal markets are developing, that nation is still heavily reliant on the U.S., whether it wants to formally admit it or not.  For this reason, a trade war between the two nations would prove catastrophic and one can see how a trade war between these two economic titans could easily escalate into something far more destructive.  Touching on this issue in his latest book, “The Ascent of Money,” author Niall Ferguson asks, “Could anything trigger another breakdown of globalization like the one that happened in 1914 [leading to World War I]?  The obvious answer is a deterioration of political relations between the United States and China, whether over trade, Taiwan, Tibet or some other as yet subliminal issue.”He further comments, “Scholars of international relations would no doubt identify the systemic origins of the war in the breakdown of free trade, the competition for natural resources or the clash of civilizations….Some may even be tempted to say that the surge of commodity prices in the period from 2003 until 2008 reflected some unconscious market anticipation of the coming conflict.”

#### China-US War causes extinction

Straits Times 2000 [The Straits Times, “No One Gains in War over Taiwan,” 6/25/00, Lexis]

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

### CV Link

#### Countries with CV have higher spending.

Chong and Olivera 08 [Alberto Chong and Mauricio Olivera. “DOES COMPULSORY VOTING HELP EQUALIZE INCOMES?” Economics and Politics, Volume 20, Number 3. November 2008. Blackwell Publishing] AJ

For all the countries in which data are available (World Bank, 2004), we find further corroborating evidence that the adoption of compulsory-voting laws are linked with substantial increases in social expenditure, as a percentage of gross domestic product. In Fiji, a country that instituted such laws in 1996, the three-year average in social expenditure before the law change went from 16.2% to 17.1% of GDP, three years later, on average. Analogously, countries that dropped compulsory-voting laws saw a sub- sequent decrease in social spending. This is the case of the Netherlands, where the three-year average in social expenditure went from 20% to a three- year average of 19.2% of GDP after the laws were eliminated in 1967. This is also the case of [and] Venezuela where social expenditure fell from 9.1 to 8.4 after the compulsory-voting law was eliminated in 1993.6

### Link Wall

#### Democrat-controlled Congresses have never balanced the budget in the last 4 decades – zero risk of a link turn

Jeffrey 10 [(Terrence, editor in chief of CNSNews.com, editor of Human Events for CS News, alternative news source the Media Research Center considers less biased) “No Congress in which the Democrats controlled both the House and Senate has balanced the federal budget since fiscal 1969--more than 40 years ago.” CS News March 15] AT

(CNSNews.com) - Many leading Democrats in Washington these days like to point to the fact that the federal budget was balanced for part of the time that President Bill Clinton was in office. What they do not mention is that those balanced budgets occurred only when Republicans controlled both houses of Congress. In fact, according to the historical data published by the Office of Management and Budget in the Obama White House, no Congress in which the Democrats controlled both the House and Senate has balanced the federal budget since fiscal 1969--more than 40 years ago. The federal appropriations made for that fiscal year—which began on July 1, 1968 and ended on June 30, 1969--were approved by a Democrat-controlled Congress elected in 1966. They were signed by lame-duck Democratic President Lyndon Johnson, who had decided not to run for reelection in 1968. (Until 1977, the federal fiscal year began on July 1 and ended on June 30. Since 1977, it has begun on Oct. 1 and ended on Sept. 30. Federal fiscal years are numbered by the calendar year in which they end.) President Eisenhower in 1960 was the last Republican president to preside over a balanced budget. A Democrat-controlled Congress elected in 1958 approved the appropriations for that fiscal year in 1959. More recently, the federal budget was balanced in fiscal years 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001. A Republican-controlled Congress approved the appropriations for each one of those years and Democratic President Bill Clinton signed them. In fiscal years 1994 and 1995, when President Clinton governed with a Democrat-controlled Congress, the federal government ran deficits of $203.2 billion and $163.9 billion respectively. The Republican majority Congress elected in November 1994 presided over two fiscal years with declining deficits—fiscal 1996 and 1997—before it initially balanced the budget in fiscal 1998. In fiscal 1996 and 1997, the deficits were $107.4 billion and $21.9 billion respectively. In the 2000 election, Republicans retained control of the House but the Senate split 50-50 between Republicans and Democrats. In May 2001, Sen. Jim Jeffords of Vermont switched parties from Republican to Independent and began caucusing with the Democrats, giving the Democrats the effective majority and making then-Sen. Tom Daschle (D.-S.D.) the majority leader. That split Congress was responsible for the appropriations for fiscal 2002, which put the federal government back into a deficit. After Republicans regained control of the Senate in the November 2002 elections (thus taking control of the budget process for fiscal 2004 which would begin on Oct. 1, 2003), the all-Republican Congress continued running deficits for four fiscal years (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). During that time, with President George W. Bush in the White House, the Republicans controlled both the legislative and executive branches but failed to balance the budget. In the November 2006 elections, Democrats won back the majority in both the House and Senate, and in the three fiscal years that have started since then (2008, 2009, 2010), they have run record deficits of $458.6 billion, $1.41 trillion and $1.55 trillion. The estimated deficit for this fiscal year (2010) of $1.55 trillion is more than three times as large as the $458.6 billion deficit that President George W. Bush presided over with a Democratic Congress in fiscal 2008. In fiscal 2010, of course, Democrats controlled both Houses of Congress as well as the White House.

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# Linear Econ DAs

## Welfare Bad DA

### CV Link

#### CV expands the welfare state

Jackman 4 [(Simon, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University) Compulsory Voting, 2004] AT

It also follows that the high turnout rates engendered by CV also have partisan and ideological implications. Since support for parties of the left is correlated with socioeconomic status (notwithstanding a a decline in ‘‘class voting’’), as socioeconomic based differentials in turnout diminish, support for parties of the left increases (Pacek and Radcliff 1995 ; Nagel 1988 ; McAllister and Mughan 1986 ). In turn, increased support for parties of the left results in higher welfare spending and more state interventions in the macro-economy and labor markets (Hicks and Swank 1992; Castles and McKinlay 1979). So again, to the extent that CV increases turnout, and turnout increases support for left parties and their policy agendas, then CV can be shown to have policy implications. Put differently, CV helps mobilize voters who would otherwise abstain, and whose preferences 6 are (on

### 1NC Dependency

#### Turn – Government economic regulation is the root cause of economic hardship

Daley 13 [(Janet, spent nearly twenty years in academic life before becoming a political commentator) “Does the Left really want to end poverty?” The Telegraph Jan 3] AT

The poverty lobby – as opposed to those who actually want to put an end to poverty – uses the "poor" as a political weapon in its ideological war against the market economy. That argument, which many of us have made over the years, is forcefully reiterated in an excellent post by Philip Booth of the IEA. As Professor Booth points out, the official campaigning groups which make use of the poor as fodder for their anti-capitalist rhetoric never seem to address the critical issue of the cost of living in their accounts of relative poverty, even though excessive charges for home energy, child care and housing (which are heavily inflated by taxation and government regulation) are among the chief drivers of household hardship. Where, he says, is the argument for less regulation and more market competition which would really help poorer households by bringing down their costs? Nowhere in the prospectus of the poverty groupies do these get a mention. The campaigners prefer to preserve the poor as a permanent moral affront with which to castigate our callous capitalist society, instead of contributing to a useful discussion on the factors that are keeping people poor. In spite of the fact that being in work has been shown repeatedly to be the best (and most permanent) antidote to poverty, the public relations arms of the Child Poverty Action Group and the Rowntree Trust (among many others) have been notably disinclined to support the government's welfare reform programme even though it is designed precisely to free the poor from the benefits trap. Nor can I recall them campaigning for tax cuts on the low paid: instead of allowing people to keep more of their earnings which would relieve their hardship and give them more independence, they clamour for the continuation of tax credits which subsidise (and perpetuate) low wages, and foster dependence on the state. The statistical evidence of the past twenty years has become overwhelming: that getting a job is by far the best route out of poverty, that benefit dependency tends to turn temporary hardship into permanent poverty, and that free markets can deliver mass prosperity more effectively than any other form of economic system. It is time for the debate to move on. The old fashioned socialist dogma – that only the state can "lift people out of poverty" – is not just wrong. It is pernicious.

### 1NC Productivity + Incentives

#### Social welfare policies disincentive productivity and incentivize staying in poverty, reducing the net amount of welfare and incentivizing people to stay in poverty – prefer this evidence, it uses the best indicators of poverty

Baetjer 84 [HOWARD BAETJER JR. “Does Welfare Diminish Poverty?” The Freeman APRIL 01, 1984] AT

The second basic truth becomes clear only after some thought, that is: prosperity depends on production. Unless physical goods are produced in the first place and then replaced as necessary, there can be no prosperity for anyone. If this stock of goods is not constantly increased, higher levels of well-being overall are impossible. Other things being equal, the more goods there are in the world food, shelter, medicine, electric light, shoes, water heaters, and so on the more there is to go around and the less poverty there will tend to be. (Of course things are not always equal, and different people end up with different amounts of these goods, but the principle stands nonetheless: if there is literally not enough to go around, some poverty is inevitable. At the other extreme, if goods should become overabundant, their price would approach zero and the poorest could afford all they could use.) Thus an important means of reducing poverty is increasing production. The third truth has more to do with method, that is, to paraphrase Henry Hazlitt: good economics looks beyond obvious and short-term effects to see effects that are hidden and long- term. Applying this idea to welfare programs, we must look beyond the immediate advantages such programs provide to welfare recipients-the food stamps, medicaid, increased income and the like—and see other effects of the welfare process as a whole. For example, how do welfare programs affect employment, wage rates, productivity and prices (all of which are important to the poor). With these truths in mind, before looking at any statistics, let us turn to some indirect effects of welfare that we would expect to occur. Predictable Effects of Welfare A first observation is that the incentives associated with welfare tend toward unwanted results (not that they necessarily bring about these results, only that they cause a tendency in that direction). The benefits go to people who, for a host of reasons, are relatively unproductive, while the funds to pay for them come, through taxation, from people who are relatively productive. Now we know that for human beings, benefits are positive incentives while taxes are negative incentives. Thus the welfare system tends to encourage unproductiveness and discourage productivity. A person who could bring home only a few dollars more per week working than taking advantage of the welfare system has an incentive not to work. Accordingly welfare tends to diminish both self-sufficiency, since it leads more people to accept unemployment, and production, since the productive potential of those people is not turned into goods. The effect may not be a large one, but it is something to consider. From a purely economic standpoint, we must look beyond the visible welfare benefits and compare them with other positive effects that might have occurred in the absence of welfare, but cannot occur in its presence. For an important example, consider that the billions of dollars which go into the welfare system are no longer available for other things—such as investment. Many dollars spent on welfare would otherwise have been invested in new tools, new buildings and the like. This investment would have had concurrent positive effects of creating new employment opportunities and raising productivity. With welfare, however, these contributions to self-sufficiency and production never come about. A final effect of government-provided welfare that we would expect to find, knowing how human beings behave, is inefficiency and waste. This is a phenomenon we might call “government failure”: the inherent inability of government to do much of anything well. Since bureaucrats are paid out of tax revenues, which are collected regardless of whether or not the bureaucracy does a good job, there is little incentive for them to maintain high standards. Since the amount of taxpayers’ money that passes through their hands depends on the size and perceived importance of their programs, the bureaucrats have an incentive to expand the numbers encompassed by those programs, and to find new reasons for increased funding. Since allocation of funds must for fairness’ sake be by rule, a great deal of time and paperwork gets generated, and minimal scope is allowed for individual judgment about who deserves how much. Other problems of this kind could be identified. A Look at the Record Are these potential problems realized in fact? If so, how bad are they? According to the U.S. government’s figures, the answers to these questions are, respectively, “yes” and “very bad indeed.” In regard to government failure, to begin with, there is a rather impressive disparity between the amount of money spent for the stated purpose of relieving poverty, and the amount the poor actually receive. In an article entitled “Where Do All the Welfare Billions Go?” (Human Events, February 6, 1982) M. Stanton Evans points out some remarkable figures. In 1965, combined federal, state and local outlays for “social welfare” totaled $77 billion. This was the beginning of the “Great Society” era. In 1978, the total was $394 billion. “This means that, over the span of a dozen years, we increased our national outlays for the alleged goal of helping poor people, on an annual basis, by $317 billion.” But the number of poor people in the country, according to official estimates, has remained nearly constant in those years, at about 2.5 million. Here I quote Evans at length: One has to wonder how it is possible to spend these hundreds of billions to alleviate poverty and still have the same number of poor people that we had, say, in 1968. Waive that objection for a moment, however, and simply compare the number of poor people with the dollars spent to help them: You discover that, if we had taken that $317 billion annually in extra “social welfare” spending, and given it to the poor people, we could have given each of them an annual grant of $13,000—which is an income, for a family of four, of $52,000 a year. In other words, with this colossal sum of money, we could have made all the poor people in America rich . . . . It prompts the more suspicious among us to ask: What happened to the money? . . . [A] tremendous chunk of these domestic outlays goes to pay the salaries of people who work for and with the federal government—including well-paid civil servants and an array of contractors and “consultants,” many of whom have gotten rich from housing programs, “poverty” studies, energy research grants, and the like. In the words of Thomas Sowell, “the poor are a gold-mine” for the predominantly middle-income bureaucracy. But we might expect ending poverty to be expensive. The crucial question is what has happened to poverty itself. That question is partly answered in the statistic above that the number of official poor has remained at about 2.5 million; clearly poverty has not been eliminated. But what of poverty as a percentage of population—are we at least decreasing the proportion of poor people in the country? Alas, no. In an article called “The two wars against poverty: economic growth and the Great Society” (The Public Interest, Fall 1982), Charles A. Murray demonstrates that around 1968, when Great Society antipoverty spending was booming and unemployment stood at 3.5%, progress against poverty slowed, and then stopped. The Problem Persists Since 1950, the number of (official) poor as a percentage of population was approximately 30%. From then until 1968, the figure dropped steadily, to about 13%. But then, right in the heart of the Great Society years, when more money than ever was being spent to decrease poverty even faster, the trend line flattened. After ten more years marked by ever-increasing outlays, the percentage of poor in our population had dropped only to 11%. Two years later, in 1980, it was back up to 13% again. The more we spent, the less progress we made. Murray also discusses the figures on the proportion of people dependent on the government that is, those who would be below the poverty line were it not for government benefits. This measure, which Murray calls “latent poverty,” is perhaps the best indication of progress against poverty because it best reflects self-sufficiency, or lack thereof. Like official poverty, latent poverty as a percentage of population decreased steadily until the late sixties, from about 33% in 1950 to 19% in 1968. In 1968, however, the trend reversed; the proportion of Americans dependent on the government began to increase. With the exception of one dip after 1975, it has increased since, back to 23% in 1980. In short, despite doubled and redoubled outlays to try to do away with poverty, poverty is increasing in our country. We made much better progress when we were spending less. These sad results fit well what we might expect from the theoretical expectations mentioned above. Where there are incentives against self-sufficiency and productiveness, people will tend to become less self-sufficient and productive. The bigger the incentives, the stronger the tendencies. It should come as no surprise to see dependency increase when dependency is met with large cash and in-kind benefits. Perhaps these are not the reasons for the system’s failure; perhaps entirely different forces are at the base of it. None spring to mind, however. Quit this Business of Relief In any case, welfare, the dole, poor relief—call it what you will—is a spectacular failure.

### 1NC Liberty

#### Turn – Redistributive policies as espoused by the left crush prosperity and freedom for society as a whole – this outweighs the aff

Hall 11 [(Jon, analyst for American Thinker) “Inequality: It's a Good Thing” American Thinker, September 14, 2011] AT

So government not only legitimizes inequality; it institutionalizes it. And much of this institutionalized inequality makes sense; it's a nod to Jefferson's Laws of Nature. The left is not fixated on "equality before the law," the equality where everyone has the same rights and duties. The equality that obsesses the American political left isn't even addressed by our foundational documents. The equality that motivates the left is material equality -- i.e., the distribution of goods and services among the citizenry, and even the entire world. The left thinks it monstrous that there is an uneven distribution of wealth among people. The left wants to even up things through redistribution. This is why we are subjected to a never-ending rant about the growing inequality of incomes from the likes of Al Sharpton and other lefties who use inequality to stoke resentment. Orating on "social justice," Sharpton intones: "The dream was to make everything equal in everybody's house [video]." Never mind that the income gap is due to an unequal distribution of talent and ambition, or that the wealthy might work harder. For the left, the salient issue is that the wealthy have more stuff, and for the left, that's unfair, unequal, and must be rectified through "progressive" taxation. In his keynote at CPAC 2011, David Horowitz reminds us: As the Founders warned, there is an ineluctable conflict between Liberty and equality. You cannot make men equal without taking away their Freedom. [Applause.] The Founders devised a Constitution designed to thwart what they called "wicked schemes" to take wealth from one segment of the nation and distribute it to another. [Video and transcript.] The reason prosperity took hold in America is because of inequality. The great American businesses that have so enriched us all came about because of great concentrations of private wealth, not though government-engineered equality. All of us live richer lives precisely because of the unequal distribution of wealth.

#### Three implications

#### Impact defense to the aff – inequality isn’t harmful by itself, instead some inequality is justified if the alternative is redistributive policies

#### Turns the aff – it’s key to well-being of society as a whole – also it outweighs on scope because the entirety of society is affected

#### Liberty maximizes good consequences

Petro 74 — Sylvester Petro, Professor of Law at Wake Forest University, 1974 (“Civil Liberty, Syndicalism, and the NLRA,” Toledo Law Review (5 U. Tol. L. Rev. 447), Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via HeinOnline, p. 480)

However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway--"I believe in only one thing: liberty."107 And it is always well to bear in mind David Hume's observation: "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.

### 2NC Productivity

#### Extend Baetjer 84 – welfare rewards unproductivity and penalizes productivity by paying people if they are not employed and taxing people who are – more people will choose not to be productive. There are two results – first, it incentives people to stay in poverty, increasing the net amount of poverty. Second, since it disincentives productivity, the amount of production decreases – that causes poverty since prosperity depends on having goods to consume – less goods means there’s less to go around which causes more poverty.

#### AND – Empirics prove – welfare policies create a backwards system of incentives in which the poor lose money for becoming self-sufficient

DTG 12\* [(Discover the Networks, describes the networks and agendas of the political Left. Cites several authors: (Heritage Foundation scholar Michael Franc in “Keep That Pay Raise, I Can’t Afford It” National Review Aug 2012) (Rep. Geoff Davis R-Kentucky and Rep. Gwen Moore D-Wisconsin) “HOW THE WELFARE STATE HAS DEVASTATED AFRICAN AMERICANS” \*No date, 2012 is last date cited] AT

Just as welfare policies discourage marriage and the formation of stable families, they also discourage the development of a healthy work ethic. As Heritage Foundation scholar Michael Franc noted in 2012: “[T]he necessity of phasing out [welfare] benefits as incomes rise brings a serious moral hazard. In many cases, economists have calculated, welfare recipients who enter the work force or receive pay raises lose a dollar or more of benefits for each additional dollar they earn. The system makes fools of those who work hard.” In testimony on Capitol Hill, Rep. Geoff Davis (R-Kentucky) concurred that although federal welfare programs “are designed to alleviate poverty while promoting work,” collectively they have “an unintended side effect of discouraging harder work and higher earnings.” “The more benefits the government provides,” he said, “the stronger the disincentive to work.” Yet another Capitol Hill witness, Rep. Gwen Moore (D-Wisconsin)—herself a former welfare recipient—acknowledged in her oral testimony: “I once had a job and begged my supervisor not to give me a 50-cents-an-hour raise lest I lose Title 20 day care.” The same work disincentive came into play when Moore contemplated the health coverage she was receiving through Medicaid. “I would want to work if in fact I didn’t risk losing Medicaid,” she said.

#### AND – it outweighs the aff

#### Welfare doesn’t count as progress if people remain dependent on it

#### The whole point is to get people out of poverty, not to artificially sustain their lifestyles. The aff only furthers actual poverty and dependence on external aid

#### People dependent on government aid are just as poor as people in actual poverty – the reason poverty is bad is that it lowers the standard of living – those dependent on aid aren’t any better off

#### Dependence is still oppressive – the poor stay reliant on the dominant class, which marginalizes them just as much

#### The aff’s evidence won’t actually prove that it solves poverty since it doesn’t address the issue of dependency – only my evidence does. There is no comparison – their solvency claims misunderstand what it means to solve

#### Root cause – poverty is bad since it means people can’t get the things they need – decreasing productivity has the strongest link to that since less things are produced in the first place – that makes some scarcity inevitable, undermining the aff’s ability to solve

### 2N CV Links

#### CV increases welfare spending

Fowler 11 [(Anthony, Assistant Professor in the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago) “Report to the Committee on Australian Studies” Deakin-Royce Fellowship Department of Government, Harvard University August 4, 2011] AT

Several correlational observations suggest that low turnout tends to bias election results and public policy in the conservative direction. Across and within counties, socioeconomic differences in turnout correlate with support for right-wing parties (McAllister and Mughan 1986; Nagel 1988; Pacel and Radcliff 1995). Additionally, support for right-wing parties is negatively correlated with welfare spending and state intervention in the economy (Castles and McKinlay, 1979; Hicks and Swank, 1992). As turnout increases, liberal parties tend to gain power and policy tends to shift in a liberal direction. Chong and Olivera (2008) find that the enforcement of compulsory voting across countries is positively correlated with income equality. Peter Lindert (1994) addresses a similar question by testing the effects of franchise expansion in developed countries from 1880 to 1930. As more citizens became eligible to vote, social spending increased. In the U.S., however, there is little relationship over time between turnout and support for the Democratic or Republican parties (DeNardo 1980; Highton and Wolfinger 2001).

## Single Mothers Aid Bad

### 1NC

#### An expansion of welfare has destroyed the black family –creating a never ending cycle of crime, child abuse, racism, and poverty – best evidence proves this is the strongest internal link to minority disempowerment

READ BLUE AND GREEN FOR A RACE AFF

DTG 12\* [(Discover the Networks, describes the networks and agendas of the political Left. Cites several authors: (Alex Roberts and David Blankenhorn, founder of the Institute for American Values, in “The Other Marriage Penalty” - Center for Marriage and Families September 2006) (June O'Neill, Wollman Distinguished Professor Of Economics And Director Of The Center For The Study Of Business and Government, and Anne Hill, comparing children who were identical in terms of such social and economic factors as race, family structure, neighborhood, family income, and mothers' IQ and education) (Mary Corcoran and Roger Gordon of the University of Michigan) (quotes Hoover Institution senior fellow Thomas Sowell) (quotes and cites George Mason University professor Walter E. Williams in “A Minority View” AUGUST 12, 2009) (Cites Robert Rector, senior research fellow at The Heritage Foundation and expert on poverty issues in “Married Fathers: America’s Greatest Weapon Against Child Poverty” Heritage June 2010, and in “The Effects of Welfare Reform” Heritage, March 2001) (CDC’s National Vital Statistics Report in Nov 3, 2011)) “HOW THE WELFARE STATE HAS DEVASTATED AFRICAN AMERICANS” \*No date, 2012 is last date cited] AT

The most devastating by-product of the mushrooming welfare state was the corrosive effect it had (along with powerful cultural phenomena such as the feminist and Black Power movements) on American family life, particularly in the black community.â€¨ As provisions in welfare laws offered ever-increasing economic incentives for shunning marriage and avoiding the formation of two-parent families, illegitimacy rates rose dramatically. For the next few decades, means-tested welfare programs such as food stamps, public housing, Medicaid, day care, and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families penalized marriage. A mother generally received far more money from welfare if she was single rather than married. Once she took a husband, her benefits were instantly reduced by roughly 10 to 20 percent. As a Cato Institute study noted, welfare programs for the poor incentivize the very behaviors that are most likely to perpetuate poverty.[2] Another Cato report observes: “Of course women do not get pregnant just to get welfare benefits.... But, by removing the economic consequences of out-of-wedlock birth, welfare has removed a major incentive to avoid such pregnancies. A teenager looking around at her friends and neighbors is liable to see several who have given birth out-of- wedlock. When she sees that they have suffered few visible consequences ... she is less inclined to modify her own behavior to prevent pregnancy.... Current welfare policies seem to be designed with an appalling lack of concern for their impact on out-of-wedlock births. Indeed, Medicaid programs in 11 states actually provide infertility treatments to single women on welfare.” The marriage penalties that are embedded in welfare programs can be particularly severe if a woman on public assistance weds a man who is employed in a low-paying job. As a FamilyScholars.org report puts it: “When a couple's income nears the limits prescribed by Medicaid, a few extra dollars in income cause thousands of dollars in benefits to be lost. What all of this means is that the two most important routes out of poverty—marriage and work—are heavily taxed under the current U.S. system.”[3] The marriage penalties that are embedded in welfare programs can be particularly severe if a woman on public assistance weds a man who is employed in a low-paying job. As a FamilyScholars.org report puts it: “When a couple's income nears the limits prescribed by Medicaid, a few extra dollars in income cause thousands of dollars in benefits to be lost. What all of this means is that the two most important routes out of poverty—marriage and work—are heavily taxed under the current U.S. system.”[3] The aforementioned FamilyScholars.org report adds that “such a system encourages surreptitious cohabitation,” where “many low-income parents will cohabit without reporting it to the government so that their benefits won't be cut.” These couples “avoid marriage because marriage would result in a substantial loss of income for the family.” A 2011 study conducted jointly by the Institute for American Values’ Center for Marriage and Families and the University of Virginia's National Marriage Project suggests that “the rise of cohabiting households with children is the largest unrecognized threat to the quality and stability of children’s family lives.” The researchers conclude that cohabiting relationships are highly prone to instability, and that children in such homes are consequently less likely to thrive, more likely to be abused, and more prone to suffering “serious emotional problems.” William Galston, President Bill Clinton's Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, estimated that the welfare system, with its economic disincentives to marriage, was responsible for at least 15% to 20% of the family disintegration in the United States. Libertarian scholar Charles Murray has placed the figure at somewhere around 50%. By Murray's reckoning, the growth and increased liberalization of the “welfare complex” have eroded the traditional ethos of working-class communities that once held people who worked at low-wage jobs, and men who married the mothers of their children, in much higher esteem than unwed parents who became wards of the state. The phenomenon that Murray describes has been in clear evidence for decades. Consider, for instance, a Harlem-based initiative in the 1980s known as Project Redirection, whose aim was to persuade young women who had already borne one child out of wedlock to avoid repeating that mistake. According to the Manpower Development Research Corporation's evaluation report on this project: “[M]any [beneficiaries] were beginning to view getting their own welfare grants as the next stage in their careers.... [I]t became apparent that some participants' requests for separate grants and independent households were too often a sign of manipulation by boyfriends, in whose interest it was to have a girlfriend on welfare with an apartment of her own.” The results of welfare policies discouraging marriage and family were dramatic, as out-of-wedlock birthrates skyrocketed among all demographic groups in the U.S., but most notably African Americans. In the mid-1960s, the out-of-wedlock birth rate was scarcely 3% for whites, 7.7% for Americans overall, and 24.5% among blacks. By 1976, those figures had risen to nearly 10% for whites, 24.7% for Americans as a whole, and 50.3% for blacks in particular. In 1987, for the first time in the history of any American racial or ethnic group, the birth rate for unmarried black women surpassed that for married black women. Today the illegitimacy rates stand at 41% for the nation overall, and 73% for African Americans specifically.[4] Welfare not only increases illegitimacy and poverty in the short term, but it inflicts long-lasting, even permanent, handicaps on children who are raised in welfare-dependent homes. Dr. June O'Neill and Anne Hill, comparing children who were identical in terms of such social and economic factors as race, family structure, neighborhood, family income, and mothers' IQ and education, found that the more years a child spent on welfare, the lower the child's IQ. A similar study by Mary Corcoran and Roger Gordon of the University of Michigan concluded that the more welfare income a family received while a boy was growing up, the lower the boy's earnings as an adult. The devastating societal consequences of family breakdown cannot be overstated. Father-absent families—black and white alike—generally occupy the bottom rung of America's economic ladder. According to the U.S Census, in 2008 the poverty rate for single parents with children was 35.6%; the rate for married couples with children was 6.4%. For white families in particular, the corresponding two-parent and single-parent poverty rates were 21.7% and 3.1%; for Hispanics, the figures were 37.5% and 12.8%; and for blacks, 35.3% and 6.9%. According to Robert Rector, senior research fellow with the Heritage Foundation, “the absence of marriage increases the frequency of child poverty 700 percent” and thus constitutes the single most reliable predictor of a self-perpetuating underclass. Articulating a similar theme many years ago, Martin Luther King, Jr. said, “Nothing is so much needed as a secure family life for a people to pull themselves out of poverty.” Children in single-parent households are burdened not only with economic, but also profound social and psychological, disadvantages. As a Heritage Foundation analysis notes, youngsters raised by single parents, as compared to those who grow up in intact married homes, are more likely to be physically abused; to be treated for emotional and behavioral disorders; to smoke, drink, and use drugs; to perform poorly in school; to be suspended or expelled from school; to drop out of high school; to behave aggressively and violently; to be arrested for a juvenile crime; to serve jail time before age 30; and to go on to experience poverty as adults. According to the National Fatherhood Initiative, 60% of rapists, 72% of adolescent murderers, and 70% of long-term prison inmates are men who grew up in fatherless homes. With regard to girls in particular, those raised by single mothers are more than twice as likely to give birth out-of-wedlock, thereby perpetuating the cycle of poverty for yet another generation. The calamitous breakdown of the black family is a comparatively recent phenomenon, coinciding precisely with the rise of the welfare state. Throughout the epoch of slavery and into the early decades of the twentieth century, most black children grew up in two-parent households. Post-Civil War studies revealed that most black couples in their forties had been together for at least twenty years. In southern urban areas around 1880, nearly three-fourths of black households were husband-or father-present; in southern rural settings, the figure approached 86%. As of 1940, the illegitimacy rate among blacks nationwide was approximately 15%—scarcely one-fifth of the current figure.â€¨ As late as 1950, black women were more likely to be married than white women, and only 9% of black families with children were headed by a single parent. During the nine decades between the Emancipation Proclamation and the 1950s, the black family remained a strong, stable institution. Its cataclysmic destruction was subsequently set in motion by such policies as the anti-marriage incentives that are built into the welfare system have served only to exacerbate the problem. As George Mason University professor Walter E. Williams puts it: “The welfare state has done to black Americans what slavery couldn't do, what Jim Crow couldn't do, what the harshest racism couldn't do. And that is to destroy the black family.” Hoover Institution Fellow Thomas Sowell concurs: “The black family, which had survived centuries of slavery and discrimination, began rapidly disintegrating in the liberal welfare state that subsidized unwed pregnancy and changed welfare from an emergency rescue to a way of life.”

### 1NC Crime 🡪 Racism

#### This constitutes a racist system in which black populations are contained by poverty and crime, turning the aff

Wacquant 2000 [(Loic, Distinguished University Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at the New School for Social Research, Professor of Sociology at the University of California, and a Researcher at the Center for European Sociology in Paris. His interests comprise comparative urban marginality, the penal state, bodily crafts, social theory, and the politics of reason ) “The new ‘peculiar institution’: On the prison as surrogate ghetto” Theoretical Criminology 2000] AT

By the end of the 1970s, then, as the racial and class backlash against the democratic advances won by the social movements of the preceding decade got into full swing, the prison abruptly returned to the forefront of American society and offered itself as the universal and simplex solution to all manners of social problems. Chief among these problems was the ‘breakdown’ of social order in the ‘inner city,’ which is scholarly and policy euphemism for the patent incapacity of the dark ghetto to contain a dishonored and supernumerary population henceforth viewed not only as deviant and devious but as downright dangerous in light of the violent urban upheavals of the mid-1960s. As the walls of the ghetto shook and threatened to crumble, the walls of the prison were correspondingly extended, enlarged, and fortified, and ‘confinement of differentiation,’ aimed at keeping a group apart (the etymological meaning of segregare), gained primacy over ‘confinement of safety’ and ‘confinement of author- ity’—to use the distinction proposed by French sociologist Claude Faugeron (1995). Soon the black ghetto, converted into an instrument of naked exclusion by the concurrent retrenchment of wage labor and social protection, and further destabilized by the increasing penetration of the penal arm of the state, became bound to the jail and prison system by a triple relationship of functional equivalency, structural homology, and cultural syncretism, such that they now constitute a single carceral continuum which entraps a redundant population of younger black men (and increasingly women) who circulate in closed circuit between its two poles in a self-perpetuating cycle of social and legal marginality with devastating personal and social consequences.9

### General XT + Weighing

#### Extend DTG 12 – welfare policies create a self-perpetuating cycle of poverty by destroying the black family – by creating economic disincentives for marriage, welfare increases the number of out-of-wedlock childbirths – the result is children who are more likely to be arrested, abuse drugs, and be physically abused

#### The link is linear – the more welfare families receive, the more likely children are to experience poverty as adults – this answers all their evidence indicts

#### This outweighs the aff

#### Strongest cause – Extend that the evidence itself proves familial breakdown is the single most reliable predictor of a self-perpetuating underclass – that’s a quote from my evidence – this is also comparative to all other causes of poverty so it accounts for their evidence

#### Severity and Permanency – more welfare causes more poverty, and more poverty causes politicians to give more welfare since they think it’s a solution – poverty becomes more severe since it is constantly reinforced – also means it’s long lasting since it’s a vicious cycle.

#### Multiple mechanisms – there are many causes of poverty – the aff oversimplifies by assuming a single solution will solve even though it feeds crime, child abuse, social disadvantage, and drug abuse – these multiple causes combine to outweigh the aff

#### Route to the impacts – The reason poverty is bad is that it’s supposed to lower the standard of living by causing drug abuse, crime, child abuse, and locking children in the poverty as well – but since welfare causes these things directly it has a stronger link to the aff.

#### [race affs] 5. Comparatively stronger than other sources of disempowerment – even Jim Crow couldn’t destroy the black family – through welfare the system can finally create a self-perpetuating racist policy that not only appears to be color-blind but also appears to benefit minorities – it’s the most insidious form of racism

### XT Marriage Incentives

#### Welfare increases do cause the breakdown of families----

#### ----1. Consensus proves

#### The DTG evidence cites 15 different studies – all of them reach the same conclusion

#### It also proves that this finding has been reinforced consistently over the course of decades – studies that go the other way are outliers

#### Consensus is the strongest indicator of good evidence – high schoolers can’t do as good evidence comparison in 45 minutes than professional scholars do in years – you should default to the evidence comparison done by the scholars, which is characterized by consensus since scholars change their minds

#### ----2. Best explanation

#### The DTG evidence proves welfare causes marriage to reduce income by 20 percent – it makes sense why marriage rates would decline since there are strong reasons not to marry

#### Causality – out-of-wedlock childbirths skyrocketed occurred at almost the exact same time welfare reform was enacted – the chance it was just a coincidence is infinitesimal

### XT Crime 🡪 Poverty

#### The prison destroys the freedom of black men

Wacquant 2000 [(Loic, Distinguished University Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at the New School for Social Research, Professor of Sociology at the University of California, and a Researcher at the Center for European Sociology in Paris. His interests comprise comparative urban marginality, the penal state, bodily crafts, social theory, and the politics of reason) “The new ‘peculiar institution’: On the prison as surrogate ghetto” Theoretical Criminology 2000] AT

As the state pulls out the social safety net of welfare and urban subsidies to roll out the penal dragnet in and around the collapsing inner city, through the targeted policing and aggressive prosecution of street crime (especially low-level narcotics oﬁenses), the institutional kinship between ghetto and prison moves from system to life-world—and from the plane of sociological possibility to that of everyday reality. It becomes actualized in the personal experience and collective trajectory of the unskilled African-American males trapped at the bottom of the class and caste order, for whom incarceration, like chronic joblessness and poverty, becomes a banal event and a modal pathway through adulthood. Estimates of the lifetime risks of being sentenced to prison for black and white men at diﬁerent educational levels reveal that an astonishing 60 percent of African Americans born between 1965 and 1969 who did not complete high school had been convicted of a felony and had served time in a state penitentiary by 1999.35 This nationwide rate suggests that the vast majority of black men from the core of the ghetto pass through the prison at the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century.

### A2 They Voted for It

#### The incentive to vote comes from trickery and deception – the welfare system masks the way it harms the underclass, fooling them into thinking welfare is in their interest when it’s actually not

Edwards 13 [(James Richard, medical malpractice defense attorney, Bachelor’s degree from LSU in Psychology, University of Houston Law Center, advocate for federalism) “Liberalism against blacks: Welfare state destroying black America” The Washington Times July 21, 2013] AT

Liberals, though, refuse to acknowledge the failure of the welfare state, regardless of the empirical evidence, because if they did admit they are wrong, their entire world view must also be wrong. Liberals cloak themselves in moral superiority and focus entirely on the intentions of big government and the welfare system, rather than the results of programs or policies that they implement, even if these programs have detrimental effects on the same groups that they were intended to help! Also, politicians are concerned about getting votes, and it is apparent that black Americans are very concerned about the size and nature of government programs that are designed to help the poor and needy. Therefore, liberals, regardless of the fact that these programs hurt the poor and needy, perpetuate the myth that they actually help in order to keep the vote of the black community. Essentially, the black community and the black family have been devastated by the left’s twenty-first century plantation and no amount of disgraceful, divisive, and racist speeches by the current overseer, President Obama, will alter that.

## Poverty Impact

#### Poverty kills millions and outweighs nuclear war

Abu-Jamal 98 – Mumia Abu-Jamal, prominent social activist and author, quotes James Gilligan, American psychiatrist and author, director of mental health for the Massachusetts prison system, President of the International Association for Forensic Psychotherapy. (“A Quiet and Deadly Violence,” Al-Ahram Online Sept 19 1998, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/400/in5.htm> Accessed 7/10/13 AT)

We live, equally immersed, and to a deeper degree, in a nation that condones and ignores wide-ranging "structural' violence, of a kind that destroys human life with a breathtaking ruthlessness. Former Massachusetts prison official and writer, Dr. James Gilligan observes; By "structural violence" I mean the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstrably large proportion of them) are a function of the class structure; and that structure is itself a product of society's collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society. These are not acts of God. I am contrasting "structural" with "behavioral violence" by which I mean the non-natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on. --(Gilligan, J., MD, Violence: Reflections On a National Epidemic (New York: Vintage, 1996), 192.) This form of violence, not covered by any of the majoritarian, corporate, ruling-class protected media, is invisible to us and because of its invisibility, all the more insidious. How dangerous is it--really? Gilligan notes: [E]very fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths; and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world.

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# A2 Aff Advantages

## A2 Dems Solve Warming

### Compromise Turns

#### Turn – democrats alone pass less effective climate change legislation than a Congress with compromise

Gold 10 [(Danny, Partner with Access Venture Partners, an early-stage venture capital firm with offices in Colorado and Texas) “Election Does Not Spell Cleantech Doom” Renewable Energy World December 03] AT

With the recent "shellacking" (as President Obama referred to the election results) of the Democratically controlled Congress, much of the buzz in the cleantech space has been doom and gloom. Is cleantech doomed to a new dark age? I do not believe so. Energy policy is one area where there is an overlap of goals between the parties. Members of both parties largely agree that energy is critical to our economic and national security. And most Republicans do not dismiss out of hand the risks of global warming. I suspect that energy policy will be a topic where this Congress will get something done especially with the President’sincreased desire to work across party lines. It won’t be exactly what the president wants and it won’t be exactly what the Republicans want. It will be an old-fashion compromise that may actually result in some policies and that will have greater long-term impact on cleantech than most of the short-term handout programs that were put in place under the largely ineffective cleantech stimulus bill. So, where can the Democrats and Republicans potentially agree when it comes to cleantech? ¶ 1. Energy efficiency. Republicans and Democrats have demonstrated their ability to find common ground here. George Bush signed the law from a Democratic Congress that will end the life of the incandescent bulb and that increases the fuel efficiency standards for vehicles by 40% by 2020. Democrats like tax credits for installing energy efficiency improvements, and Republicans like reducing taxes. Reads like a match made in heaven.¶ 2. Renewable energy standards. Many states have put in place such standards with support of both parties. Some Republicans in Congress have previously voiced their support. If the definition of “renewable” were expanded to include nuclear as an acceptable alternative, I suspect there would be broad support in Congress. A renewable energy standard is exactly the kind of long-term macro-economic policy needed to drive change and create more sustainable demand for renewable energy and energy efficiency. Utilities putting big dollars into development of renewable energy power sources and energy efficiency will drive much more industry growth and relieve issues around debt financing to a much greater degree than the government’s ineffectual efforts to play banker. And if the definition of “renewable” were expanded to include nuclear, then I suspect the base of support would broaden even more. Given that most renewable energy sources can’t serve as base load, it would be the right environmental and national security move to include nuclear in the energy mix.¶ 3. R&D. Republicans have long been supporters of government R&D. Although there will be an issue around funding offsets for the R&D, I believe there will be broad consensus on the need to invest in our energy future. What will happen, I suspect, is that the focus of this R&D will shift more to early stage disruptive technologies rather than the late-stage grants and government loans which are already proving to be failures. Even the Administration has internally begun to question the effectiveness of these programs. If the scope of cleantech R&D is expanded to include clean coal technologies and next-generation nuclear, I believe the support base will broaden even more. The most effective way to ramp up disruptive R&D funding is likely through the new ARPA-E and possibly to the few federal labs that do not have their roots in our nuclear weapons programs (e.g. the National Renewable Energy Laboratory). By funding ARPA-E, most of the research would take place in our universities and private companies where the potential for real product development and technology transfer is much greater than in our defense oriented federal labs. The biggest challenge will be finding the funds given the need to reduce the deficit. One possible solution would be to take the funds already appropriated to later stage projects/loans that have yet to be awarded and redirect them to disruptive R&D. Another would be a 4. Gas Tax. Cap and trade is likely dead. And given that such a program would have been a largely ineffectual mess (see my previous post, Cap and Trade: Right Debate, Wrong Solution) that is not necessarily bad. As I pointed out, the area where there is the greatest overlap between environmental, national security and economic objectives is with gas/diesel, which most cap and trade proposals largely wouldn’t have touched. The co-chairs of President Obama’s bi-partisan tax commission recently included a gas tax as a piece of its budget solution and two key Senators (one Republican, one Democrat) recently recently wrote the commissionencouraging them to consider even bigger increases. A heftier tax phased in over time may be possible by using the concept of a “tax and dividend”, whereby a tax is levied to increase its price and much or all of the revenue is distributed back to consumers. If the money raised from this tax is largely given right back to the consumers in the form a rebate, then it’s not a tax increase but rather a tax incentive to reduce consumption of gasoline/diesel. Increasing the cost of gasoline/diesel to drive market demand for alternative fuels and energy efficient vehicles can help Republicans and Democrats achieve their desire of enhancing our national and economic security while reduc[e]ing carbon emissions.¶ 5. Government Procurement. The government is a large consumer of many items. One of the best ways to accelerate market adoption is by creating a market for the product/service. For example, the Federal government’s decision to require all new buildings to be LEED certified is accelerating a shift in the building industry to green buildings. The government purchases a large amount of energy for buildings, vehicles, airplanes and ships. Policies that drive increased purchases of domestic energy sources based on non-fossil fuels can provide a significant lift to multiple cleantech industries. The Department of Defense understands the critical nature of this issue, especially around liquid fuels. The Pentagon’s concern provides the nexus of an opportunity for collaboration between Democrats and Republicans on government procurement policies. ¶ Even if you believe we will see a stalemate in Washington on cleantech, the global macro-economic trends will not change. Consumption of fossil fuels is accelerating as the world, especially heavily populated China and India, dramatically increase the number of automobiles, power plants and factories. It is a certainty that the price of these commodities will, on average, increase over time. The next spike in oil prices, I suspect, won’t be too many years away and, worst case, whatever lull in cleantech enthusiasm that may occur will be quickly washed away.

### Climate Action Plan Turn

#### Democrats support the Climate Action Plan. The Republicans oppose the plan.

Halper 7/18 [(Evan, Staff Writer at LA Times) “Democrats Looking to Build Support for New Climate Change Action” LA Times July 18, 2013] KK

Boxer and fellow Democrats are hoping to build momentum on President Obama’s release of a “Climate Action Plan” last month. The plan is a series of executive actions the administration is taking to nudge the country toward increased use of renewable energy. Elements of the plan include: Permits for clean burning power plants are to be fast tracked, loans for alternative energy firms are to be made available, partnerships on fighting climate change will be launched with other countries, and so on. The plan has annoyed Republicans, who had planned to use Boxer’s hearing to grill the administration on the effort. However, Boxer limited witnesses to independent scientists and other outside experts. No administration officials were invited to give testimony.

#### CAP backfires and increases warming

Weis 13 [(Tom, President, Climate Crisis Solutions) “President Obama’s Climate Action Plan: Not Even Close” Huffington Post, August 13, 2013] KK

In June, after more than four years as president, President Obama finally proposed a climate action plan for America. True to form, the president gave an eloquent speech, with strong words for those still in denial about the severity of the crisis we face: "We don't have time for a meeting of the Flat Earth Society." Unfortunately for all of us, the blueprint he presented is more PR than plan, and has zero chance of stabilizing the climate. To the contrary, it promises even more climate chaos by promoting fracking, mountaintop removal coal mining, offshore and Arctic oil drilling and tar sands exploitation. It also threatens future generations with the specter of more radioactive nuclear power… The President is actually saying we will continue to publicly finance new coal plants overseas if developing countries really need it, or if they are willing to deploy cost-prohibitive and unproven "clean coal" technologies (which are set to receive up to $8 billion in loan guarantees domestically under his plan). But I want to be honest--this will not get us there overnight. It's going to take time for carbon emissions to stabilize. Real World Translation: The President is right to acknowledge that stabilizing carbon emissions will take time. What he fails to tell us, however, is his plan will never get us there. His plan comes nowhere near to stabilizing carbon emissions.

### Keystone Ad WIP

#### More evi.

Sivy, Michael, Chartered Financial Analyst and a former securities analyst for an independent stock research firm, “The Unlikely Green Alternative to the Keystone Pipeline? Railroads,” January 24, 2012.

(http://business.time.com/2012/01/24/railroads-the-unlikely-green-alternative-to-the-keystone-pipeline/#ixzz20KcXHwFA. JMC.) Accessed 7/11/12.

President Obama’s decision last week to kill the Keystone XL Pipeline that would carry oil from Canada to the U.S. was cheered by some environmental activists like Robert Redford. But many mainstream commentators reacted with dismay. A Washington Post editorial called the decision wrong on the substance of the question. And a columnist for the same newspaper described it more hyperbolically as “an act of national insanity.” The argument for the pipeline is not only that it would give the U.S. a secure source of oil with low transportation costs, create jobs and help our close ally Canada, but also that the alternative is actually worse from an environmental point of view. Canada is still going to produce its oil, and the U.S. is still going to need energy. Without the pipeline, Canada will have to try to sell some of its oil to China, which means building a pipeline to the Canadian West Coast. And we will buy more from the Middle East or somewhere else. The overall result: more oil shipped longer distances and greater chances of an oil spill

#### Canada isn’t waiting for the US --- will shift to China.

Madhani ’12, Aamer, National correspondent at Chicago Tribune, “Canada seeks alternative route for Keystone XL pipeline”, Jan. 9th, 2012.

(http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2012/01/obama-canada-alternative-route-keystone-xl/1#.T-MBgbWcATZ.)

While President Obama wants to delay a decision on the controversial Keystone XL pipeline until after the 2012 election, Canada's Prime Minister Stephen Harper is stepping up efforts to explore an alternative pipeline that would allow Canada to ship their tar sands oil to China. On Tuesday, an independent federal panel in Canada will begin its review of a proposed western pipeline that would carry the oil from Alberta to the coast of British Columbia. From British Columbia, the oil would be shipped on tankers to oil-hungry China. "I think it's essential, based on what's occurred with Keystone XL, that this country does diversify its energy-export markets," Harper said in a radio interview on Thursday, the Wall Street Journal reports.

## A2 GOP Sucks

#### Yes, the government shutdown was a debacle for the Republicans – but that’s exactly why they will reform – it crushes the credibility of hardcore Tea Partiers and forces the party to reform

#### And empirics prove – Republicans are revising their stance

Kondracke 10/8 [(Martin, political correspondent for Beltway Insiders) “When Will Grown-Ups Come to the Rescue of ‘Rigid’ GOP?” Roll Call, Oct 8 2013] AT

Faint glimmers are appearing that Republican grown-ups have decided to reclaim the schoolyard, but there’s a long way to go for the party to avoid long-term disaster. Even Speaker John A. Boehner’s defiant-sounding statements Sunday demanding concessions from President Barack Obama can be interpreted as an appeal for face-saving help from the president, giving him permission to rely on Democratic votes to reopen the government and temporarily lift the U.S. debt ceiling to avoid a catastrophic default on the national debt. Reportedly, other grown-ups — House Ways and Means Chairman Dave Camp, R-Mich., and Budget Chairman Paul D. Ryan, R-Wis. — are working on a GOP negotiating position that might lead to a “grand bargain” with President Barack Obama on entitlement and tax reform. Another good sign is that Senate Republicans, conservative activist Grover Norquist and the Wall Street Journal editorial page are criticizing Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, for causing the party to get major blame for closing down the federal government.

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# Random stuff

#### Democrat control of the House and Senate results in defense cuts

Herb 12 [(Jeremy, staff writer for the The Hill covering defense and national security. He has previously written for the Minneapolis Star Tribune, The New York Times) “Dem platform argues for some defense cuts” DefCon Hill 09/04/12] AT

The Democratic platform argues for the necessity of defense cuts enacted in the Budget Control Act, in one of the relatively few clear policy breaks with Republicans on defense issues. The Republican platform criticized President Obama for reducing the defense budget by $487 billion over the next decade, and for the potential of an additional $500 billion cut through sequestration. The GOP criticizes Obama for his willingness to cut the military in the face of growing threats, as part of a broader attack Republicans are leveling accusing the president of “leading from behind” on national defense issues. But the Democrats argue that in the current fiscal environment, tough budget decisions must be made, including with regard to the defense budget. The platform points out that both Democrats and Republicans supported the Budget Control Act that instituted the $487 billion cut to Pentagon spending. “The administration has worked with Congress to make these decisions, which has been a strategy-driven process,” the platform says. "As we look beyond the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — and the conclusion of long-term nation-building with large military footprints — we will be able to ensure our security with a more agile and more flexible force.” The Democratic platform does not mention sequestration — the $500 billion across-the-board cuts that would hit both defense and non-defense spending — while the Republicans devote a plank to it. The two platforms run along the same lines of the yearlong debate over defense spending, including attempts by both parties to blame the other for the looming sequester cuts. Democrats also included further reductions of the U.S. nuclear stockpile as a plank of the platform, which clashes with the Republican plank criticizing the New START treaty with Russia and the Obama administration for not modernizing its nuclear weapons. On foreign policy issues, Democrats said the GOP has a “Cold War mentality,” and accused Mitt Romney of not taking a clear position on the Afghan war. The Democrats also said the United States is "safer" now that Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda terrorists have been killed, a word that wasn't included in the GOP national security section.